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THE RHETORIC OF CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: A STUDY IN
C i m  WAR CAUSATION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Philosophers and statesmen across the Atlantic in i860 and l86l 
asked one another why twenty-five million intelligent Americans oonld not 
settle the condition of four million uneducated Africans without tearing 
one another's throats. Over one hundred years later Professor J, Jeffrey 
Auer, in his Preface to Anti-slaverv and Disunion. 1858-1861. asked: "Why 
did the Americans, trained in the democratic tradition of free speech and 
compromise, ultimately fail to talk out their differences?”^
The rejection of compromise in the ante helium struggle was 
reflected in the failure of the rhetoric of conciliation as a rational
12instrument in the "energizing of knowledge and the humanizing of truth.” 
The alternative was a bloody war resulting in over one million casualties 
and a total monetary cost well in excess of eight billion dollars.^
J^ohn Jeffrey Auer (ed.), Anti-slaverv and Disunion. 1858-1861 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. x.
T^his definition of rhetoric by Charles S. Baldwin is cited in 
Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 19^ 3), P. 70.
D^avid M. Pottor, "Why the Republicans Rejected both Compromise 
and Secession,” in The ^ ^ieis ^ f th^ ioojj—xooji, eo. vjeorge narmon
Knoles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), p. 105, 
points out that the war cost the life of one soldier, either Rebel or
2This dissertation will focus on the development of a theoretical 
approach to conflict and conflict resolution. An analytical model, re­
flecting current thought from several disciplines, will be applied in an 
historical analysis of the factors which brought on the American Civil 
War. This interaction of the theoretical with the historical is both 
deductive and inductive. This study performs a deductive function in 
that the basic principles of the eclectically-derived construct will 
be superimposed on the historical context. This dissertation follows 
an inductive pattern in that some of the insights gained from the his­
torical data modify or replace the theoretical concepts.
The deductive and inductive views of conflict, rhetoric, and 
compromise result in a more sophisticated theoretical approach on one 
hand and more accurate historical judgment and interpretation on the 
other. An approach to conflict and conflict resolution which has been 
developed theoretically and tested historically should prove to be a 
useful paradigm in the examination of other controversies.
Purposes of the Study
The intent of this dissertation, therefore, is two-fold. First, 
this study develops a theoretical construct dealing with the interaction 
of rhetoric and compromise within a conflict. The main objective is to 
determine at what point a controveri^ becomes so rigid that it is no 
longer amenable to some form of peaceful settlement. This approach, 
which views conpromise as a rhetorical activity, focuses on those factors
lank, for every six slaves who ware freed and for every ten white 
Scuthsrners who were held in the Union. This is not to say, however,
A C  4  4-l^a A A w f l  4  «%4» 4> V aw  w w i» w -b w i*  w M w  W A A A . ■*!ifcw w n w A  w  c&MOk* w  ÿ  c a w  w x x v  v x i o
implications of their decision to resort to arms.
3within the anatomy of a controversy which either make possible a settlement 
or deepen the confrontation into an "irrepressible conflict.” The analytical 
model will be described in Chapters II and HI.
Second, the theoretical construct will be applied, in the form of 
a case=study, to the pre-Civil War controversy in general and to the presi­
dential campaign and election of i860 in particular.
The ante bellum controversy, which has been described by Devote as
"the crux of our history,"  ^has been selected as a testing-ground for the
theoretical approach. Three factors motivated this choice. First, maqy of
the issues which caused the disruption of the Union are just an meaningful
and important now as they were then. Although the contemporary attitudes
do not activate the same degree of intensity as they did in I860, they
are still vital to many Americans of this century. The importance of the
issues discussed in the sectional conflict has been underlined by EllHns
in his study of the problem of slavery.
It can hardly be doubted that the estrangement of North and South 
over slavery, and the consequences of it, offer us what is potent­
ially the most distinguished subject in our history. That it 
might have ended otherwise is a shadowy possibility that will 
trouble our minds forever. That there may have been alternatives—  
that choices were at least conceiva]?le— makes it a subject not quite 
foreordained and fatal, but tragic."
Second, the student of the prologue to the war is able to observe 
the development and interaction of various shades of attitudes as the 
conflict emerges and intensifies. The critic, then, is in a position to 
study both the rise and fall of ideas and movements related to the
B^ernard Devoto, "Slavery and the Civil War," Slavery as a Cause 
of the Civil War, ed, Edwin C, Rozwenc (Boston: D, C. Heath and Co.,
1 9 W 7  p. 99.
2 _
Stanley K, Elkins, Slavery; A Problem in American institutional
and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959)*
p. 194,
k -
sectional confrontation.
Third, the various forms of behavior stimulated by the attitudes 
of that generation can be examined hy the modem critic because of the 
availability of research materials, both primary and secondary, dealing 
with that period in American history. For these reasons, then, the 
theoretical model will be applied to the general area of the causes of 
the American Civil War.
The campaign and election of i860 will be the specific focus of 
this historical study; both of which were highly significant events 
along the path that led to war. First, the importance of the campaign 
was reflected in the nature of the issues discussed and the degree to 
which they captivated the thoughts and emotions of the voters. Smith 
claimed that the campaign "became a contest over principles in i860, 
not one of personalities as it was in 1828, 1840, and 1856."^
The extent of the nation's involvement in these issues was noted by 
Fite.
The whole history of the country and its social, legal and govern­
mental institutions, %ere searched for proof and refutation; con= 
temporary society, manners, and customs were rigorously held up to 
view, analyzed,^and judged. Rarely has the nation taken a broader 
view of itself.*^
For the first time in the histozy of the slavery controversy the 
clearly-defined issue was placed before the voters in a national election. 
For decwies the slavery issue had been temporarily resolved within the 
halls of deliberative bodies. In i860 the question was put to the people
William Ernest amith. The Francis Preston Blair Family in 
Politics (New York: The Macmillan Cospany, 1933)? I, 503.
^Emerson David Fits, The PMsidential Campaign of i860 (New 
York; The Macmillan Company, 1911A  P. %i.
5for a verdict. Fish and Smith point out that
it is doubtful that ths Aasrican people, unless possibly in l89o, 
ever partisipatsd in a sa^aign more enlightening than that of 
I860, It was a cançaign built on six years of constant debate, 
preceded by another six during which points of view had been 
sha^ned. If ever the people were prepared to speak it was in 
November, i860.
The nature of the issues and the degree of their penetration into
the social structure of that period made the I860 caaçaign a momentous
event in the history of this nation. The editor of the Daily Missouri
Democratic was correct when he predicted in July of that year that "wo
have entered upon a caiqpaign that will be memorable in the annals of 
2
^erican politics,"
Second, the results of the i860 presidential election intensified 
the cleavage between the North and the South, The role of Lincoln's 
election in the coming of the war has been described by several historical 
critics, Lipset argued that "the election of i860 stands out decisively 
as the presidential election which most affected Merlcan life. Its 
controversies culminated in the Civil War," Knox suggested that "the 
election of Abraham Lincoln in Kcvsabsr of i860 set into action the 
secession which the South for many years had threatened.," Fehranbaehar
*Carl Russell Fish and William Ernest Smith, The American Civil 
War (New York: Longmans, Green and Co,, 1937)» p. 26.
D^ailv Missouri Democratic. July 30, I860.
S^eymour Martin Lipset, Political Man; The Social Bases of 
Politics (Garden City. New York; Doubledey & Gonçany, Inc., 196^,
p. 345,
*^Cliston Svsrett Knox, "The PosHibilities of Cqnpromise in the 
Senate Coisflittee of Thirteen and the Responsibility of Failure,"
Journal of Negro History. XVII (October, 1932), 437,
asserted that "whatever disagreement there may be about the underlying
causes of the Civil War, it is clear that the conflict was precipitated
in I86O-6I by a series of momentous decisions which began with the
election of a Republican president,"^ Finally, Luthin, in his study of the
first Lincoln victory, reached the conclusion that
many of the students of the period are agreed that without Lincoln's 
victoiy in November, i860, war between the sections would not have 
been precipitated in the following April, if indeed this greatest 
of American tragedies would have occurred at all.
Both the campaign and the election, consequently, contributed to 
the intensification of the sectional conflict which led to the firing on 
Sumter. In this regard James, who described the i860 campaign and 
election in Illinois, claimed that "the cançaign and election of i860 was 
one of the most crucial events in the history of the United States. It 
was the last contest of speech and editorial preceding the battle of 
blood and lead."^  The application of the theoretical construct to the 
historical context of the ante bellum controversy will be developed in 
Chapters IV, V, and VI.
This study, then, proposes (1) to construct an analytical model 
dealing with the interaction of rhetoric and compromise within a conflict, 
and (2) to apply that construct in an analysis of the factors which culminated 
in the most costly war this nation has ever known.
D^on E, Fehrenbacher, "The Republican Decision at Chicago," in 
Politics and the Crisis of i860, ed. Normun A. Graebner (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, I96I), p. 32.
2
Reinhard H. Luthin, The First Lincoln Campaign (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 19#), p. vii.
%arold Preston James, "Lincoln's Own State in the Election of 
i860" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of History, University 
of Illinois, 1943), p. viii.
7Approaches to the Study 
Iri âpplyirig the dictum of Kenneth Burke that the critic should 
use "all that is there to use" in the act of criticism,^  this study will 
approach the investigation of conflict arei compromise from the distinctive 
yet interdependent viewpoints of rhetoric, history, political science, 
and the behavioral sciences. The intent, here, will be to integrate 
these four fields of study in light of their interdisciplinary, interactive, 
and perceptive characteristics.
Interdisciplinary Approach 
Some of the most productive types of critical research and writing 
are interdisciplinary in their approach. The general interrelationship 
of these four disciplines appears in the following six ratios.
History and the Behavioral Sciences
History and the behavioral sciences interact in two directions.
First, the descriptions of human behavior which have arisen from 
quantitative research within the behavioral sciences serve to assist in 
the unraveling of the complex problems of historical interpretation. Nevins 
contends that
history, over the long period since Hume and Voltaire, has become 
steadily more useful to people as it has broadened its scope, and 
gained an eclectic use of new tools. It has learned to take all 
possible profit from the other social studies— statistics, sociology, 
economics, psychology, geography— in presenting a complete and exact 
picture of the past.^
^Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Baton Rouge : 
Louisiana State university Press, 194-1 ;, p. 23.
^Allan Nevins, The Gateway to History (Garden City: Anchor
Books, 1962), p. 31.
The same idea has been expressed by Sellers as he contends that "the 
infant discipline of social psychology" can lui'nish Lhe historian with 
useful concepts.
Historians of the Old South have a special reason for pressing 
their problems on their brethren in social psychology, while the 
social psychologists may find in historical data a challenging area 
for developing and testing hypotheses. Especially rewarding to 
both historians and social scientists would be a collaborative 
study of ante —bellum southern radicalism and its peculiar locus, 
South Carolina.1
Modern historians have not hesitated to view ante bellum behavior 
from the vantage point of the behavioral sciences. For exançle, Maiy 
Scrugham's The Peaceable Americans of 1860-1861; A Study in Public 
Opinion has been described by Pressly as "the first important statement 
in the twentieth century by a historian reflecting the distinctive 
outlook which was to characterize the 'revisionist' approach."  ^ In 
her study Scrugham ençloyed "psychological explanations" of events ard 
quoted heavily from such books as Human Nature in Politics by Graham 
Wallas, The Crowd by Gustave Le Bon, Social Psychology by William 
McDougall, and Educational Psychology by Edward Thorndike.
Information and insights derived from a study of present human 
behavior may, consequently, contribute to a study of past human behavior. 
The behavioral scientists, then, may assist the historian in recreating 
and understanding the past.
Second, the study of past human behavior may help explain the 
nature of present human behavior. Just as scientific research assists
C^harles Grier Sellers (ed.), The Southerner as American (Chapel 
Hills University of North Carolina Press, I960), p. 68.
2m'Thomas J. Pressly, Americans Interpret Their Civil War (New 
York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 292.
9in the solution of historical complexities, historical research contributes 
to a better understanding of coritenqjorary problems. Holsti and North 
suggest, in the context of "game theory," that the exploration of past 
wars and conflicts can materially aid the student of current and future 
events.1 They base their claim on two factors. First, the historical 
critic has more data with which to work than the contençorary critic since 
more documents and papers are available. Second, the critic can, in the 
language of Holsti and North, "enjoy the advantages of an algebra book 
with the answers in the back. He can compare in minutest detail what 
statesmen have said with what they have actually done— and determine what 
perceptions have shaped their decisions."^
The student of modern conflicts and controversies will profit from 
a careful examination of past conflicts and controversies as he is able to 
observe the kinds of choices that were made with their corresponding 
results.
The relationships between the historical and scientific studies of 
human behavior are, as a result, conçlementary and interdependent. The 
social psychologist "may find in historical data a challenging area for 
developing and testing hypotheses"} the historian may profit from the 
"other social studies" in presenting a "complete ard exact picture of the 
past."
^le R, Holsti and Robert C. North, "The History of Human Conflict," 
in The Nature of Human Conflict, ed, Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 196$), pp. 155-71. For a description 
of "game theory" see Anatol Rapoport, "Game Theory and Human Conflict,"
in The Nature of Human Conflict, pp. 196-226.
2
Holsti and North, pp. 155-56. Their own study focuses on the
weeks just prior to the outbreak of war in 1914. They contend that
"embedded in archival data lies something close to a prototype of crisis 
against which a contenç)orary crisis==or future crisis— can be measured."
10
History and Political Science
The integration of history and political science occurs on several 
dimensions. The historian is interested in the history of political 
movements; the political scientist is interested in the politics of 
historical movements. The historian studies past elections in order to 
understand the past. The political scientist studies past elections in 
order to understand the present and, hopefully, predict the future. This 
relationship has been stated succinctly by what Lane calls "Seeley's 
rhyme. "
History without political science has no fruit:
Political science without history has no root.l
The sharing of data and interpretations by the historian and 
political scientist aids substantially the development of both disciplines 
as they seek to understand the nature of man as a political animal.
Political Science and the Behavioral Sciences
The relative merits of the traditional as opposed to the behavioral
approach to the study of politics is a controversial subject within the
discipline of political science. Saveth described the behavioral approach
in the following statement.
Emphasis upon the concept as a nuclear and interdisciplinary factor 
in social science analysis is suggestive of the behavioralist trend
in social science, and, particularly, in political science. This
theory stresses the role of certain hard core disciplines— psychology, 
sociology, and anthropology— in the explanation of political behavior. 
Transcending these disciplines are concepts such as voting behavior, 
decision-making, and those associated with psychology and psychoanaly­
sis, which are used to explain past and current political bphavior.^
“Cited in Robert E. Lane, "Political Science and Psychology," in 
Psychology: A Study of a Science. ed. Sigmund Koch, Vol. VI of Inyesti-
gation of Man as Socius: Their Place in Psychology and the Social
Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 587,
E^dward N. Saveth (ed.), American History and the Social
11
Kirkpatrick contends that the controversy between the two points of view
is needless for they are not, as he says, "nnitually exclusive."^  Las.swell
defended the importance of the behavioral view when he wrote;
If archaeology, history, and anthropology have provided a corrected 
map of the past of organized politics, we must credit social 
psychology with helping to explain the mechanism whereby interacting 
individuals achieve both culture and individuality. It is 
unthinkable that any center of political science would cut itself 
off from these disciplines,^
An understanding of human behavior can assist the political
scientist in exploring the conplexlties of political behavior. Since
the scientific approach can add to our knowledge of the nature of
human behavior, then the political scientist has much to learn from the
behavioral scientist.
Rhetoric and the Behavioral Sciences
Rhetoric, defined as "the function of adjusting ideas to 
people and people to ideas,"3 has always relied on the theories of human 
behavior which were accepted in each generation. Maccoby observed that
Sciences (New Yorks The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 17. For the 
opposite point of view see James C. Charlesworth (ed.), The Limits of 
Behavlorfdism in Political Science (Philadelphia: The American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 1962).
E^vron M. Kirkpatrick, "Ths Impact of ths Behavioral Approach on 
Traditional Political Science," in Essays on the Behavioral Study of 
Politics, ed, Austin Ranney (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1962), p. 27.
Harold D. Lasswell, The Future of Political Science (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1963), p. 22^ .'"
%onald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric; Its Functions and Its Scope," in 
Philosophy. Rhetoric and Argumentation. ed. Maurice Natanson and Henry 
V7. Johnstone, Jr. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1965) p. 47. In this sense "rhetoric" is not to be thought of as 
"mere verbiage" but has a much broader definition. See Hoyt Hudson, "The 
Field of Rhetoric," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians. sd. 
Ra3rmond F. Ho^ res (New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 3-15.
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"for both jpiato and Aristotl^ the approach to rhetoric was through
pâÿchology--to them the science of the mind,"^ Brockriede contended that
the "essence of the Aristotelian study of rhetoric is not the system of
finding the available means of persuasion; rather, it is the empirical
description of rhetorical situations and the philosophical construction
of an appropriate system of principles."^  Bryant added that such an
"empirical description of rhetorical situations" should be influenced by
the behavioral sciences.
It is a commonplace that of the studies recently come to new and 
promising maturity, psychology, especially social psychology, aiKi 
cultural antropology have much to teach modem Aetorio and to 
correct and reinterpret in traditional rhetoric.^
In his discussion of the interaction between the traditional and 
experimental viewpoints of rhetoric, Thonpson asserted that the "experimen­
talists are a potential source of material for a new rhetoric."^ Both 
viewpoints, the traditional and the scientific, may contribute to the 
formation of a theory of rhetoidic which reflects rhetorical situations 
in the twentieth century. Current research in the behavioral sciences, 
consequently, provides the empirical descriptions of human behavior 
necessary for the formulation of a conteiroorary theory of rhetoric,
“Nathan Maccoby, "The Hew 'Scientific* Rhetoric," in The Science 
of Human Communication, ed. Wilbur Schramm (New York: Basic Books Inc.,
196377?."^:
W^ayne E. Brockriede, "Toward a Contenporary Aristotelian Theory 
of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech. LII (February, 1966), 34.
Bryant, p. 50.
Il
?/ayns H. Thonpson, "A Conservative View of a Progressive Rlietoric," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech. XLK (February, 1963), 3. For a defense 
of the traditional view of rhetoric see Otis M. Walter, "On Views of 
Rhetoric, Whether Conservative or Progressive," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech. XL.IX (December, 1963), 374.
13
Rhetoric and History
The alliance between rhetoric and history, which was firmly
entrenched in Classical thought, is just as meaningful in the twentieth
century. This alliance was described by Auer when he wrote the following
paragraph in the Preface to Anti-slavery and Disunion. 1858-1861.
Historical studies must, of necessity, investigate rhetoric, 
identify persuasive appeals, and examine the causative factors 
influencing men's minds, impelling them to act in one way or 
another. Historical events do not take place in a vacuum; a 
people's behavior develops from their reactions ard adjustments 
to the forces playing upon them.^
Not only will an understanding of rhetorical theory and practice
aid the historian, but an analysis of various historical movements will
add to the knowledge of the rhetorician. Baird wrote:
Nothing is more illuminating to the student of speeches than to 
trace, through the debates and orations of the 1850s and l860s, 
the disintegration of discussion, the split in the Democratic 
Party, the secession, and the resort to war.^
The student of rhetoric views rhetorical transactions against the
background and within the framework of Mstorical processes; the
historian views the various dimensions of rhetorical interaction as
essential parts of the rise and fall of historical movements. Rhetoric
and history, consequently, share a close interdependency.
Rhetoric ard Political Science
Both rhetoric and political science are interested in the means 
of social influence. They jointly concern themselves with the character­
istics of effective communication and persuasion within and between
A^uer, p. X.
A^. Craig Baird, American Public Addresses. 1740-1952 (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 195bj, p. 6.
14
political organizations and movements, A student of rhetoric should 
explore the nature of political theory and practice in order to under­
stand the rhetorical transaction; the political scientist should become 
familiar with the nature of rhetorical theory and practice in order to 
comprehend the full implications of the political transaction.
The fields of history, political science, rhetoric, and the 
behavioral sciences are, consequently, interrelated and interdependent.
The student of human behavior both past and present should avail himself 
of the information and insights to be found in these related disciplines. 
This study is eclectic, then, in the sense that it follows the advice of 
Kenneth Burke in seeking to "use all that is there to use."
Interactive Approach 
In addition to their interdisciplinary relationships, these 
four disciplines share an interactive nature. All four stress the 
interaction of elements within the situation or chronological period to 
be studied.
Interaction in History
The historian endeavors to view the interaction of ideas, individuals, 
and events >rithin the historical drama. This concern for an interactive 
approach to the study of history is reflected in the nature of historical 
causation. Bestor contends that "the fundamental historical problem, in 
short, is not to measure the relative weight of various causal elements, 
but instead to discover the pattern of their interaction with one another."^
A^rthur Bestor, "The American Civil War as a Constitutional 
Crisis," American Historical Review. XLTX! (Jan'-iary, 1964), 339.
15
Stpout observed that "the historien conventionally speaks of 'multiple
causes' because he knows he has no monistic formula to ejqplain the
course of history and no single generalization to cover all the necessary
and sufficient conditions for a civil war."^ Silbey rejected what he calls
the "single-factor explanations for human behavior" in favor of an approach
which considers all the "political stimuli" operating upon an individual
or groups at a given time.'^  Finally, Nevins suggested that
since in nine instances out of ten, any important historical 
transaction should be treated as of multiple causation, its 
roots as numerous and far-ramifying as its consequences, the 
office of the historian is not to select one or two eaqplanations, 
excluding or minimizing all others, but to ascertain all the 
factors and assign each its proportionate weight.3
This study of the influences which led to the American Civil War 
will be based on the concept of multiple causation.^ The investigation 
of any war, for that matter, must consider the interaction of the various 
components within a historical situation. The role of the Mstorian, then, 
is to attempt to balance the interacting causes instead of isolating a 
"single-factor e^ qplanation. "
Ints?âôtiOii_^Jî__thô_Beh^io£âl_&giôxiçô^
Considerable interest exists in the interaotive approaeh to human
C^ushing Strout, "Causality," in American History and Social 
Sciences, p. 510.
J^oel H. Silbey, "The Civil War Synthesis in American Political 
History," Civil War History. X (June, 1964), 140.
■lievins, p. 247.
or a list of the explanations which have been given to the cans;
of the Civil War see David Donald, "Excess of Democracy: The American
Civil War and the Social Process," Centennial Review. V (Winter, 1961) 
22.
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behavior in the behavioral sciences, especially in social psychology. In
rejecting the one-wair \riew of traditional psychology or sociology, social
psychologists focus on the interaction of the individual with his social
situation, Sherif and Sherif wrote;
In short, we can achieve a balanced understanding of relationships 
among influences coining from individuals and from social environments 
if we avoid a stand that glorifies the individual and a stand that 
glorifies culture, By viewing experience and behavior as joint 
products of influences coming both from within him and from groups 
and the culture surrounding him, we can approach our study of social 
psychology prepared to note the interplay of both sets of influences 
in shaping any particular experience and behavior.^
The current trend in social psychology is to view human behavior 
within the context of the "interplay" of external and internal stimuli 
which influence an individual. The theoretical construct developed in 
this dissertation will rely, in large part, on the interactive nature of 
attitudes and group formation and modification.
Interaction in Rhetoric
Rhetoric is an interactive transaction. When Thonssen and Baird 
published their conprehensive treatment of rhetorical criticism in 1948, 
they expressed a need for "a set of principles which will bind the many 
concepts together."^  One of the concepts they used to represent their 
view of the rhetorical process was "interaction." They observed that 
judicial criticism "reconstructs a speech situation carefully in the
O
light of the interaction of speaker, audience, subject and occasion."
M^uzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, ^  Outline of Social 
Psychology (New York; Harper & Row, Publishers, 1956), p. 8.
2_
Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird. Speech Criticism (New 
York: Ronald Press, 1948), p. 465.
<fbid.. p. 18.
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Marie Hochrmith ^ichol^ proposed that the totality of rhetoric
should be seen as an ’’organism." Rhetoric, she suggested, must be
concerned with every aspect of the situation.
If we do not press the analogy too far, we may compare the speech 
with a multi-celled organism, whose units consist of speaker, audience, 
place, purpose, time and form. In order to evaluate the speech, all 
these elements, verbal and nonverbal, must be examined.^
The parts of the organism cannot be studied individually but must be
evaluated as a functioning unit with a matrix of relationships. The
rhetorical transaction involves the interaction of multiple factors which,
in combination, determine the final outcome of the rhetorical appeal.
Kenneth Burke uses the analogy of the drama in demonstrating
the interactive nature of rhetoric. Just as a drama is created the
interaction of act, agent, agenpy, scene, and purpose, the rhetorical
transaction is created by the interaction of speech, speaker, method,
2
occasion, and intent.
Thonssen, Baird, Nichols, and Burke have emphasized the relation­
ship among the elements in a rhetorical situation and look for "the set 
of principles which will bind the many concepts together," Brockriede 
summarized the current view of rhetoric when he observed that "central to 
the rhetorical function is the notion of purposeful interaction between 
speaker and audience,"^
^arie Hochmuth (Mohol'0 , "The Criticism of Rhetoric," in A 
Hstorv and Criticism of American Public Address, Ed. Marie K. Hochmuth 
Qlichol^ (New York: Longman's Green and Company, 1955), III, 9.
S^ee Virginia L. Holland, "Kenneth Burke’s Dramatistic Approach 
to Speech Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Soeech, XLI (December. 1944^ . 
352-58.
B^rockriede, 39.
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Interaction in Political Science
A political scientist, in his study of individuals and groups 
within society, views political interaction on the ideational and inter­
personal dimensions. A student of political theory is interested in the 
interaction of ideas and concepts in a dialectical sense. One need not 
accept the full inçlications of the Marxist-Hegelian form of dialectical 
materialism to interpret the ideational interaction of thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis within the political dimension.
Furthermore, political scientists explore in depth the inpact of 
interpersonal relations in the quest for political power and influence.
The interaction of candidate with party is matched along side the interac­
tion of candidate with voter. In short, the study of politics requires an 
analysis of the interaction of ideas and individuals as they confront each 
other within the political context.
The interdisciplinary fields of history, rhetoric, political 
science, and the behavioral sciences share a reliance on the process of 
interaction. The critic who works within or among these disciplines should 
examine the interplay of the basic and multiple factors which influence 
human behavior.
Perceptive Approach 
The thii"d approach to a study of conflict and conflict resolution 
employed in this dissertation is based on the notion of perception. The 
perceptive approach to human behavior suggests that ideas, events, and people 
are not perceived in the same way by any two individuals. Instead, each 
individual brings with him his own evaluative categories or "pictures in 
the head" which determine the way he will perceive a stimulus. Historians,
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political scientists, rhetoricians, and behavioral scientists all deal, 
in one fora or another, with the phenomenon of perception.
Perception in History
The historian views an event, idea, or movement through the
©yes of the participants involved. Jaffa claimed that the historian
most first "see the past as it appeared in the past and not only in the
light of the opinions of a later and different a g e , I n  discussing the
role of the student of history. Potter contends that
the supreme task of the historian, and the one of most superlative 
difficulty, is to see the past through the iaçerfect eyes of those 
who lived it and not with his own omniscient twenty-twenty vision.
I am not suggesting that any one of us can really do this, but only 
that it is idiat we must attempt.%
In other words, the historian must be cautious to avoid supertuços-
ing the values and mores of his own generation on a different generation.
The student of history strives to "see the past as it appeared in the
past" and eimteavors to avoid the tendency to judge the past by the
standards of the present.
Perception in Political Science
V/altsr Lippman, in his study of Public Opinion, described what he 
called the "triangular relationship between the scene of action, the 
human picture of that scene, and the human response to that picture 
working itself out upon the scene of action."3 Lippman contended that man
^Harry V, Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (New York: Doubleday
& Co., Inc., 1959), p. 28.
hotter, pp. 92-3.
W^alter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Conçjany,
1932), p. 17.
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does not live in the real environnent but, instead, exists in the 
"pseudo-environment" of his own perceptions.
A graphic example of the nature of perception in political science 
is in the area of voting behavior. Bone and Ranney use the term "cognitive 
map" to represent the picture carried in the mind of an individual which 
he utilizes in his assessment of political ideas and candidates,^
Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee, in their classic jstudies of voting 
behavior, made two observations about political perception.^ First, they 
distinguish between the "objective campaign" that is carried on in the 
"real" world and the "perceived campaign" that exists in the voter's mind. 
There are, then, two canç>aigns— one real and the other perceived. Second, 
these political scientists discuss the effect of perception on political 
judgment. They contend that perception in response to political canç>aigns 
operates to maximize agreement with one's own party and maximize the 
amount of disagreement with the opposition party.
The nature of perception within the political process, therefore, 
makes it essential that the political observer attempt to see the issues 
and candidates through the eyes of the participants within the political 
transaction.
Perception in Rhetoric
The rhetorician is interested in perception as a way of viewing 
the interaction between speaker and audience. First, the audience's per­
ception of the source and message fundamentally shapes the reaction that
“Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney, Politics and Voters (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., I963). p. 15-
B^ernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfeld and William N. McPhee, 
Voting; A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1954), pT 231.
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will result. Auditors judge a communication on the basis of what they 
perceive; they perceive through the filter of their cognitive structures.
The critic, then, should raise the question: "How did the audience per­
ceive the speaker and his message?"
Second, the speaker perceives the audience through his cognitive 
stiructure. The rhetorical choices he makes are based on the way he 
perceives his audience or audiences. His rhetorical failure may be caused 
by his distorted perceptions of the auditors. The rhetorical critic should 
attenç)t to discover how the speaker did perceive the audience in a partic­
ular rhetorical situation and how his perceptions influenced his 
performance.
The effective rhetorician, then, must be sensitive to the po­
tential effects of perception and must endeavor to account for them in 
his study of the rhetorical transaction.
Perception in the Behavioral Sciences
The significance of perception to the behavioral sciences, especially 
social psychology, is too involved and complex to be discussed in this 
chapter. In contrast to both faculty psychology and behaviorism, percep­
tion rejects a straight stiraulus-response linkage. Harley maintains, in 
his study of perception, that "perception does not copy anything. Perceived 
objects are not existent entities in the outside world that have the 
visual, tactual, thermal, and solidity characteristics which we experience 
in thera."^
A detailed discussion of the nature of psrcsption will appear 
in Chapter II of this dissertation. Perception-judgment, along with ego-
S^. Howard Bartley, Principles of Perception (New York: Harper <&
Brothers, 1958)* p. 22.
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involvement underpin the attitude and attitude change construct used in 
this study as the basis for the formulation of a theory of rhetoric and 
compromise.
The effective analysis of human behavior requires that the 
theoretician, critic, and practitioner understand the nature and impact 
of perception on experience and behavior. The historian endeavors to see 
the past as it was seen; the political scientists hopes to explore the 
perceptions of the political world within individual and group "cognitive 
maps"; the rhetorician seeks to probe into the perceptions that speaker 
and audience have of each other; the social psychologist strives to 
determine how individuals are perceiving the diverse stimuli within 
their social situations.
This dissertation has approached an analysis of conflict and 
conflict resolution from the related disciplines of history, political 
science, rhetoric, and the behavioral sciences. These four viewpoints, 
which are indisciplinary in natuie, share an interest in both interaction 
and perception. This study, in drawing from all four disciplines, hopes 
to weld the information and insights derived from these disciplines into 
a comprehensive statement of conflict and compromise.
Sources of Material
Because of the dualistic nature of this dissertation, two types 
of sources have been used. The theoretical model, developed in Chapters 
II and III, is based primarily on the scientific method of research. The 
historical application of the anal^ rtical model, found in Chapters VI, V, 
and VI, depends on the historical method of research.
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Sources for the Theoretical Formulation
The material used in the construction of the analytical modal of 
conflict and conflict resolution comes from several sources. First, most 
of the information used in the development of the construct comes from the 
work of behavioral scientists, especially in the areas of attitudes 
and groups. The adaptation of the scientific method of research to 
these areas has provided some useful findings for a theoretical 
statement of human behavior in conflict situations. Of special interest 
in this study have been a series of attitude experiments related to the 
social judgment-involvement approach.  ^ This approach is based on experimen­
tation which seeks to determine the influence of ego-involved attitudes on 
the social judgment of controversial issues.
Second, studies of voting behavior from the province of political 
science are used in this dissertation. The work of such political 
scientists as Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee has made an effective 
contribution to understanding political influence. The voting behavior 
studies, based primarily on extensive inteinriewing during and after 
political campaigns, coiroborate the results produced in the social 
judgment studios.
Third, the theory of compromise developed in this study relies 
heavily on the creative insights of theorists like Kenneth Boulding who 
have worked in such areas as economics, labor relations, sociology, and 
international relations.
The theoretical formulation, consequently, has drawn from many
^he best summary of social judgment experiments appears in 
Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude 
and Attitude Change (Philadelphias W. B. Saunders Company, 1965).
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fields and disciplines in order to develop a conçrehensive view of 
conflict and eoB^ roinise. No single discipline has developed a broad 
enough view of the interaction of the components within a controversy 
and it remains for the critic, in an interdisciplinary study, to 
integrate the separate points of view.
Sources for ths Historical Application
Material for the historical phase of this dissertation falls 
into four categories; (l) primary sources represented by speeches, news­
papers, private papers, and eançaign documents, (2) biographical studies 
of the candidates and their conten^oraries, (3) historical monographs 
dealing with the ante bellum controversy, and (4) general histories of 
that period.
The newspapers in I860 present a highly partisan but useful 
account of the presidential cançaign. These newspapers, described by 
Williams as the "truest mirror of the time," lined up behind the various 
candidates and turned their editorial fire on the opposing camps.^  In 
addition to the regular newspapers published during the campaign, several 
special campaign editions were introduced. Among these publications were 
the Squatter Sovereign, the Freeport Wide Awake, and the Chicago Rail 
Splitter. Representative newspapers of each of the positions on the issue 
of slavery and of political parties were used in this study. The 
criteria for selection were based on the information found in Dumondis . 
study of the secession crisis as seen through Southern editorials and
'Wayne C. Williams, A Rail Splitter for President (Denver; 
University of Denver Press, 1991), p, vili. For a more thorough 
discussion of the role of the newspaper in the ante-bellum period 
see Chapter IV of this dissertation under the heading "Rhetorical 
Background."
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Perkin*s study of the same period through Northern editorials,^ A 
Complete list of the newspapers used in this dissertation will 
be included in the Bibliography.
The campaign speeches have been preserved in a number of places.
The newspapers of that day were careful to print the texts of the 
major speeches. In addition, a number of the speeches were pub­
lished in the form of political tracts which were circulated as 
campaign documents. Finally, some of the major speeches are included 
in the history books dealing with the prologue to the Civil War,
A limii^ amount of work has been done in private paper collections. 
Some private collections are now available on microfilm and were consulted 
in this study. In addition, several groups of letters and campaign 
documents were consulted while I was doing research in the Chicago 
Historical Society, the Illinois State Historical Society, and the New 
York Historical Society.
Biographies have been written of many of the leading political 
figures of that generation, Lincoln, of course, has been the subject 
of numerous biographical studies. Useful biographies are also available 
on Stephen A. Douglas, John C. Bell, William Garrison, Carl Schurz,
William L. Yancey, and William Seward.
The historical literature, both published and unpublished, is full 
of essays and monographs discussing various aspects of the i860 election. 
The list would be too long to cite in this chapter. In addition to the
-See Dwight Lowell Dumond (ed.), Southern Editorials on Secession 
(New York: The Century Co., 1931), pp. vii=xxlii, and Howard Cecil
Perkins (ed.). Northern Mitorials on Secession (New York: Appleton-
Century Coa^any, 19^ 2), I, 2-10.
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publications of the national historical organizations, many of the
states have their own historical journals and proceedings which were
valuable in this study.
As one might expect, a number of general histories deal with
the prelude to the war. A rather complete list of these is found in
Thomas J. Pressly's Americans Interpret Their Civil Var. Pressly
also places each of the interpretations with its own "school" thus
providing the reader with an understanding of the premises behind
each of the points of view. This becomes important when one realizes
that the post-war historians are just as subject to assimilation and
contrast effects as the pre-war politicians.
The campaign itself has also interested the historian. Qmerson
David Fite’s The Presidential Campaign of I860 includes valuable texts of
speeches, but it is not a critical study. Reinhard H. Luthin, in The
First Lincoln Campaign, describes in detail the nomination and election
of Lincoln. OUinger Crenshaw, in The Slave States in the Presidential
Election of I860, discusses the canpaign in the South. Melvin L. Hayes
wrote for what he calls "John Q. and his good Wife" in îfr. Lincoln
Runs for President. Wayne C. William examined the I860 campaign
through the journalism of that day in his A Rail Splitter for President.
Norman A. Graebner edited a series of essays dealing with the political
background to I860 in a book entitled Politics and the Crisis of i860.
Finally. William B. Hesseltine recently edited the newspaper reports
Murat Halstead made of the nominating conventions of I860 in Three
Against Lincolng Murat Halstead Reports the Caucusaes of i860.
Research for this dissertation, consequently, has been varied
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and diverse. The materials used have ranged from highly abstract 
statements of conflict and comprortiise to the perceptions of a country 
newspaper editor as to the fate of the nation if Lincoln were elected 
in I860. This kind of research has been necessary, however, in order to 
pursue an eclectric approach to a study of human behavior.
Plan of ths Study 
Chapter II
The intent of this chapter is to explain the basic assumptions 
and applications of the social judgment-involvement approach to attitude 
and attitude change. This behavioral science viewpoint, which is based 
on the concepts of perception-judgment and ego-lnvolvement, attempts 
to explain the basic factors involved in social influence. This 
discussion of the social judgment approach will consider its effect 
on both group and rhetorical theory.
Chapter III
This chapter presents an interdisciplinary approach to a theory 
describing the interaction of rhetoric and compromise within a conflict. 
Although the construct is called an "approach" and not a "theory," it is 
based on the assuaçstion that man should pursue the development of a gen­
eral theory of conflict and conflict resolution. This chapter delineates 
the relationship between conflict and conqpromise; the interaction of rhetoric 
with compromise I and the influence of ego «involvement on both rhetoric and 
compromise. The thesis will be advanced that rhetoric is the necessary 
antecedent of compromise and that both are undermined in certain types 
of conflicts. Those characteristics of a conflict which undermine rhetoric 
and compromise are discussed in this chapter.
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Chapter IV
The campaign of I860 was conducted in an atmosphere that was 
highly explosive and unstable. The purpose of this chapter is to 
attempt to recreate that atmosphere by describing the historical, 
political, social and cultural, and rhetorical factors which combined 
to form the background to the campaign and election. These influences 
contributed to the intensification of sectionalism and influenced the 
state of mind of the American of that generation.
Chapter V
The purpose of this chapter is to single out the slavery issue 
for more careful analysis. The slavery issue is seen against the frame­
work of the anti-slavery, pro-slavery, and ’’neutral” sentiments which 
existed in I860. Furthermore, this chapter traces the effect of the 
cançaign as a form of sectional confrontation in amplifying the assimila­
tion and contrast effects which were described in Chapter II. The 
participants in the campaign did not isolate the positions which were 
delineated at the beginning of this chapter but, instead, wsrs subject 
to the effects of perceptions and ego-involvement.
Chapter VI
This chapter combines the material from Chapters IV and V in 
describing the extent and nature of bipolarization. The purpose of this 
chapter is to apply the analytical model directly to the ante bellum 
struggle by demonstrating that the split into sections and the decision 
to accept the alternative of war were the products of the nature of the 
conflict. In short, this chapter arguss, as doss ths entirs study, that 
by I860 the conflict was no longer amenable to eoHçroaise because of the
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ideational, interpersonalp and structural effects of sectionalism in 
that particular period.
Chapter VII
This final chapter will restate both the theoretical jjastrumejit 
aM the application of the instrument in the ante bellum study. The 
purpose, here, xri.ll be to demonstrate the similarities between the 
principles described in the model and the degree to which the pre-Civil 
War conflict coincided with those principles. Furthermore, this 
chapter will discuss the possibility of other kinds of research to 
improve the analytical model and seek other controversies in which to 
apply it.
CHAPTER II 
THE SOCIAL JDDGMEKTJNVOLVEMEHT APPROACH
This chapter intends to focus on one sjf the starting points for 
ejçjloring attitude acquisition and change„ namely, the, social judgment- 
involvement approach. This approach, first presented by Hovland, Harvey, 
and Sherif in 1957» was delineated in some detail in 19&1 by Sherif 
and Hovland and by Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall in 19&5.^
This approach to a study of attitudes is in contrast to two 
other starting-points. First, Katz argues that attitudes perform major 
functions for the individual’s personality.^ The basic assumption of 
personality theory, then, is that both attitude formation and change 
must be understood in relation to the needs they serve. Second, the 
various balance-theory approaches consider imbalance reduction as the 
basic starting*.point.^  The social judgment-involvement approach, however,
C. I. Hovland, 0, J. Harvey and M. Sherif, "Assimilation and 
Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change," Journal of 
Abnoimtal and Social Psvchology. LV (September, 1957), 244-52; M. Sherif 
and C. L. Hovland, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects 
in Communication and Attitude Change (New Haven: Tale University Press,
1961; and CarolyiW. Sherif, Huzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, 
Attitude and Attitude Change (Philadelphia: W. B. SauMers Coapary, 196$ ),
2
See Donald Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of 
Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly. XXIV (Summer, 19o0), 163-204.
3
"Common to the concepts of balance, congruity, and dissonance is 
the notion that thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior tend to 
organize themselves in meaningful and sensible ways. It assumes that 
inconsistency is a noxious state setting up pressures to eliminate it 
or reduce it." Robert B. Zajonc, "The Concepts of Balance, Congruiiy, 
and Dissonance," Public Onlnion Quarterly « XXIV (Summer, I960), 260,
30
31
centers on perception-judgment and personal involvement in the issue as 
the key influences in the process of attitude formation and modification. 
For the purposes of this study the most significant features of this 
approach involve the cognitive process of perception»judgment; the effect 
of ego-involvement on perception-judgment; the effect of social judgment 
on group theory; and the effect of social judgment on rhetorical theory.
The Cognitive Process of Perception-Judgment
This approach postulates that an individual's frame of refeirence 
or psychological structure determines how he perceives or judges a psycho­
physical or psychosocial stimulus at the moment of exposure.^ The frame of 
reference determines how that person will categorize the stimulus, 
influences how he will assess the stimulus, and controls his response to 
the stimulus. Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall explain that
the present approach to problems of attitude change starts with the 
fundamental process of evaluation, or social judgment, which underlies 
the way an individual sizes up a communication situation, whether 
he is fully aware of it or not. His appraisal of the communication 
and the communicator fundamentally shapes his response to thsm.^
Perception operates in at least three ways in establishing a 
response to a situation. First, it can magnify the observance of certain 
stimuli, giving them greater weight than they necessarily deserve. Second,
^Both psychophysical and psychosocial judgments are included because 
the concept of social judgment is underpinned by psychophysical investiga­
tions of the time error and of the effects of anchor-points on perceptions 
of weights and lights, etc. For examples of psychophysical experiments see 
Harry Helson, "Adaptation-level as a Basis for a Quantitative Theory of 
Frames of Reference," Psychological Review. LV (November, 1948), 297-313, 
and Mti7,afer Sherif, Daniel Taub, and Carl I. Hovland, "Assimilation and 
Contrast Effects of Anchoring Stimuli on Judgments," Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. LV (February, 1958), 150-55.
“Sherif- Sherif- and Nebergall, p. 13.
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perception can diminish the importance of other stimuli which are 
competing for attention. Finally, an individual may actually distort 
the real meaning of the various stimuli he is perceiving. These 
processes of exaggeration, ninimization, and distortion occur at the 
moment an individual engages the particular stimuli involved.^
The frame of reference, which plays a critical role in perception- 
judgment, is the product of the interaction of internal and external
O
factors. The internal factors include social attitudes which have become 
internalized, biogenic motives, and the states of the organism.  ^ The 
external factors that merge with the internal influences include the 
point of view or stand represented in the stimulus material, the 
initiator of the point of view, the speaker or writer, the form of 
presentation, the medium through which it is presented, and the social 
context in which it is presented.^
Not a.11 of these factors, however, have equal weight in determining 
a person's perception-judgment. Those factors which are more important 
to the individual at a given time are called "anchorages." Sherif and
S^ee Ross Stagner, "Personality Dynamics and Social Conflict,"
The Journal of Social Issues. XVII, No. 3 (1961), 33.
For a full discussion of the integration of the internal and 
external factors in the formation of the frame of reference and the impact 
of those factors on perception-judgment see Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. 
Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychclogy (New York: Harper and Row, 1956),
pp. 37-1'^ .
list of biogenic motives would includs hunger, thirst, rest, sex, 
temperature regulation, evacuation, and others. States of the organism 
include such conditions as emotionalism and exhaustion.
S^herif and Sherif, p. 539.
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and Sherif observeds
All influences operating at a given tiae do not have equal 
effect in determining the behavioral outcome. Major reference points, 
which are called anchorages, weigh more heavily than others in shaping 
the final psychological product. Major reference points or anchorages 
may be in the external stimulus situation or on the side of internal 
influences, depending on the particular interrelationship among 
factors at the time.l
These anchorages, then, become the most important judgmental 
factors used by the individual in his assessment of a stimulus. An 
individual, in effect, compares the stimulus with the anchorage or 
anchorages which he views as pertinent. For exançle, weightlifters and 
watchmakers judge a ten-pound weight differently because they begin with 
different points of conçarison or anchorages.
A situation may develop in which a stimulus calls forth two or 
more anchorages which represent conflicting goals. Anchorage "A" would 
call for a favorable assessment of the communication; anchorage "B" would 
insist that the communication be rejected. If the anchorages are of 
relatively equal weight the individual is subject to what the political 
scientists call "cross pressures."^ An example of this kind of anchorage 
conflict occurred in the I96O presidential election when the pro«Democratic
^IbW., p. #.
^aul F. Lazarfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet in The 
People's Choice : How the Voter Makes up Ms Hind in a Presidential Campaign 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 19^7, pp. xxi-xxii, argue that "such
predispositions to change are more typical for individuals in whom cross­
pressures operate. In our complex society, individuals do not belong to 
one group, only. They have a variety of major social affiliations; their 
social class, their ethnic group, their religious group, the informal 
associations in which they participate. These various affiliations will 
make conflicting claims on some individuals: an upper-class Catholic, for
example, may find that his religious affiliation pulls him in one direction, 
while his class position pulls him in the opposite direction. And when 
concrete situations such as an election campaign require him to make a 
definite decision, he must also decide which of his group loyalties should 
take priority."
Jk
bat anti-Catholic voter was caaght in a political "crpssMpressore."
feternal and internal factors, consequently, are integrated within 
the frame of reference. When one of the factors dominates in a given 
situation it is called an anchorage. These reference points are used in 
the process of judgment in that the stimulus to be judged is conçiared to 
the particular anchorage or anchorages whicl^  are activated.
Latitudes of Acceptance, Rejection, and Noncommitment 
If a person has an attitude on a social issue, he will have diffused 
within his frame of reference a set of categorical responses that will be 
aroused when the attitude stimulus is perceived. The predetemined 
categories of response are acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment.
In the social judgment language, a latitude of acceptance refers to the 
position on an issue that is most acceptable, plus other acceptable 
positions; a latitude of injection involves the most objectionable posi­
tion on the same issue, plus other objectionable positions; and a latitude 
of noncommitment represents those positions not categorized as either 
acceptable or objectionable in some degree. This concept of latitudes 
can best be explained by citing an example of the use of an experimental 
instrument in a social judgment study.
In 1957 the following continuum of nine statements was presented 
to subjects to determine their evaluative categories within their frames 
of reference on the repeal-of-prohibition controversy in the then "dry"
State of Oklahoma.
(a ) Since alcohol is the curse of mankind, the sale and use of alcohol, 
including light beer, should be cmpletely abolished.
(B) Since alcohol is the main cause of corruption in-public life, law- 
, lessness, and Immoral acts, its sale and use should be prohibited.
(C) Since it is hard to stop at a reasonable moderation point in the 
use of alcohol, it is safer to discourage its use.
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(D) Alcohol should not be sold or used except as a remedy for snake 
bites, orampsç colds; fainting; and other aches and pains.
(B) The arguments in favor and against the sale and use of alcohol are 
nearly equal.
(F) The sale of alcohol should be so regulated that is available in 
limited quantities for special occasions,
(G) The sale and use of alcohol should be permitted with proper state 
controls, so that the revenue from taxation may be used for the 
betterment of schools, highways, and other state institutions.
(H) Since prohibition is a major cause of corruption in public life, 
lawlessness, immoral acts, and juvenile delinquency; the sale and 
use of alcohol should be legalized,
(I) It has become evident that man cannot get along without alcohol; 
therefore, there should be no restriction whatsoever on its sale 
and use.l
These statements on the prohibition issue were formulated ty a 
process of content analysis and description of the actual arguments used 
in the campaign. This was done in order to correlate the attitude 
continuum as accurately as possible to the shades of attitudes which were 
reflected in the wet-dry controversy.
The latitude of acceptance of each individual was determined by 
requesting that individual to select the statement that best represented his 
own position, followed ty the selection of other statements he could accept. 
He was then requested to indicate the statement that was most objectionable 
to him as well as any other statement or statements he must reject. These 
statements formed his latitude of rejection. The remaining statements, if 
ary, comprised his latitude of noncommitment. These categories reflected 
that individual's attitude on the prohibition controversy at that time.
Two important observations should be made at this point. First, an 
individual's position on the issue is multi-dimensional instead of single 
dimensional. A person can accept or reject multiple positions instead of 
single positions only. Second, the subject is using the latitudes that he
T^he prohibition experiment is reported in Hovland, Harvey, and 
Sherif, pp. 244-52.
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brought with him to the experiment. These latitudes, then, lie dormant 
within the frame of reference until activated by an attitude-arousing 
stimulus. The evaluative categories are then called forth in the act of 
judging a stimulus.
Assimilation and Contrast Effects 
The frame of reference, consisting of anchorages and latitudes, 
influences an individual’s perception of a communication in that it causes 
him to assimilate son» messages while contrasting others on the same issue.
When a communication advocating a position between clearly defined 
extremes is given to subjects with varying positions on the issue, those 
whose stand corresponds most closely tend to judge the communication 
properly. Some people with positions slightly removed from that of the 
communication may judge it as being more like their position than it 
actually is. This is known as an "assimilation effect." On the other 
hand, if an individual perceives the communication to represent a position 
more remote from his own anchorage, he will displace the communicator's 
stand away from his own. This is called a "contrast effect."
In other words, if a stimulus representing a position on the social 
issue is either within or close to the accepted latitude, an individual 
tends to minimize the difference between it and his own preferred position 
or anchorage and is inclined to adopt it as his own. If a stand is 
perceived by a subject to be further away from his own position or anchor­
age, he will exaggerate the difference and displace it further away from 
his stand than it actually Is.^  For example, in the 196h presidential
Social judgment may be related to the dissonance approach in that 
in the process of assimilation an individual reduces the distance between 
the stimulus and his own position. Furthermore, in the contrast effect the 
individual reduces dissonance by exaggerating the distance between positions.
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campaign the radical right element was able to assimilate the candidacy 
of M, Goldwater but displaced or contrasted Nelson Rockefeller and
George Romney into the camp of the Americans for Democratic Action,
Various studies of voting behavior have reported this same assimi= 
lation and contrast phenomenon. Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee, for 
exanrole, in their extensive survey of voting patterns in elections from 
1940 to 1952, observed that the voter, especially when he is involved in 
the campaign, tends to perceive his own candidate’s position as his own.
At the same time, however, he makes the opponent into more of an "enemy" 
than he actually represents.
This tendency to "misperceive" issues in a favorable direction 
does not operate in a uniform fashion within the electorate. The 
degree of affect attached to the election, in the form of intensity 
upon one's vote intention, also influences perception. Those voters 
1Â 0 feel strongly about their vote intention perceive political issues 
differently from those who do not feel so strongly about the matter.
With remarkable consistency within each party, the intensely involved 
"pull" their own candidate and "push" the opponent more than the less 
involved.^
The "push" or contrast phase of this phenomenon has also been 
described various political scientists. Abcarian and Stange, for exam­
ple, point out that "right wing extremism expresses itself publicly in 
the form of telescoping— a process of compressing or coalescing levels and 
categories of political events and analyses which are ordinarily treated 
as distinct or u n i q u e . Pournelle, in his study of the left-right political
B^ernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfeld, and William N, McPhee,
Voting; A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago;
The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 223.
Gilbert Abcarian and Sherman M. Stange, "Alienation and the 
Radical Right," Journal of Politics. XXVII (November, I965), 782.
In their study, Abcarian and Stange cite the example of Senator Thurmond’s 
assertion that "communism" is furidamentally "socialism" in order to 
illustrate the "telescoping" process.
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continuum, observed that "the man on the Loft accuses the Conservatives 
of being akin of Reactionaries, and very nearly allied with î*à8eistsj 
while the man on the Right links Liberals to Socialists, and Socialists 
to Communists."^
In summary, the frame of reference provides an individual with a 
wired-in set of evaluative categories with which he perceives a particular 
stimulus. The three reactive categories are acceptance, rejection, and 
noncommitment. If the communication is close to an individual's position, 
he will minimize the difference and assimilate it; if the communication 
is further away, he will exaggerate the difference and contrast it. As 
a result, the individual's placement of the stimulus within his frame of 
reference determines the kind of response he will make.
Impact of Ejgo-Involvement 
This approach considers the degree of ego-involvement in the 
particular issue as a basic variable in determining both perception and 
propensity for attitude change. An ego-involved attitude is different 
from other attitudes primarily in intensity. The person who is highly
tm, a  i  ^  Æ  «*1 ^  ^  I, w  w* A  J  A  • M
w w i i i i a j . v w v a  w  o  | / V 0x v x u i i  x a c f to  «  i ^ u u u u o i x o u A ' a w o  e t v u x v v v u v  w x a x v i a  x m o  w w v u x w  ex
critical factor in prescribing iiis relatedness to the world. Whenever his 
self-view becomes part of that attitude, he has become ego-involved.^
^Jerry Eugene Pournelle, "The American Political Continuum: An 
Examination of the Validity of the Left-Right Model as an Instrument for 
Studying Contei^orary American 'Isms'" (unpublished Ph. D, dissertation. 
Departnant of Government, University of Washington, 1964), p. 12.
^Robert E. Lane and David 0. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 53-4, suggest that such attitudes 
may have been tested by e^eriencej there is an authority or a source for 
the attitude which is valued; the attitude is anchored in valued group 
membership; the individual has a public stake in his attitude; the 
attitude serves some social function for the individual; the attitude
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Such attitudes which are characterized by high intensity are not
made and re-made daily. Nor can they be produced in brief instructions or
transitory experiences in a laboratory. This is not to say, however, that
there are only two kinds of attitudes—«involved and non-involved. The
attitude spectrum can represent as many shades of involvement as there
are people. Ego-involvement, then, should be seen as dimensional rather
than dichotomous. Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall contend that such
attitudes constitute a person's
self-picture, not snap judgments or transitory opinions on his part.
To this extent, change in his attitudes is not a discrete event of 
shifting one single item in his psychological makeup. Changing his 
attitude means changing him as a person, changing a part of himself 
as he has come to know himself relative to his social world.^
Several useful synonyms for ego-involvement exist in the litera­
ture of the social and behavioral sciences. Lane and Sears, for example, 
use the concept of "intensity" as the term representing commitment,^
Some of the voting behavior studies prefer the concept of "partisanship."3 
One of the most interesting delineations of the kinds of attitudes comes 
from the writings of Kenneth Boulding, an economic theorist.
Thus we have, in effect, divided the value structure of a person’s 
image into two parts: an inner core around which he integrates his
personality and which holds him together and an outer shell which he 
holds or possesses but which does not constitute an essential part 
of the image of the person who does the holding or the possessing.
serves some economic function for the individual; the attitude serves an 
intra-psychic function; and, the attitude rationalizes some role-strain in 
which he finds himself.
S^herif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. I3.
L^ane and Sears, p. 10.
3Berelson. Lazarfeld, and McPhee, p. 225.
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The core is rigid and not subject to small changes, though it may be 
subject to catastrophic reorganizations in conversion. The shell 
is not rigid and is amenable to the processes of modification 
under the stimulus of discussion and argument.-
Whether the terms "ego-involvement," "intensity," "partisan," or 
"core" are used, the meaning is the same. Certain kinds of attitudes, 
because they are integrated into the self-view or value structure of an 
individual, are much more rigid and firm than other attitudes which are 
more superficial and temporary since they are found in the "shell." A 
study of attitude and attitude change, consequently, must ask the qual­
itative question (How involved are the subjects in their attitudes?) as 
well as the quantitative question (How many people are for, against, or 
neutral?).
The effect of ego-involvement on assimilation and contrast effects 
may be seen in the following two ways. First, the degree of ego-involve­
ment determines the number of rejected positions on the issue-scale which 
fall within the contrast range. Second, the degree of ego-involvement 
determines the number of different positions or categories perceived on a 
partièular issue.
Effect of Ego-Involvement on Latitude Size
The extent to which an individual is personally committed on a 
particular issue will be mirrored in the relative sizes of the latitudes 
of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment. The more ego-involved 
individual will reject more positions on the continuum and will accept and 
be noncommitted on fewer positions.
K^enneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Dsfsnse (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 196?), p. 312.
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In the prohibition experiment, conduoted by Hovland, Harvey, and 
Sherif in 1957, the data revealed that the 193 siibjeots who took an 
extreme position (A, B, G, H, or I) accepted a mean of 2,81 statements, 
rejected 4.71 statements, and failed to check 1.48 statements. On the 
other hand, those taking the intermediate positions (G, D, E, or F) 
accepted 3.05 positions, rejected 3.70 positions, and were neutral 
toward 2.24 statements.^
Similar results were found in a social judgment, based on a nine- 
point continuum, in the I960 presidential election. This study was 
populated by 945 subjects in the Northwest and 571 respondents in the 
Southwest. Although the experiment had several features, of interest at 
this point is the relationship among acceptance, rejection, and noncommit, 
ment. Subjects from the Southwest revealed the following mean sizes of 
latitudes.
TABLE I
mean sizes of LATITUDES OF ACCEPTANCE, REJECTION, AND 
NONGOHMITMENTs OKLAHOMA, I96O*
Position A B G D E F G H Î
Latitude of:
Acceptance 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.5 2,6 3.1 3.0 2,9
Rejection 4.9 4.3 3.7 3.6 3.0 3.4 3.2 4.0 4.9
Noncommitment 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.3 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.0 1.2
n 42 137 77 75 48 44 22 48 14
*This chart is recorded in Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 53.
This chart demonstrates that those who identified the more 
extreme positions as their most favorable statement tended te reject
%ovla&i, Harvey, and Sherif, 248.
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more statements, accept fewer statements, and refuse to respond to fewer
statements. Those, however, who idsntifisd one of the intermediate positions
inclined to reject fewer positions while enlarging their latitudes of
acceptance and noncommitment. This is not to say, however, that the most
preferred statement selected by an individual reveals all the necessary
information about his attitude. Nebergall points out that
it is possible, though, that people who would Identify the same 
position or alternative as their own would judge differently 
regarding other possible stands. If they did, then the single 
position which they most preferred would not reveal their attitude 
fully. 1
In short, the relative sizes of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, 
and noncommitment are necessary in obtaining a complete picture of a person's 
attitude. The individual variations among those who identify the same 
most-preferred position will be revealed in the latitude sizes.
These two studies provide support for the notion that, generally 
speaking, those taking the more extreme positions had larger latitudes of 
rejection, smaller latitudes of acceptance, with a diminishing latitude 
of noncommitment. This instrument assumes, of course, that an extreme 
position tends to reveal a more involved position. There is considerable 
statistical evidence for this assumption. Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall 
claim that
there is considerable evidence in the literature that degree of personal 
involvement with the stand varies with the extremity of the stand, as 
Dsntioned earlier. Adherents of extreme positions are likely far 
beyond chance level to be intensely partisan. Therefore, it was 
reasonable to investigate latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and 
noncommitment as a function of extremeness of most preferred positions
ftW +.Vi* 4 sfliia 2
“Roger E, Nebergall, "The Social Judgment-involvement Approach to 
Attitude and Attitude Change" (unpublished paper. Department of Speech, 
University of Oklahoma, 1965).
S^herif, Sherif, and Nebergall, pp. 26-7.
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This same relationship is corroborated by Lane and Sears. Although 
they contend that, in theory, extremity and intensity are not the same, as 
a practical matter the two elements are closely related.
Nevertheless, empirically it has been well established that on 
most issues there is a U-shaped curve, relating the two. The more 
extreme a person's position is— say, on desegregation, idiere 
immediate total integration is one extreme and total and absolute 
segregation is the other— the more intensely he is likely to feel 
about his positions.^
There are several possible explanations for this correlation between 
intensity and extremity. Allport and Hartman suggest that extremists are 
usually taking a more selective view of a situation and must devote 
energy (emotional intensity) to screen out opposing considerations,^
Cantril contends that those who are on the defensive because of their 
extreme views must either develop a rigid position or else succumb to 
community pressures to moderate their vi.ews.3 In short, for a person to 
reject the traditional moderation of the majority requires a stronger 
anchorage for support.
Although high ego-involvement is usually associated with the 
more extreme positions on a continuum, this does not preclude an 
individual from experiencing a "core" attitude in an intermediate 
position. In describing the "interesting case of middle-of-the-roaders," 
Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall make the following observation from the 
i960 social judgment experiment.
L^ane and Sears, p. 10.
2Cited in Lane and Sears, p. 105.
%. Cantril, "The Intensity of an Attitude," Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology. XLI (January. 1946), 129-35=
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Thus, the middle-of-the readers in the election study turn out 
to be some mildly Republican and Democratic sympathizers, some 
persons generally unconcerned and equally tolerant of either side, 
and other persons strongly committed to the middle position or, at 
least, strongly against both major parties,^
When a person is ego-involved in an intermediate position, however, he
rejects a larger number of positions than his "neutral" counterpart. In
short, his latitude of rejection is as large as that typical of a strong
partisan of an extreme position.
The prohibition study in 1957 and the I96O election experiment 
support the predicted correlation between extremity of the respondent's 
own anchorage and the sizes of the evaluative latitudes. The latitude of 
rejection within the frame of reference of the committed person tends to 
be larger; the latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment are smaller.
As a result, the intermediate or neutral positions tend to be skewed 
toward the opposite-end position in order to enlarge the contrast range.
In effect, then, the involved person sees the issue as "black" or 
"white" and has difficulty perceiving shades of "gray."
Effect of Ego-Involvement on Position Discrimination
Ejgo-involvement influences the number of positions perceived by 
a subject within the universe of discourse on a particular issue. Persons 
who are strongly committed to a stand on a controversial issue tend to 
use fewer categories and distribute their judgments differently than 
persons who are less concerned with the issue. In addition, the subject 
is unable to differentiate among the statements which he has lumped into 
the rejected-contrast range.
Instead of the nine-positional scale used in the prohibition
S^herif, Shorif, and Nebergall, p. 58.
45
and i960 ©lection studies, the experiments to be reviewed in this section 
utilize the ”own-cat©gories" approach. This differs from the other 
system in that the experimenter does not impose on the subject a scale of 
nine fixed positions which artifically structure his response. Instead, 
the e:q)erimenter gives the subject a number of statements representing 
various positions on the continuum and asks him to sort them into as many 
or as few categories as he finds necessary to reflect the positions of 
the statements. The value of this method lies in the ability to determine 
an individual's attitude without revealing the purpose of the experiment.
He is not asked to reveal his personal attitude, but his point of view 
becomes apparent as he judges the statements by placing them into the 
number of stacks he deems necessary to reflect their positions.
In 1953 Sherif and Hovland predicted that individuals with strong 
personal involvement in an extreme stand on a controversial issue would 
(1) use fewer categories for judging relevant statements than less-involved 
subjects and (2) would place fewer statements in the extreme category most 
acceptable to them than in the opposite (objectionable) extreme.^  The 
subjects in the experiment were told to sort 114 statements on the segre­
gation issue into the number of piles that seemed to be required so that 
the stand expressed on the issue of the social position of Negroes would 
be different from the other pile or piles.
The data indicated that the more highly-involved subjects (Negroes) 
used fewer categories for judging relevant statements than less-involved 
subjects (average white subjects). Moreover, the highly-involved subjects
M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland. "Judgmental Pehnomena and Scales of 
Attitude Measurement: Placement of Items with Individual Choice of Nimber 
Categories," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. XLVIII (January, 
1953), 135-41.
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placed a disproportionate number of items in the extreme category 
farthest removed from their most acceptable position. In fact, Negro 
subjects, on the average, found 65 of the 114 statements highly objec­
tionable but only 27 acceptable in some degree. By comparison, average 
white subjects found 43 statements objectionable, on the average, and 38 
statements acceptable. The subjects were not responding to whether or 
not the statements were acceptable or objectionable to them as 
individuals. They were to judge whether the statements were favorable 
or unfavorable to Negroes.
In 1961 Vaughn selected 60 statements on the Latin American 
controversy and asked four groups of subjects to place them in cate­
gories.^ Included in the population of the study were (1) intensely 
anti-Latin residents of South Texas, (2) South Texas residents who were 
not overly anti-Latin, (3) unselected college students in South Texas, 
and (4) unselected college students in extreme northern Texas who were 
not involved directly in the social issue.
The results indicate that over 85 percent of the highly involved 
subjects used three or fewer categories; almost 92 percent of the uninvolved 
subjects used four or more categories. The number of categories used by 
involved subjects ranged from two to five; uninvolved subjects used two 
to eleven, with the median at five categories. Only 8 percent of the 
uninvolved subjects used three categories or less.
John Reich investigated the own-categories method in relation 
to the reapportionment issue in Oklahoma in 1963.^  Using active members of
S^herif, Sherif, and Nebergall, pp. 118-22.
-Ibid.. pp. 122-25.
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the League of Women Voters who had dedicated a major effort for some 
time to reapportionsroiitÿ and a conparahls gronp of ioso—iiivoiirod school 
teachers, Reich sttidied the categorization effect on 60 statements. Of 
these, 15 statements had been consistently judged in a pretest situation 
as favorable, 15 as unfavorable, and 30 had been rated with high varia­
bility. In categorizing these statements by the own-categories 
procedure, 74 percent of the highly involved women used four or fewer 
categories; only 26 percent of the teachers used such a small number.
The teachers placed about the same number of statements in favorable 
and unfavorable categories; the women actively favoring reapportion­
ment placed over half of these statements in unfavorable, rejected 
categories.
These experiments tend to verify the notion that a direct correla­
tion exists between the Isport^ce an issue has to an individual and 
the number of categories he uses in judging statements along the 
continuum. Furthermore, the data indicate that a person who lumps 
rejected statements into a single category or categories fails to 
discriminate the shades of differences among the grouped statements.
M l o u v *  Vy V—M iV VU.VVU « u v x u u u o o  u r o a v o  v u e  o x v —l uo
T^ndrôœô sinôê the committed person does not discriminate among the 
rejected positions.
Ego-involvement, consequently, plays an iaportant role in the 
social judgment process. The highly=coramitted individual rejects more 
positions within the universe of discourse on a particular issue and has 
difficulty discriminating among the rejected positions. Conversely, the 
l0ss=committed person rejects fewer positions and is better able to 
distinguish among positions.
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Impact of Social Judgment on Grcfup Theory
Although the SOClal jüugôiêzît &ppFO«Ch j.S prlüîâl^ Hy dssigHSd tc
investigate individual attitudes, it is also directly related to the 
various aspects of group theory, Sherif and Sherif observe that
a centrial portion of the individual’s sense of personal identity, 
his ego-attitudes defining his status and role relations with 
others, his prestige concerns, the level of his future goals is 
derived from groups of which ho %s a part or aspires to he a 
part.l
Attitudes and reference groups are not separate and distinct fields of 
study but, instead, are interrelated and interdependent areas of human 
behavior. For this reason, this discussion of the social judgment 
approach will consider (1) the nature of a reference group, (2) the 
effect of ego-involvement on the intra-and intergroup relationships, 
and (3) the reduction of group conflicts.
Nature of Reference Groups 
Reference group is a traditional subject of social psychology. 
Secord and Backman define it as "a group the individual takes as a frame 
of reference for self»evaluation and attitude formation."^  Sherif and 
Sherif define reference groups as "those groups to which the individual 
relates himself as a part or to which he aspires to relate himself 
psychologically."^ A person may belong to a "membership" groiç» which may 
or may not influence him psychologically. Whenever a person’s standards
S^herif and Sherif. p. 63O,
^aul F. Secord and Carl W, Backman, Social Psychology (New Yorks
«kw— LU. Jb/vv/n. g X7V-rf’/j y  «
S^herif and Sherif, p. 175.
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and aspirations are regulated by a social unit, whether he is an official 
asabsr or not, that social unit has becons a reference group. Furthermore, 
he may be a member of a particular group but psychologically refer himself 
to a different group to which he does not belong.
A reference group is formed whenever a number of individuals
(1) interact, (2) over a period of time, (3.) toward the fulfillment of 
certain common goals.  ^ A reference group has two salient characteristics. 
First, a reference group possesses a structure which serves to determine 
the relationship among group members in terms of role, power, status, and 
intent.  ^ These factors determine the more or less stabilized system of 
interdependent relationships among individuals according to their 
reactive contributions to interaction toward a comon goal or goals.
Second, a reference group performs a normative function in 
setting and enforcing standards of conduct and belief. These group 
norms regulate the behavior of individual mmbers within the social 
unit. They become internalized attitudes which serve as anchorages on 
the individual's frame of reference. This superstructure of rules, 
standards, and values is concerned only with matters of iaçortance to that 
particular rôfôrôiicô group. Conformity, then, refers to a situation in
S^heria and Sherif, p. lo2.
^Role. in this context, refers to the reciprocal expectations that 
each group member has of all the other group members in terms of responsi­
bilities to the social unit. Power« which is related to role, is defined 
as the influence that "A" has on "B" whenever ”B” perceives tWt "A" is 
instrumental to "B's" goals. Status defines the influence that "A" has 
"B" when "B” perceives that "A” identifies with or shares "B’s" goals or 
values. Finally, intent represents the way in which "A" influence's 
”B” in so far as "B" perceives "A's" intention in relation to "B's" goals. 
These definitions were taken from a class lecture by Jack E. Douglas at 
the University of Oklahoma in the summer of 1965.
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which group members follow the tolerable ranges of behavior which have 
been established by the group Itself; deviation refers to an individual 
course of action which is beyond the limits of acceptable behavior within 
the group.
The structural and normative influence of wference groiçs on 
individual attitudes and behavior has been well documented in a number 
of e^ qoerimental studies. The experiments of Newcomb with the Bennington 
College students, Lewin and his associates with discussion groups, and 
Sherif and others with Robbers Cave campers verify this assertion.^ 
Furthermore, as Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall point out, "the most dramatic 
cases of attitude change, the most widespread and enduring, are those 
involving changes in reference groups with differing values."
Single stands on specific issues are not unrelated characteristics 
of an individual's frame of reference but are directly related to group 
contexts. These group contexts, in the form of reference groups, super- 
inpose a structural and normative pattern on the individual.
Effect of % o-Invôlvêmânt on Reference Groups
Since attitudes tend to be group-oriented, an ego=involvod attitude
would, in most cases, indicate an ego-involved group, Coser observed that
in groups that appeal only to a peripheral part of their member's 
personality, or, to use Parsons' terminology, in groups in which
^he Newcomb study of Bennington College is described in Sherif and 
Sherif, pp. 139-5^ î the Lewin experiments can be read in K. Lewin, "Group 
Decision and Social Change" in Readings in Social Psychology, ed, by T, M, 
Newcomb aiyî E. L. Hartley (New York: Holt, 19-7); and the Robbers Cava
study has been described in considerabl© detail in M. Sherif, 0. J, Harvey, 
B. J. White, W, R. Hood, and Carolyn Sherif, Intergroup Conflict and 
Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment (Norman; The University of
%herif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 214.
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relations are functionally specific and affectively neutral, 
conflicts are apt to be less sharp and violent than in groups 
wherein ties are diffuse and affective, engaging the total 
personality of their meaibers.^
Groups, then, which engage "the total personality of their members" are
different from those which are "affectively neutral." In most eases,
when a group becomes firm in a position, it usually does so in eompeti=
tion with another group or groups.  ^ This group commitment influences
both intragroup rigidity and intergroup hostility.
Whenever a group becomes highly involved in a particular norm, 
more pressure is put on individuals within the group to conform to that 
norm. Deviation is viewed as extremely dangerous and would, at least, 
result in carefhl surveillance of that member, if in not severe sanctions 
or expulsion. Two types of deviant behavior pose a threat to the cohesive, 
ness of the group. First, a renegade, who leaves the group and even 
joins a rival organization, threatens to breakdown the boundary lines 
of the established group. In doing so, the renegade confirms the 
conviction of the rival group of the righteousness of its cause and, in 
most cases, will be more firm in his lovaltv to the new eroun.^
llewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe,
Illinoiss The Free Press, 1956), P.
S^herif and Sherif, p. 280,
C^oser, p. 70. This same point of view has been expressed by Erie 
Hoffer, The True Believer (New Yorks Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1951),p. 
117, who declares that "it is doubtful whether the excommunicated priest, 
the 63qpe'lled Communist and the renegade chauvinist can ever flM peace of 
mind as autonomous individuals. They cannot stand on their own, but must 
embrace a new cause and attach themselves to a new group,"
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Second, the heretic presents a somewhat different problem to the 
group than does the apostate'» The renegade deserts the group in order to 
go over to the "enonçr"; the heretic, in upholding the group’s central values 
and goals, presents even a more insidious danger. By proposing alternatives 
where the group wants no alternative to exist, the heretic continues to 
conç»ete for the loyalty of the members of his former group. The renegade, 
then, will tend to fight the group ; the heretic will attempt to prosely­
tize it» As Robert Michels wrote, "the hatred of the party is directed, 
not in the first place against the opponents of its own view of the world 
order, but against the dreaded rivals in the political field, against 
those who are competing for the same end.
Deviant behavior, then, personified in the renegade or the heretic, 
presents a serious problem in a reference group whenever an ego-involved 
attitude or group norm is concerned. The permanence of the group may well
be determined by its success in withstanding attacks from within as well
2
as from without.
Intergroup Hostility
Whenever two or more groups come into contact and interact in one 
way or other, they develop some form of intergroup relations» If this 
interaction becomes unfriendly as each group becomes more ego-involved and
C^ited in Coser, p. 70.
%offer, p. 115, points out that "this eneiiy— the indispensable 
devi.1 of every mass movement— is omnipresent. He plots both outside and 
inside the ranks of the faithful. It is his voice that speaks through 
the mouth of the dissenter, and the deviationists are his stooges. If 
anything goes wrong within the movement, it is his doing. It is the 
sacred duty of the true believer to be suspicious. He must be constantly 
on the lookout for saboteurs, spies and traitors."
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rigid in its position, intergroup prejudice becomes a group noim in both 
organizations. The prejudice, if unchecked, may lead to friction, 
feelings of hostility aiid superiority, and distorting stereotypes. As 
the conflict becomes more intense, three related processes develop.
First, the groups attempt to isolate themselves from the contam­
ination of the other in order to protect their members from defilement.
This isolation, according to Lipset, produces "a tendency to view politics 
and personal relationships in black-and-white terms, a desire for immediate 
action, an impatience with talk and discussion, a lack of interest in 
organizations which have a long-range perspective."^ In short, the two 
groups,because of ideational and interpersonal conflicts, lose the 
ability to communicate objectively on almost any issue.
Second, the groups exaggerate the "evil" in the other and tend 
to discover a "conspiracy" within the adversary. The group members 
express "a readiness to follow leaders who offer a demonologioal interpre­
tation of the evil forces (either religious or political) which are con-
2
spiring against them." Osgood points out that partisan perceptions make
Sogey Men of the opponents in every human conflict: if We are good.
kind, fair and so on, then cognitive consistency requires that THEY 
(the Hust be equally bad, cruel, unfair and so on through the
opposites of all traits we attribute to ourselves. The Bogey Man 
conception both justifies aggressive behavior on ou  ^own part and 
nullifies any non-aggressive ploys by the opponent.^
Third, the ego-involved reference group is inclined to stereotype
Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Coup any. Inc., 19^), p. 121.
^Ibid.
3
Charles E. Osgood, "An Analysis of the Cold War Mentality," The 
Journal of Social Issues. XvH, No, 3 (I96I), I3,
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all meabeps of the opposing group as "bad” and "untrustworthy”; all 
Boabers of the in-^ roup, however, are "good” and "trustworthy." This 
stereotyping effect has been observed by many social critics, Lippman, idio 
used the word in 1932» wrote that "the pattern of stereotypes at the 
center of our codes largely determines what group of facts we shall see, 
and in which light we shall seo' them,” In applying the concept of stereo­
typing to international conflict, Buchanan and Cantril argue that
the danger of stereotypes is not so much that nations are hostile to 
other "peoples" because they have unfavorable stereotypes; it begins 
to appear that they have unfavorable stereotypes because they are 
hostile. The greater danger is that we will act irrationally on 
the basis of these simple, realistic, but entirely fanciful images,^
When an intergroup conflict becomes full-grown, consequently, there 
is a break down in communication as the groups isolate themselves; danger­
ous conspiracies are searched for and found in the opposing group; and 
all members of the out-group are stereotyped as "evil" but all members of 
the in-group are "good."
Reduction of Group Hostilities
Perhaps the most effective way of rsducing or eliminating inter­
group tension is through the iBçlementation of a superordlnat# goal— a 
value that is meritous to both groups. There are two types of superordinate 
goals. First, the common enemy approach may bind together conflicting 
rivals, Boulding suggests that
a strong enemy, however, is a great unifying force; in the face of
a common threat and the overriding common purpose of '#iotory or
■‘■Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1932), p. 125,
‘William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations S00 Each Other 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), p. 9&.
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snurvival, the diverse ends and conflicting interests of the popula­
tion fall into the background and are swallowed up into the sii^ le, 
measurable, overriding end of winning the conflict.i
Alexander adds that "the best safeguard against internal disruptive
antagonisms seems to be the presence of an external enemy which gives
the hostile impulses an external target." Finally, Edwards insists
that "hatred of a common enemy is the most powerful known agency for
producing group unity.
The common enenjy approach, however, may not be the most reliable
kind of superordinate goal. As one might egpect, as soon as the enemy
is defeated there would be a tendency to revive old antagonisms since the
reason for unity has vanished. Even a cursory investigation of the history
of military alliances verifies this notion.
The second and most effective means of intergroup tension
reduction involves a program that leads to the constructive integration
of the two groups through the completion of a number of cooperative
projects. This technique, which was demonstrated in the classic Robbers
Cave experiment, is superior to the common enemy approach in that the
A
reason for unification is relatively permanent. Sherif, Sherif, and
neoergaxi. summarxzea unau parxxcuxar iioxa sxuay oy wrxxxiig xnau -a âèrxôs 
of superordinate goals and the cooperative efforts they required for 
attainment did result in changed attitudes on the part of members of both
B^oulding, p. 162.
C^ited in Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup 
Tensions (New York: Social Science Research Council, 19^ 7), p. 58.
C^itsd in Williams, p. 58.
2i
For a discussion of the superiority of a constructive program of 
integration see Coser, pp. 140-46.
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groups in varying degrees.^
Groups and attitudes are two ways of looking at the same phenome- 
non, namely, the behavior of an individual within his social situation.
The structural and normative influences of a reference group are reflected 
in both intra and intergroup relations. Under conditions of ego-involve- 
ment, intragroup rigidity and intergroup hostility appear. The application 
of a common enemy or constructive siç>erordinate goal may be the most 
effective means of controlling the hostility of intergroup tensions.
Impact of Social Judgment on Rhetorical Theory 
In discussing the failure of a movement to secure the flubridation 
of municipal water supplies, Rosenfield suggested that the crucial 
question must not be "Why did the campaigns fail?" but, instead, "Why 
did the voters resist the caagiaign messages?"^ The answer to Rosenfield's 
question may lie in a qualitative analysis of the way audiences perceive 
both the content and the sources of communication. The social judgment 
approach provides at least one method of viewing the effect that an 
individual's frame of reference has on his perception of and reaction to
The last part of this chapter will investigate the impact of social
judgment, a behavioral science approach, on rhetorical theory.  ^ First, the 
effect of ego-involvement on individual reactions to communications will
S^herif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 217.
2
Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "Rhetorical Criticism and an Aristotelian 
Notion of Process," Speech Monographs. XXXIII (March, 1966), l6.
%ebergall contends, in the paper already cited, that the social 
judgment approach satisfies the two salient characteristics of rhetorical 
theory, namely, the (l) accurate description of the phenomenon to be 
studied, and (2) reliable predictions about future attitudes and future 
behaviors.
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be described. Second, the relationship between social judgment and 
rhetorical theory will be delineated.
Individual Reactions to Communications
People are not blank sheets of paper on which the communicator
makes some verbal etchings in the form of communication. Instead, the
audience, whether singular or plural, brings to the rhetorical situation
a set of evaluative categories which determine the kinds of perceptions
and reactions that will result. Davidson supports the notion that
the communicator's audience is not a passive recipient»—it cannot be 
regarded as a lump of clay to be molded by the master propagandist. 
Rather, the audience is made up of individuals who demand something 
from the communications to which they are emosed, and who select 
those that are likely to be useful to them.^
The effect of ego=involvement on the frame of reference has
already been described. The purpose, here, will be to relate the concept
of ego»involveraent directly to the perception of persuasive messages. The
principles to be discussed at this point will reflect the dimensional
nature of attitudes in that they are more or less present, depending on
the intensity of the attitude under consideration. First, ego=invclve=
ment influences the perceptions of communications. Second, ego=involve=
ment influences the number of positions which are perceived. Third, ego-
involvement influences the assessment that will be made of the message.
Effect of Ego-lnvolvement on Perception
A st''idy of the perception of communications involves an analysis 
of (l) what the individual perceives and (2) how he perceives it. First,
C^ited in Raymond A, Bauer, "The Obstinate Audience: The Influence
Process from the Viewooint of Social Communication," American Psvchclogist. 
x n  (May, 1964), 319.‘
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the selective nature of perception was discussed earlier in this chapter.
In summary of that discussion,- however, it should be recalled that 
individuals are not capable of attending to every stimulus within their 
perception ranges but must focus on a limited number of stimuli at a 
given time. Stagner points out that
The answer to this question is found in the principle of selective 
perception. The principle operates even in the sinpler levels of 
perceiving objects; one learns to disregard confusing cues, e.g., when 
viewing through colo3*ed lenses, through inverted prisms, etc. To 
survive, man must leam to sift the information coming in, emphasize 
some items, and ignoM others.^
In short, an individual is not capable of perceiving everything at 
a given moment but tends to select ideas which he favors but ignores ideas 
which he does not favor. Bone and Ranney, in relating this principle to 
political campaign communications, point out that
The partisan viewers and readers, moreover, for the most part 
"tune in" only messages from the side they favor and "tune out" the 
opposition. Consequently, most political mass communications become 
pep talks to the faithful, not arguments to convert the heathen.
Lazarfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet make the same observation concerning the
perceptions of political cançaigns on the part of voters.
Despite the flood of propaganda and counterpropaganda available to 
the prospective voter, he is reached by very little of it. Arxi, when 
TTO examine what does actually reach him, wo find that he elects to 
:;;.pose himself to the propaganda with which he already agrees, and 
to seal himself off from the propaganda with which he might disagree.^
Second, an individual perceives conmunications in relation to his 
position on the issue. Information which confirms his cognitive structure
R^oss Stagner, "The Psychology of Human Conflict," in The Nature 
of Human Conflict, ed. Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., I965), p. 48.
2
Hugh A. Bens and Austin Rannsy, Politics and Voters (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Coüçany, Inc., I963), p. 37.
^azarfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, p. xx.
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will b® assimilated; information which challenges his cognitive structure 
will be contrasted ard avoided, Berelson, Lasarfeld, and Md*hee suggest 
that
in the course of the canpaign, then, strength of party support 
influences the perception of political issues. The more intensely 
one holds a vote position, the more likely he is to see the political 
environment as favorable to himself, as conforming to himself, as 
conforming to his own beliefs. He is less likely to perceive 
uncongenial and contradictory events or points of view and hence 
presumably less likely to revise his own original position. In this 
manner perception can play a major role in the spiraling effect of 
political reinforcement.1
An individual's position on the issue, consequently, detemines 
how he will perceive a communication. Messages which reinforce his position 
will be accepted; messages which deny his position will be rejected. Hoffer 
insists that a persuasive message penetrates "only into minds already open, 
and rather than instill opinion it articulates and justifies opinitms 
already present in the minds of the recipients."^ The over-all effect of 
political perception, therefore, is to "increase the amount of political 
consensus within the parties and to increase the amount of political 
cleavage between psrties^^ once again, homogeneity within and polarisation 
between."3
Perception, in summary, influences both what a person perceives 
and how he perceives the stimulus he has selected. An individual, espe­
cially under high ego-involvement, selects that which is favorable to him 
and assimilates it; he rejects that which is unfavorable and tunes it out.
B^erelson, Lasarfeld, and MoPhee, p. 223. 
%offer, p. 98.
. =yv4 MoPVkm* . n 01?
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Effect of Ego^ Involvement on Judgmental Categories
Several expsrisasnts, "s'hich wsrs siunsiariEsd in this chapter,
demonstrate that a personally committed individual uses few categories
in judging the positions within the universe of discourse on a social
issue. He does, moreover, see the world as "black" or "white,"
Because of this phenomenon, the ego=involved person attacks all
positions which are not exactly his own. Communications from the opposing
point of view are, of course, rejected. Communications from neutral or
intermediate positions are grouped with the extreme opposition. Finally,
communications from heretics or renegades are likewise grouped with the
opposing positions and are rejected with equal vehemence and determination.
Stagner described this "all-or-nothing" attitude in this statements
The patriot who feels that his nation is threatened will find it 
difficult to tolerate nations following a policy of nonalignment.
The neutral country is an uncertain quantity; and under stress, we 
cannot tolerate this uncertainty, "if you are not for us, you must 
be against us." Thus the neutral is perceived as the enemy,^
A person who becomes extremely rigid in his position will view
all other positions as a single group which he rejects. He is not
sensitive to doctrinal differences or shades of belief. Everyone is
either for or against him. Neutrality or even a moderate view of his
own position is identified with the extreme position.
Effect of Ego-Involvement on the Assessment of a Communication
The degree to which an individual is committed to his position 
determines the standards of fair-unfair, truth-propaganda, and biased- 
unbiased that he will use in assessing a communication. The individual
■^ Stagner, "The Psychology of Human Conflict," n. 57-
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will "protect" his position and his psychological eoimnitment to that 
position by judging subjectively the various commmlcation to #ieh he 
has been exposed „ If he assimilates the communication it will be 
identified as fair, truthful, and unbiased. If he contrasts the 
communication it will be judged as unfair, propagandistic, and biased.
In the 1957 prohibition study conducted by Hovland, Harvey, and 
Sherif, the subjects were exposed to various communications one to three 
weeks after th%r took the initial attitude test,  ^ The wet (repeal) com­
munication was presented to extreme (dry) subjects and unselected subjects. 
The moderate communication was presented to wet, dry» and unselected 
subjects. Following the communication, the same nine-point questionnaire 
for determining the subjects’ attitudes was completed a second time. In 
addition, the subjects were given a test to indicate their assessments of 
the truthfulness of the messages they had heard. The results of the 
experiment may be summarized in the following statements.
First, when the distance between subject's own stand and the 
position advocated in the communication is small, the communication is 
judged to be favorable, fair, and factual. A communication that reinforces 
personal anchorages is, of course, thought to be reliable.
Second, with increasing distance between the two positions, the 
favorable reaction is sharply reduced with the communication being perceived 
as propagandistic and unfair, A communication which challenges precon­
ceived beliefs is viewed an unreliable.
The amount of ego-involvement, then, influences the intensity of the 
reaction to the communication. The highly involved individual perceives 
favorable communications to be more truthfnl than they actually are.
hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, 246-249.
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Furthermore, he considers unfavorable communications to be more biased 
than they actually are,
Ego-involvement, consequently, plays an important role in the 
social judgment process by influencing "why voters resist the campaign 
messages.” In addition to a distortion of perception, ego-involvement 
reduces the number of perceived positions and establishes the kinds of 
adjectives which will be used in assessing the communications from those 
positions. The more ego-involved mis-perceive more statements than the 
less involved; they recognize fewer positions on the issue; they use 
stronger language in assessing the communications within the universe 
of discourse.
Relationship Between Social Judgment and Rhetorical Theory 
The social judgment approach provides a realistic framework for 
a study of audience analysis. Since ego-involvement influences the frame 
of reference, the critic or practitioner should not only determine the 
attitude or attitudes represented in the audience but should also 
consider the personal involvement in those attitudes. The inçact of 
social judgment on rhetorical theory and criticism can best be summarized 
hy discussing the rhetorical alternatives in two situations— high and 
low ego-involvement.
Rhetorical Strategies Under High Ego-involvement
Whenever an audience becomes rigid in the defense of its anchorages, 
little if any possibility exists that a rhetoric of change will be able 
to dislodge them from the entrenched attitudes. In fact, an opposite
■^ For a conçrehensive discussion of this judgmental distortion see 
Sherif, Sherif, ard Nebergall, pp. 133-38.
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reaction might occur, Williams points out that "imparting information
to the more militant of those prejudiced against the group will rarely
produce an immediate change in attitudes and may intensify hostile
reactions; a nonlogical prejudice may be transformed into consciously
irrational hostility.Sherif and HovlaM point out that
another possibility, which was evident in reactions to extreme 
communication oh the political campaign, is that the highly in­
volved individual may move still further away from a divergent 
communication. He retrenches, so to speak, ty taking a stand 
more opposed to the communication than the one he initially upheld.^
Boulding contends that a communication may "serve only to harden and widen 
his core of values and so make agreement all the more difficult.Rhet­
orical theory, as a result, which assumes that any attitude may be changed 
through persuasive discourse is not consistent with human behavior.
This is not to say, however, that rhetoric plays no role under 
conditions of high ego-involvement, A rhetoric of reinforcement could 
serve to (l) strengthen an anchorage which is already held, and (2) influ­
ence the anchorage an individual chooses as dominant when he is subject 
to anchorage "cross-pressure,"
Furthermore, in certain kinds of situations a rhetoric of
a v r o  e n m o  a f f a  / * t  r\%e4 mBVS'î 1 t t  rsm  ' f n a  a w e m v a  a re v r r \ /« a
of a position. Whenever a speaker or writer recognise that his position 
is perceived by an audience as identical with an extreme position, he 
should disengage this position, in the mind of the audience, from the 
objectionable position. In the mayoralty election in New York City in 1965,
2
Sherif and Hovland, p. 1?4. 
Moulding, p. 312.
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Lindsay was able to disengage his candidacy, in the mind of the New York 
voter, from the ’altraconservative image of the Republican party. The 
purpose, here, would be to break up the contrast effect which would 
influence an individual to the left of center from grouping all spokesmen 
and positions to the right of center as identical with the extreme right 
persuasion.
EJgo-involved audiences, consequently, are insulated against a 
rhetoric of change but may be subject to a rhetoric of reinforcement and, 
possibly, a rhetoric of disengagement.
Rhetorical Strategies Under Low Ee o-Involvement
When individuals are less involrred in their anchorages they may 
be influenced by a number of rhetorical factors„ Since they would 
characteristically have larger latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment, 
the persuader has a more flexible situation in which to work. Furthermore, 
since their frames of reference are not as structured, they will be subject 
to external stimuli. Sherif and Sherif contend, for exançle, that "the 
more unstructured, the more uncertain, the st-ira^ilus situation, the 
greater are the effects of social influences (personal suggestion, infor­
mation, group demands, majority opinion, -nd the like) in psychological 
structuring.
Among the external factors which may influence the frame of refer­
ence when relatively unstructured are (l) source credibility, (2) fear
S^herif and Sherif, p, 82.
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arousing appeals, (3) organization of the arguments, and (4) participation 
in persuasion through such devices as role-playing,^
To conclude, people who are personally committed to a stand are 
less susceptible to attitude change in the first place and less responsive 
to variations in communication in the second. Conversely, less committed 
and less involved persons are more susceptible to changing their stands as 
a result of communication and are more responsive to situational factors 
that may provide additional anchorages for their evaluations. The 
difference in behavior on the part of an involved and non«involved audience 
may, therefore, be explained by the effect of eg o-involvement on perception, 
recognition of shades of belief, and evaluation of messages.
Audience analysis, consequently, by a rhetorician, should con­
sider the effect of ego-involvement on the qualitative development of 
positions on social issues. This awareness can contribute to a better 
understanding of the role of rhetoric In social influence.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to (l) describe the social 
judgment-involvement approach to attitude and attitude change, and (2) 
discuss the effect of this approach on group theory and a contemporary 
theory of rhetoric. The two salient characteristics of the social judg­
ment approach which have been delineated in this chapter include percep­
tion- judgment and personal involvement in the issue. The frame of refer­
ence, reflecting the integration of internal and external stimuli.
The best summary of current research in these four areas is found 
in Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, Communication 
and Persuasion (New Havens Yale University Press, 1953).
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influences the way individuals perceive messages and determines their 
behavioral reactions to those perceptions. Ego-involvsment, in turn, 
influences the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment 
which determine the positions on a social issue that will be either 
assimilated or contrasted.
Second, this chapter has examined the effect of this approach 
on both group relations and rhetorical transactions. The influence of 
ego-involvement on group theory has been discussed in terms of intra­
group rigidity and intergroup hostility. Finally, the last part of this 
chapter was concerned with the reactions made by individuals under both 
high and low involvement when exposed to communicative messages.
The next chapter will apply the social judgment approach, as 
it relates to group relations and rhetorical practices, to a broader 
study of the nature of conflict and conpromise.
CHAPTER III
RHETORIC AND COMPROMISE; A THEORETICAL APPROACH
One of the basic characteristics of a democratic society is a
reliance on compromise as a means of reducing conflict %nd engineering
consent. The economist studies conflict and compromise among economic
organizations— management and labor unions. Political science is
interested in conflict resolution among branches of the government,
states, and nations. Sociology studies the role of compromise and
conciliation both within and among racial, religious, economic, and
social groups in our society. Hallowell is probably not overstating
the case when he claims that "cong)romise not only is a worthy, self-
sufficient political ideal but, many insist, is the distinguishing
and essential characteristic of democracy as a form of government.’*^
Simmel corroborates this view by describing compromise as "one of
mankind’s greatest inventions."* Finally, this point has also been
suggested by Charles Bollard, Carl I. Hovland, and Leonard S. Cottrell.
Implicit in democratic theory and practice is the acceptance of 
the fact of conflicting interests and even the positive encouragement 
of the expression of divergent views, aims, and values. However, 
there is the equally important assumption that conflicts can be 
resolved or accommodated by nonviolent means and that intergroup 
hostilities can be kept below the point where the basic consensus
J^ohn H. Hallowell, "Compromise as a Political Ideal," Ethics. 
LP; (April, 1944), 157.
%eorg Simmel, Conflict. trans, Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe. Illinois: 
The Free Press, 1955). p. 115.
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of the society is threatened. The survival of a democratic nation, 
therefore, depends on the invention of techniques for resolving its 
internal group conflicts in such & vsy that the welfare and interests 
of all elements of the community are given adequate consideration in 
the community,^
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate some of the basic 
concepts involved in a theory of rhetoric arsi conçromise. This foimnila- 
tion of a general theory, based on insights from many sources and discip- 
plines, can more accurately be called an "approach" since broad generaliza­
tion about human behavior, especially in conflict situations, may be both 
impossible and misleading. The intent, then, will be to suggest various 
dimensional guide-lines which, at least, will be an initial attempt to 
provide a synthesis of the contributions from many disciplines.
The specific focus, here, will be to consider the role and func­
tion of rhetoric within the anatomy of a controversy. The first part of 
this chapter will discuss the relationship between conflict and compromise; 
the second will consider the interaction of rhetoric with compromise; the 
third will measure the effect of ego-involvement on both rhetoric and 
compromise.
Relationship Between Conflict and Compromise
Since the terras "conflict" and "compromise" are used rather 
liberally in this chapter they should be clearly defined. Conflict, from 
the point of view of Boulding, refers to "a situation of competition in 
which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future 
positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is 
ineoi a^tlble with the wishes of the o t h e r . fhe salient characteristics
•^ Cited in Robin H. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup 
Tensions (New York: Social Science Research Council, 194?), p. vii.
%enneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New Yorks Harper & 
Brothers, 1962), p. 5.
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of this definition include (1) competition, (2) awareness, and (3) 
desire. Competition, in its basic meaning, is broader than conflict 
in that it exists when any potential position of two behavioral units is 
mutually exclusive, Athletic teams, political parties, and individuals 
may "compete" in the sense that they are in a situation in which their 
potential positions are mutually exclusive,  ^ In conflict, however, there 
is a deepening of the competition in that the parties are "aware" that 
the incompatibility of behavior space does exist; both parties "wish" 
to occupy the contested space; and, each party would not hesitate to 
destroy the other in order to gain exclusive occupancy of the behavior 
space. Wright distinguishes between the two by writing:
Conflict, defined as opposition among social entities directed 
against one another, is distinguished from competition defined 
as opposition among social entities independently striving for 
something of which the supply is inadequate to satisfy all. 
Conpetitors may not be aware of one another, while the parties to 
a conflict are.^
Conflict may be handled in two ways. First, a conflict may be
prevented through soma phase of avoidance. Avoidance occurs when (1) one
party removes itself from the field on its own volition; (2) both parties 
withdraw from the field or competition; or (3) one party forcibly removes 
the other.3 In all three cases the basic cause of the conflict, namely, 
joint competition for behavior space, has been eliminated,
^Ibid., p. 4. See also Kurt Singer, "The Resolution of Conflict," 
Social Research. X7I (June, 19^), 230, and Jessie Bernard, "The Concep= 
tualization of Intergroup Relations with Special Reference to Conflict," 
Social Forces. XXH (March, 1951)» 243=51.
^Quincy Wright, "The Nature of Conflict," Western Political 
Quarterly, IV (June, 1951), 197.
Moulding, pp. 3O8-O9.
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The alternate method of managing a conflict is through what 
Boulding calls "procedural conflict conclusion.”^  This type of conflict 
reduction or elimination may take one or more of the following forms.
First, the parties in a dispute are able to reconcile the conflict by 
changing their value systems in such a way so that they will have 
common preferences in their joint field, thus eliminating conflict.
Whenever their values become identical, the satisfaction of one group 
also results in the satisfaction of the other group. Reconciliation 
has ended the conflict.
The second method of resolving the conflict is through 
compromise. Compromise is a means whereby each party is willing to 
settle for something less than the ideal position rather than continue 
the conflict. Although the parties have different optimum positions in 
the joint field, they would prefer, through bilateral negotiation, 
to accommodate the controversy.
Finally, conflict may be concluded through an award which has 
been given by an adjudicating agency or individual who has been brought 
into the dispute as a third party. This becomes possible when both 
parties have consented ahead of time to accept the verdict of the neutral 
person or agency instead of continuing or proliferating the conflict. The 
award method of conflict resolution may also apply in cases where sub-groups 
have agreed to accept the will of tlie majority.
For the purposes of this study, howover, the term "compromise" will 
be broadened to include all the forms of procedural conflict conclusion- 
réconciliation, compromise, and award. A compromise may result, therefore,
^iwd., P. 309.
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when the parties involved alter their goals in such a way so that there 
is harmonyj when the parties, through negotiation, are able to Sacrifice 
non-essential goals or values in order to preserve goals or values of 
higher priority; and, when the parties agree to accept the mediation of a 
third party or the decision of the majority in order to conclude the 
conflict.
Both conflict and compromise are viewed in this study as "amoral" 
activities in that neither is inherently "good" or "bad." Conflict, on 
one hand, makes possible a free enterprise economy and, on the other, leads 
toward a disastrous war. Conpromise provides a means whereby conflicting 
parties are able to discover a meaningful and constructive accommodation 
or, in other situations, it may lead to a "Munich." Hallowell recognized 
this difficulty when he wrote that "compromise can lead just as surely 
to individual degeneration and social decay as it can to individual 
growth and social progress.He concluded by suggesting that "a compromise 
is not good in itself; it is good only if it leads to good results. But 
one can know if it will lead to good results only by subjecting the sub­
stance of the compromise to the test of some ideal goal one hopes to attain.
Conflict, which grows out of intensified competition, may be resol­
ved through avoidance and "procedural conflict conclusion." Both conflict 
and conpromise are amoral and must be evaluated in terms of their goals 
and effects instead of their inherent characteristics.
Relationship Between Rhetoric and Compromise
Although there are many influences which contribute to the act of
■^ Hallowell, 159.
I^bid.fl 163.
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compromise, none is more important than rhetoric, defined previously as 
the "adjusting of ideas to people and people to ideas." McKeon delin­
eated this relationship by suggesting that
the difficulty in planning and resolving conflicts lies, not in the 
multiplicity of elements to be considered or in the incompatibility 
of objectives to be realized, but in the initial establishment of 
the elements as those proper to the problem and in the translation 
of objectives acknowledge verbally into ends practicable in a 
course of action.^
To Bryson, the "rhetoric of conciliation" is identical with the "rhetoric 
of democracy" in that it rests upon the willingness to accept any other 
individual's cooperation, in practical tasks, without demanding that he 
share all our beliefs or that he depend on our ultimate sanctions. In 
summing up his notion of the "rhetoric of conciliation," Biyson wrote:
Here is the creative paradox of a rhetoric of mediation; the 
search for the grounds of mediation; the search for the grounds of 
decision is an effort to bring into a converging force all the 
elements in all the differing opinions that can drive action 
forward. At the same time, the search uncovers the differences 
idiieh cannot be managed aM undertakes to let people live with them 
in peace and friendliness. There are no safe foriaulas \sy idiich 
real differences can be smoothed out. The hope of a rhetoric of 
conciliation is that these differences will prove to be loss in 
number and importance, and less hindering to practical cooperation, 
when all avenues of agreement and difference have been quietly 
explored, vigorously debated, and fairly judged.%
Fisher continues this line of thought by suggesting:
Compromise is a natural invitation to rhetoric. It is a situation 
in which rival factions are at odds with one another, in which an 
effort is made to reconcile or adjust these differences, and in 
reconciliation or adjustment depends on the discovery and persuasive 
presentation of proposals on which rival factions can reach a consensus.3
R^ichard McKeon, "Discussion and Resolution in Political Conflicts," 
Ethics. LIV (July, 19#), 237.
^Lyman Bzyson, "The Rhetoric of Conciliation," Quarterly Journal 
of Speech. XXXIX (December, 1953), #3.
3n'alter R„ Fisher, "The Failure of Compromise in lô6û=166l: A
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Rhetoric or coTnmtmication, however, are not ntopian schemes that 
will lead to an agreeable compromise regardless of the nature of the issue 
or the involvement in that issue. In fact, rhetoric may have the opposite 
effect of blocking rather than clearing the path to an accommodation. 
Boulding develops this point of view by observing!
The elimination of misunderstanding will not necessarily 
eliminate the conflict or produce conçlete reconciliation of 
values and images of the two parties. Indeed, there may be 
occasions when conciliation can actually exacerbate a conflict; 
each party may think, quite wrongly, that the other party 
agrees with him, and the clearing up of this mlsunderstanling 
may make the parties realize that their conflict is deeper than 
they thoughtA
Rhetoric and conçromise, then, interact in the conclusion of 
conflicts involving social issues. The nature of this interaction 
process can be explored by the examination of two concepts. First, the 
interaction between rhetoric and compromise is on both an ideological 
and an interpersonal level. Second, the interaction requires the 
availability of institutions and communicative channels.
Ideational and Interpersonal Interaction
The conplementary nature of the ideological and interpersonal
interaction within a rhetoric of conpromise is firmly grounded in
rhetorical theory. The point of view of a rhetorician has been expressed
by Brockriede when he observed:
If contenporary practice is essentially interactive, the theorist, 
accordingly, might appropriately be concerned along a personal 
dimension with the images that, speakers and audiences have of 
themselves and of one another, along an ideational dimension with
Rhetorical View” (unpublished paper, Department of Speech, University of 
Southern California, 19^ 5), 4. ^  press in Speech Monographs.
B^oulding, pp. 316-17.
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tho strategies for material and formal identification, and with 
the conditions under which the reciprocal images and attitudes 
of speakers and audiences may climige.-
Osgood, in his concept of “congruity,” presents a similar view 
from within social psychology. Osgood argues that in effect message 
and source are inseparable in that the attitude of an individual toward 
one influences his attitude toward the other.  ^ In a simple illustration, 
if a person is an avid supporter of Lyndon Johnson on the personal level 
he is apt to be a supporter of the "Great Society" on the ideational 
level. On the other hand, if an individual is strongly anti-Johnson he 
is likely to view any of Johnson’s ideas with considerable suspicion.
Finally, the philosophical view of the interaction of these 
processes is provided by Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca. Johnstone writes 
that
for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, most of the inçortant techniques 
of rhetoric depend upon the fact that there is, in the mind of the 
audience, an interaction between the personality of the speaker and 
the propositions he asserts. If the speaker is trusted, his thesis 
will be received with less hesitation than otherwise, and if the 
thesis seems obviously true^  ^the trustworthiness of the propounder 
will appear to be enhanced.-5
The ideational (message) and interpersonal (source) variables 
are ao Interwoven into the rhetorical process that it is difficult if not
IWayns E. Brockriede, "Toward a Contemporary Aristotelian Theory 
of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech. LII (February, 1966), 36.
O^ne of the best discussions of the principle of congruity as it 
relates to attitude change may be found in C. E. Osgood and P. H, Tannen- 
baum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," 
Psychological Review. LXII (January, 1955)» 42=55.
%enry W. Johnstone, Jr., "A New Theory of Philosophical 
Argumentation," in Philosophy. Rhetoric, and Argumentation, ed. Maurice 
Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr." (University Park; The Pennsylvania 
State university Press, 19o5), p. 129,
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impossible to pry them apart. They may be discussed separately, however, 
provided this separate treatment does not imply-exclusive categories.
This section will relate rhetoric and conçiromise from the ideational and 
interpersonal points of view.
Ideational Relationship
Rhetoric shares with compromise the necessity of working from
ideational premises that are jointly held by the factions within a
dispute. Compromise, from this orientation, is theoretically available
when the participants in a controversy possess or perceive that they
possess a common goal or value. In the language of the social judgment
approach, their latitudes of acceptance or noncommitment overlap. From
the viewpoint of Kenneth Boulding, their "boundaries of acceptability"
overlap within the same behavioral space.^
The definition of compromise itself indicates such a reliance
on shared values on the part of both parties. Lasswell finds that
such a theory ^f conçromisel would emphasize the advantages of 
drawing attention to the values which are cherished in common, in 
the hope of avoiding too much concentration upon values which are 
mutually exclusive. When there are many such values held in 
common, success in the pursuit of any particular value is secondary 
to the preservation of the whole network of common interests and 
sentiments.2
The in^ ortance of accepted premises in order to turn a conflict into a
iRoulding, p. 17, points out that "a position in the field is 
acceptable to one of the parties if the party is willing to conclude a 
bargain or enter into some continuing relationship with the other party. 
The field can, therefore, be divided into an acceptable set and a non- 
acceptable set by a boundary of acceptability for each party. If the 
acceptable sets of the two parties do not overlap, that is, if there are 
no points common to both sets, no bargain can be struck."
“Harold D. Lasswell, "Coüçircmise," Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligaan (1931)» 148.
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possible compromise situation was echoed by Hallowell when he wrote
that "if intelligent deliberation is to achieve a solution to conflicts,
it must start from the same or similar premises and have as its goal
the same or similar objects."  ^ The same observation was made by
Williams when he wrote:
Mediation between groups in conflict is possible only when effective 
appeal can be made to a superior value-consensus which transcends 
group differences, e.g. the preservation of a larger community, 
common larger "interests," basic religious values, shared mores, 
etc.2
Fisher points out that "conçromise is not meant to explore and to 
establish what is the good, the true, and the just as abstract conceptions, 
but to reach and implement decisions which reflect these values."3 
Broyles refers to conflicts which do remain within the context of com­
mon acceptance of basic ends or values as "communal" and argues that 
such conflicts are, indeed, amenable to settlement in one form or 
another. Conflicts, however, which occur in a context in which "the 
common acceptance of basic ends or values" does not exist, are called 
"noncommunal" and would be difficult if not impossible to settle peace­
fully.^
Whenever a common value, goal, or premise is not present within 
a controversy, one may be introduced into the confrontation in the 
form of a superordinate goal. In this sense a goal or "issue" is inserted
H^allowell, l64.
W^illiams, p. 75.
%isher, 4.
J^. Allen Broyles, "The John Birch Society: A Movement of Social
Protest of the Radical Right," Journal of Social Issues. XIX (April,
1963), 59.
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into the conflict tdiich makes it "communal" and, as a result, within the 
range of accommodation. Bscause both parties share the superordinate 
goal, compromise becomes theoretically possible as they seek to protect 
and perpetuate the accepted value.
The i^ortance of the presence or perceived presence of an
accepted value or superordinate goal for a conflict to become amenable
to compromise is also reflected in the servant of compromise— a rhetoric
of conciliation. Bitzer contends, in his study of the enthymeme, that
rhetoric must begin with premises held b7 both speaker and audience
because persuasion cannot take place unless an audience views a conelu-
Sion as required by the premise it subscribes to. Weaver echoes this
reliance by rhetoric on shared premises by stating that
it may not hurt to state that this [ênthymea^ is the syllogism with 
one of the three propositions missing. Such a syllogism can be used 
only when the audience is willing to supply the missing proposition.
The missing proposition will be "in their hearts," as it were; it 
will be their agreement upon some fundamental aspect of the issue 
being discussed. If it is there, the orator does not have to supply 
it; if it is not them, he may not be able to get it in any way— at 
least not as orator.^
Whenever a controversy, then, involves questions of value or 
truth instead of matters of expediency that reflect the accepted concepts 
of value and truth, the confrontation is dialectical instead of rhetorical. 
In this context dialectic means a process of rational analysis or specula­
tive thought designed to discover the philosophical and moral truths 
involved in a particular controversy. In the Platonic sense, dialectic 
provides the method of discovering the "Truth"; rhetoric provides the method
L^loyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech. XLV (December, 1959), 40^ .
%leîi«rd n. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1953), pp. 173=74.
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of presenting the "Truth."There is no true rhetoric without dialectic," 
WesTsr concludes, "for dialectic provides that basis of high speculation 
about nature without which rhetoric in the narrower sense has nothing to 
work on.Compromise, therefore, is a rhetorical activity which thrives 
on expediency in the search of practical proposals; it is not a dialectical 
activity which is employed in search of philosophical and moral truths. 
Rhetoric and compromise, consequently, share an interest in the 
existence of common goals or values, however abstract, idilch can be 
appealed to in resolving practical and expedient issues. Rhetoric and 
compromise thrive on "communal" conflicts but are both negated in "non­
communal" disputes. In this context Hallowell claims:
If there is no agreement on fundamentals, there can be no 
discussion worthy of the name, no common policy, no compromise 
that is anything but the extraction of concessions by force, no 
assurance that humian dignity will be respected.3
Interpersonal Relationship
The importance of inteipersonal relations to both rhetoric and 
compromise does not need an extended apology in this study. The ability 
and willingness to compromise is, in part at least, based on the degree 
to which the parties in\rol?ed respect the motives and intents of their
See William M. Sattler, "Socratic Dialectic and Modern Group 
Discussion," Quarterly Journal of Speech. XXIX (^ril, 19^ 3), 156; 
Wilbur Sammel Howell, "Nathaniel Carpenter's Place in the Controversy 
Betweto Dialectic ard Rhetoric," Speech Monographs. I (September, 193^ ) 
26-7; Maurice Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal 
of Speech, XLI (April, 1955)* 137; and Albert Duhasssl, "The Function of 
Rhetoric as Effective Expression," Journal of the History of Ideas, X 
(June, 1949), 345.
leaver, p. 17.
%allowell, l64,
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counterparts. This is also true in those situations where a neutral or
third party is brought into the controversy to negotiate a settlement.
The workability of what Boulding has called the "award" system is pre=
dicated upon the amount of faith and confidence both parties have in the
objectivity of the intermediate source or agency, Bernard contends that
mediation is a profoundly moral process; it cannot successfully take 
place unless both parties have faith in the integrity of the mediator. 
Both parties, furthermore, must inhabit the same moral universe, 
otherwise there will be no understanding. For success, both parties 
must want a solution,^
Suspicion, mistrust, personfJ. bitterness, and like sentiments 
are the natural enemies of compromise. Simmel has described a situation 
in which a party would ordinarily give up the struggle because of a 
concession offered ly the other faction but fails to do so "merely 
because it is offered by the opponent,"^  Furthermore, Broyles suggests 
that when a conflict is "initiated on and remains on a highly acrimon­
ious tone," it will probably not be concluded peacefully,^
Inquiry into the relationship between the rhetor and respondent 
on the interpersonal level is as old as Aristotle. The Greek rhetorician, 
in his concept of ethos, codified the doctrine of ethical proof under 
the categories of wisdom, character, and good will.^ The speaker who
■^ Jessie Bernard, "The Sociological Study of Conflict," in The Nature 
of Conflict, ed. Jessie Bernard, T. H. Pear, Raymond Aron, and Robert C. 
Angell (New York: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, 1957), p, HI.
S^immel; p. U5.
B^royles, 58-9.
Vor a thorough discussion of the doctrine of ethos see William 
H. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," Speech Monographs. 
xrv (1949), 55-65.
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possessed, in the perceptions of the audience, -these characteristics 
«as EOFÔ likely to persuade that audience than the speaker with less 
"ethos."
In modern rhetorical theory the term ethos has been largely 
replaced by the concept of source credibility. Whether one chooses to 
Identify the interpersonal relations between the speaker or communicator 
and the audience as ethos or source credibility, the meaning is the 
same. Both refer to an ii o^rtant dimension of the rhetorical transaction. 
Both compromise and rhetoric share the basic factors of the 
ideational and interpersonal dimensions of their interaction. Conpro- 
mise and rhetoric rely on values, pxremises, or goals jointly held by the 
participants; both are influenced by the interpersonal relations which 
exist among the parties to the conflict. These two dimensions, however, 
are interrelated ard interdependent. Personal hostility can destroy 
ideational harmony; divergent ideologies can turn friends into enemies.
Stmctural Interaction 
Rhetoric, operating on both the ideational and interpersonal 
levels, serves conpromise in the discovery of possible grounds of 
agreement. This takes place through the basic structural components 
of compromise— institutions and channels of comnunication.
Institutions
An institution, in this context, refers to an organization or 
negotiating agency which serves as the focal point for the conciliation of 
a conflict. Among such institutions that perform this function are
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law-making bodies, boards of arbitration, national conventions, or 
confederations of parties, states, or nations.
The institution may be either permanent or tençorary. Insti­
tutions which are engaged in a continual search for compromise, such as 
the United Nations, are always available for the purposes of conflict 
resolution. On the other hand, certain types of institutions may be 
created on a temporary or contingency basis. The settlement of the 
dispute will create a situation in which the institution is no longer 
needed, so it will be either disbanded or withdrawn from the field.
Whether the institution is permanent or temporary, however, it 
still serves a useful purpose in the resolution of disputes. Boulding 
underlines the importance of such organizations when he wrote that "when 
procedural conflict proves inadequate to deal with the intensity of the 
conflict in society or when there are no institutions for procedural 
conflict, violence is likely to result."^ To substantiate this claim, 
Boulding cites the example of the First World War which, he argues
might well have been scotched in the six weeks before its outbreak 
if communications had been better and if there had been a quite 
simple apparatus of mediation; it was, at least at that moment, a 
war that nobody really wanted, and that happened because of a 
dynamic process that bred misunderstandings and misinterpretations
of intention.2
Channels of Communication
Rhetoric also serves compromise by acting through various 
channels of communication. Throe such channels exist at some point in 
the development of a controversy. First, the two parties in the dispute
B^oulding, pp. 322=23,
I^bid.. p. 325.
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may have access to each other. As the conflict deepens, however, tho 
availability of such a communication channel is sharply reduced. Boulding 
observes that "messages between the parties have to pass through an 
intense emotional field in which they are likely to be distorted so that 
the image that each party has of the other's position may be quite false. 
Furthermore, Stagner points out that "perceptual distortions and percep­
tual rigidities block communication between groups in conflict.
Second, the two parties may communicate through an intermediate or 
third party. Since the neutral party is, more or less, outside the 
emotional field which has been charged by the controversy, it is in a 
better position to transmit messages between the parties with more accuracy 
provided, of course, the intermediary is actually perceived to be neutral 
by both parties. The conciliator or mediator may perform three functions 
within the anatomy of a dispute. First, he may insure that the parties 
involved see all the trading opportunities which may, in intense rivalry, 
be missed because of inadequate communication of suspicious motives.
Second, the adjudicating party may be able to introduce new variables 
into the dispute in order to avoid an impasse which may have resulted from 
the lack of t^ e raw material of concessions and trade. Finally, the mediator 
may, from his relatively uninvolved vantage point, introduce a possible 
bargain which will be acceptable to both parties. The third party is not, 
moreover, totally without power since he may be able to influence public 
opinion in such a way to pressure one or both recalcitrants to reconsider 
a possible accommodation. In short, conflicts may result in meaningful
^Ibid.; p. 316
^oss Stagner, "Personality Dynamics and Social Conflict," 
Journal of Social Issues. XVII, No, 3 (1961), 41.
83
compromises through the intervention of a neutral, intermediary agency
into the dispute, Coser contends:
The mediator shows each party the claims and arguments of the other; 
they thus lose the tone of subjective passion. He helps to strip 
the conflict of its non-rational and aggressive overtones. Yet this 
will not in itself allow the parties to abandon their conflicting 
behavior since, even boiled down to the "facts of the case," the 
conflicting claims remain to be dealt with. The mediator's function 
is primarily to eliminate tension which merely seeks release so that 
realistic contentions can be dealt with without interference. In 
addition he may suggest various ways to conduct the conflict, point­
ing out the relative advantages and costs of each.
Third, in addition to intergroup and intermediate communication, 
the leaders within a particular reference group may have some flexibility 
in influencing, through rhetoric, the group norms. Hartley points out 
that attitude
changes can be brought about (1) by creating new reference groups 
with which the individual can identify; (2) by charging the relative 
dominance of the reference groups on the individual; (3) through 
skillful leadership, changing the norm in some one particular of 
existing dominant reference groups; or (4) changing the individual's 
perception of the norm of his reference groups.2
There are so many variables involved in this process that a full discussion
o
of intragroup communication and influence should be sought elsewhere.''
That this channel of communication is available in certain kinds of contro­
versies is, however, obvious. The relative value of intragroup rhetoric
^ewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, 
Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. 59. See also Elmore Jackson,
Meeting of Minds : A Way to Peace Through Mediation (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952).
2
Eugene L. Hartley, "The Social Psycholcgy of Opinion Formation," 
Public Opinion Quarterly. XIV (Winter, 1950), 6?4,
-^ See, for example, the chapter on "Leadership" in Paul F. Secord 
and Carl W. Backman, Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1964), pp. 252—72.
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in resolving conflicts depersis on the nature of the controversy and the 
degree of rigidity of the group norm. Even leaders may be branded as 
"renegades" or "heretics" if they openly challenge a cherished group 
norm.^
Compromise, then, is an effective means of conflict resolution 
when its necessary counteipart, rhetoric, is able to operate from 
accepted premises within an atmosphere of a relative amount of mutual 
trust and has, at its disposal, the necessary institutions and channels 
with which to "adjust ideas to people and people to ideas."
Effect of Bgo-Involvement on Rhetoric and Compromise
The last part of this chapter will examine the effect that an 
intense conflict has on the effectiveness of the rhetoric of conciliation 
and, ultimately, the success of compromise. Ego-involvement, already 
defined in Chapter II, describes the kinds of attitudes which reflect 
man’s self-image and world-view. These attitudes, which may be held 
by individuals or groups, become more intense when they are challenged 
by other individuals or groups. In short, conflict situations are 
natural breeding grounds for ego-involved attitudes.
The purpose of this discussion will be to measure the effect of
ego-involvement on (l) the ideational, interpersonal, and structural
aspects of rhetoric and compromise and (2) the anatomy of a controversy.
Effect of Ego-Involvement on the Dimensions of
Rhetoric and Compromise
Whenever parties within a dispute become highly ego-involved in a
■^ See Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, ^  Outline of Social 
Psychology (New Yorks Harper aM Row, 1956), pp. 211-22.
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controversy, they tend to erect ideological defenses of their positions; 
brand the opposing party as an ''enemy"; and ■undermine the structures 
and channels of communication and negotiation. Edelman, in his study of 
politics and symbolism, describes this process in the following terms;
When, on the issues that arouse men emotionally, there is a 
bimodal value structuring, threat and insecurity are maximized.
Those who hold the other value become the enemy. Under these 
circumstances condensation symbolism and mental rigidity become 
key factors in social interaction.
Effect on the Ideational Dimension
Three factors influence the development of an ideological position,
separate and distinct from that of the other disputant. First, ego-
involved proponents of a position seek to justify their rigid stand by
developing an abstract, philosophical defense of that point of view. As
a result, the highly committed individual is able to justify his stand on
the basis of "principle" instead of the pragmatic considerations of
"interest." Conflicts on the abstract level, which transcend personal
interests, are likely to be more radical and merciless than conflicts over
immediate "selfish" issues. Summarizing Simmel, Coser says that
the consciousness of speaking for a superindividual "right" or system 
of values reinforces each party's intransigence, mobilizing energies 
that would not be available for mere personal interests and goals.
He j^imme^ bases this assertion on two arguments: (1) that
■Sîurray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1964), p. I75. Edelman further suggests that "a 
multimodal scattering of values is the opposite extreme. In this situa­
tion a very large part of the population is likely to see some merit in 
both sides of the argument: to be ambivalent and at the same time free to 
explore the possibilities of alternative courses of action. A minimal 
fraction of the population is frozen in a narrow class or other fixed 
grouping, and a major fraction is marginal and searching for a synthesis. 
Value structuring is therefore relatively slight. Rather than a fixed 
past and future, accepted with passion and carrying clear ijçlications 
for present behavior, alternative possibilities can be recognized and 
pluralistic politics supported. The preconditions exist for cognitive 
planning, negotiation, and logrolling.V Ibid.. p. r?6.
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Individuals enter into a superindividual conflict as the represen­
tatives of groups or ideas; and (2) that they are imbued with a 
sense of respectability and self-righteousness since they are not 
acting for "selfish" reasons.
Therefore, a struggle is intensified when it becomes depersonalized 
and becomes depersonalized when it is intensified. The process of ab­
straction to a higher ideological level can, consequently, transform an 
interest group into an ideological movement, thus increasing the degree 
of ego-involvement.
Second, the tendency toward abstraction also serves to magnify 
the points of difference between the hostile parties within a dispute.
The "enemy" must be made to appear radically and significantly different 
from the in-group. As Boulding observed, "an ideology often increases 
its power because it runs into opposition, and two mutually opposed
ideologies reinforce each other, and each may even increase the
2
power of the other hy the modifications that it engenders."
This mutual reinforcement may take several forms. First, a 
belligerent attitude on the part of one party will be met with a bellig­
érant attitude on the part of the other party. Furthermore, even a 
series of concessions on the part of one faction may contribute to the 
increase in social distance between the conflicting units. Simmel argued 
that "every concession of the other side, which is only partial anyway, 
threatens the uniformity in the opposition of all members and hence the 
unity of their coherence on which a fighting minority must insist
Coser, p. 112. Erie Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper 
and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1951)» P. 50, makes the same point in that "to 
ripen a person for self-sacrifice he must be stripped of his individual 
identity and distinctness. The most drastic way to achieve this end is 
by the complete assimilation of the individual into a collective body,"
B^oulding, p. 280.
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without compromise,"^ Therefore, in extreme conflict situations practically 
any action on the part of one group will facilitate the further entrench­
ment of the competitor in its divergent position. The exception, here, 
would be what would amount to a complete capitulation on the part of one 
of the parties as it removes itself from the behavioral field in a foimi 
of avoidance.
Third, the growth of an ideological position is part of a 
vicious cycle. The more a group becomes committed to its position the 
more the ideas it supports become integrated into the life of the group.
As these concepts permeate the structure and life of the group it tends 
to become even more rigid. As a result, ideological positions which 
"infect" more areas of a group's activity are more ego-involving,
Boulding described this cycle;
The power of an ideology depends in large measure on its 
ability to organize a culture around it. An ideology is a view of 
the universe. It must give the individual a sense of the drama in 
which he is acting and the role that he has to play. It must be 
able to resolve doubts and bewilderments and to explain messages that 
apparently contradict it. It will be stronger and more persistent 
if the culture that it organizes contains structures, symbols, 
occasions, and agencies such as cathedrals, monuments, rituals, 
elections, churches, parties, and schools, that transmit and 
reinforce the ideology.
Attitudes, on the ideological dimension, become more ego-involv­
ing because of the depersonalization of the stand, the "foil and counter­
foil" interaction with the "eneny," and the adoption of the ideology as 
the sine quo non of the group's world-view.
The interaction of the bipolarized ideologies, in the Boulding 
system, can occur in three patterns. First, the two ideologies may merge.
'^ Simmel, p. 97. 
B^oulding, p. 280.
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much in the manner of Hegel's dialectic, to form a synthesis or
tertium quid. Second, the defense of an ideolo^ may require the pattern
of isolation or segregation.
Where an ideology is exposed to strong counterideologies in its 
environment, its adherents may resort to the defense of their 
ideology by withdrawing from the hostile environment into an 
insulated subculture where the ideology is continually reinforced 
by mutually supportive cossiunicationo and where hostile oommmi- 
cations from outside are siaply cut off
The third pattern of interaction, according to Boulding, has 
already been mentioned in the chapter. This pattern, which usually 
takes place in the early days of the development of an ideology when it 
is fighting to differentiate itself sharply from the world around it, is 
called "mutually divergent modification.
Whenever the bimodal value system is formed within a controversy 
and is reinforced by either the pattern of isolation or mutually divergent 
modification, the tendency is for both sides to develop the "either-for- 
rae-or-against-me" syndrome. This process, which was introduced in 
Chapter II, occurs here on the doctrinal level. First, the doctrin­
aire individual fails to recognise differences among the positions on the 
other side of the continuum. As has been demonstrated in the contrast 
effect, ail the positions on the other side are skewed toward the extreme 
and boccme identical with it, in the individual’s perceptions. Second, 
the neutral position, because it occupies middle ground and refuses to 
declare for the extremist, is likewise grouped with the "ene^." Finally, 
the ego-involved individual views the ideological position of the heretic, 
even though it nay be a mild version of his own, as being the same as the
~Ibld.. p. 284. 
^Ibid.. p. 285,
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opposing extreme position.
Ego-involvement, therefore, sabotages a "communal” conflict on 
the ideational dimension and destroys any existing values or premises 
ïdiich could conceivably connect the two factions. Both parties see the 
world in "black" or "white" and insist that neither neutrality or milder 
shades of their positions can exist. Thomas defined this klM of situa­
tion wiien he wrote: "When a controversy becomes a moral issue idxerein
opponents each see right and justice as altogether on their side, then 
there is no further hope of conçromise.
Effect on the Interpersonal Dimension
Since the ideological split requires the viewing of the opponent 
as the "enemy," strong emotional responses are likewise activated. As a 
result, deterioration occurs in the interpersonal as well as ideational 
aspects of the dispute. Just as the ego-involved individual has difficulty 
discriminating among doctrinal positions on the spectrum, he also questions 
the motives and integrity of those represented by the various shades of 
belief. People irtio hold the opposing point of view or even the neutral 
position arc psrcsivsd as either knaves or fools, rurthermore, those 
supporting a position only slightly removed from the orthodox view are 
subject to the same description.
This kind of interpersonal hostility is heightened somewhat when
B^enjamin P. Thomas, Theodore Weld; Crusader for Freedom (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1950), p. 238. "We
may find that people whom we decide are "beyond the reach of reason* be­
cause they remain on the other side of the fence on an issue, are likely 
to charge us with unreasonableness, prejudice, and emotion. If either 
side is to get across to the other, the only alternative is for the 
parties to escape the tyranny and blinding influence of their
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the conspiracy or "devil” theory becomes the accepted doctrine of the 
group, Rlstory is full of examples of hatred and bigotry among organisa- 
tions, nationsf and races. Whereas all members of the out-group are 
viewed with suspicion, all members of the in-group are above reproach. 
EJgo-involvement blinds individuals to both ideational differences and 
interpersonal objectivity.
Effect on the Structural Dimension
When such firm positions develop within a dispute, the institu­
tions, either permanent or teaçorary, become virtually useless as 
legislation is stymied, organizations are split, confederations are 
severed, and arbitration agencies are rejected by both parties as instru­
ments of the "enemy." Any kind of negotiation with the opposing group 
through any media is viewed as evil "coexistence" or, at least, dangerous 
appeasement.
Furthermore, the channels of communication from the viewpoint 
of both the message and the source are blocked. Messages from the 
opposite party are categorically rejected: communications from the "neutral" 
source are displaced; individuals within the same reference group who 
indicate "heretical" tendencies are quickly censored.
Extreme ego-involvement, then, destroys the process of communi­
cation as it creates both ideational cleavages and interpersonal 
hostilities. The end result is the disruption in the influence of 
rhetoric, and consequently, the destruction of compromise.
entrenched premises or stands and to examine the premises of the other 
side," Carolyn W, Sherif, Mifsafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebezgall, Attitude 
and Attitude Change (Philadelphia: W, B, Saunders Company. 1965),
pp. 2-3.
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Effect of Ego-involvement on the Anatomy of a Controversy 
The effect of ego-involvement on the anatomy of a conflict 
can best be described as a qualitative and quantitative intensification 
of the polarized positions near the ends of both wings of the continuum, 
For the sake of clarity, the following diagram represents, in sinpli- 
fled fashion, the possible positions within a comprehensive controversy.
Extreme Moderate Conservative Neutral Conservative Mofkrate Extreme
These positions should not be viewed as exclusive ccmpartments but, 
instead, are dimensional in that they move from one extreme position to 
another through numerous moderate stands as well as a neutral position. 
This spectrum corresponds in type to the "left-fight* political 
continuum lAieh represents the spatial relationships among political 
concepts with the extreme right-wing representing fascism and the 
extreme left representing communism.^
The intensification on a qualitative dimension occurs as the 
entire wing of the continpum moves toward a more rigid position on the 
particular issue. The extreme position will be even more extreme; the 
moderate and conservative positions will be less moderate and conser­
vative. The same process is occuring simultaneously in the other
^here is some disagreement as to the validity of the left-right 
political model for the structuring of attittsies. Jerry Eugene Pournsile, 
"The American Political Continuum: An Examination of the Validity of the 
Left-Right Model as an Instrument for Studying Contemporary American 
'Isms,(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Government, 
University of Washington, 1964), p. 149, points out that "the Left-Eight 
Model of politics is sot only inadequate for analysis of tho Aasricaa 
scene, but dangeroua: that it leads to a blurrir» of theoretical distinc­
tions between perspectives which must be seen as differing from each 
other."
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wing ao that the total effect of the intensification is a literal 
pulling apart of the two wings of the spectrum.
The second type of intensification is quantitative ■iji the sense 
that the point of assimilation or polarization which will ultimately 
capture the attention and commitment of most of the people on that 
side of the continuum will, in most oases, tend to locate itself between 
the extreme and moderate positions instead of between the moderate and 
conservative positions. Instead of the population being dispersed 
evenly along the spectrum, the individuals and groups will be skewed 
to a polarized position. This position will be somewhat ambiguous in 
that it speaks the language of extremism but advocates the policies of 
moderation. The condition described here is in reaction to a conflict 
situation instead of a coo^ etitive engagement. Whenever the confronta­
tion falls into the competition classification, the assimilation point 
will tend to be closer to the middle of the wing of the continuum.^
This kind of conflict, moreover, is described by Dahl as •'severe 
disagreement: symmetrical" in that extremism dominates the controversy.
In addition to the move toward the more extreme position by 
the moderates and conservatives, there is a corresponding shift to what
" B^ums discusses in some detail the inçortanoe of a political 
party being able to discover the "vital center" ao that the party will 
include "conservatives ^ o  grumble that it is going too fast, activists 
who coiq>lain about its inertia, and moderate party leaders lAo seek to 
hold thô t^wô groups together and put the party in the right tactical 
position for engaging the ene;^ ," See James KacGregor Bums, The Dead­
lock of Democracy; Four-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, and Co., I9Z3), p. 60.
2
Robert A, Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press. 1956), p. 98.
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appears to be a more moderate position by a segment of the more realistic 
extremists. Boulding described this process when he wrote:
The conflict of ideologies is a dynamic process, and ideologies 
themselves c<mstantly change through time. A very common pattern is 
for an ideology to emerge as the result of the rise of a charismatic 
leader. In its early years the ideology is intense and narrow in its 
appeal. It grows by separating out from the mass of the society a 
small subculture of dedicated people, idio differentiate themselves 
very sharply fr^ the mass culture and are frequently persecuted both 
by its official and its unofficial rspr-ssentatives. If the power 
of the ideology is sufficient, however, it may develop to the point 
where it becomes a dominant ideology in the society. As it approaches 
this point, the character of the ideology changes: it becomes less
Intense and of wider appeal, reflecting a movement toward a maximum 
of power.^
This is not to say, however, that all the extreme elements are able to 
make this adjustment in order to gain quantitative e^ort. There is 
usually a die-hard band of radicals who view such popularisation as a 
sell-out to the "enemy." These radicals, who are characteristically 
agitators and not politicians, lose control of the movement and are, in 
many cases rebuffed by it.^
The moderate and conservative supporters, then, move toward 
the more aoctrems position, in a qualitative intensification; a portion 
of the extremist supporters moves toward the moderate position in a 
quantitative intensification. The moderates and oconservatives make a 
doctrinal shift; the more radical element govas "toward a maximum of power.^  
The qualitative and quantitative changes which occur within the anatoay 
of a dispute may be summarized in the following postulates.
First, most of tho communioation that is produced during the
Moulding, p. 262.
Coffer, p, 17, points out that "a »ov««ent is pioneered by men of 
words, materialized by fanatics and consolidated by men of action," The 
distinctions he makes amo% these three kinds of individuals and the role 
play in a mass movement are very useful to a student of human behavior.
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controversy is between the rigid, extremist positions. Radical 
agitators are inherently more vocal as they attack what they consider 
to be wrong with society. Conversely, the moderate and conservative 
positions are put on the defensive. Because of this, the language of the 
extremist is perceived as representative of the entire wing of the 
continuum— at least in the eyes of those on the other side. This 
reinforces the stereotyping effect in that conservative and moderate 
voices are not heard as well in the other group. Even if they were 
heard they would be subject to the contrast effect in that th^ will be 
grouped, especially by the radicals, with the extremist position.
Second, opinion leaders, who are not necessarily extremists, use 
the language of extremism in order to identify the "enemy" as the entire 
opposite wing. Politicians, as they appeal for votes, feel the need to 
out»flank each other by taking a more extreme stance than their opponent 
in order to prove their superior patriotism. Once the support has been 
secured, however, it is sometimes difficult to retract. This problem has 
been discussed at length by J. David Singer in his study of international 
relations.
The tragedy is, of course, that at about the time the political 
elites discover what they have set in motion, it is extremely costly 
to sssk to slow or reverse it. They discover that their domestic 
pay=off structure is full of rewards for continuing to feed the 
hostility and the jingoism, and loaded with penalities if they hesitate 
to do so. Normally, the would-be peacemaker loses out (at the polls, 
in the smoke-filled rooms, or whatever the path to political power) 
to the sabre-rattler and the demagogue. As a consequence, the 
holder or seeker of domestic power finds himself seriously inhibited 
from "doii% business with the enecy. Bargaining is seen as appease­
ment, quid pro quo concessions represent capitulation, and serious 
negotiation may be denounced as trsason.l
■J, David Singer, "The Political Science of Human Conflict," in 
The Nature of Human Conflict, ed. Elton B, McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentioe^all, Inc., Î965), p. 146.
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Third, the parties to a dispute may take a more extreme position 
for the purposes of ir^ roving their relative bargaining positions. Zinn 
asserts that
two factors demand recognition by moderates who disdain "extreme" 
positions on the ground that compromise is necessary. One is the 
above-mentioned point that the early projection of an advanced 
position ensures a conqpromise on more favorable terms than would 
be the case where the timorous reformer conçromises at the start 
(in which case the result is a compromise upon a coüçromise, since 
he will be forced to retreat even from his retreat after all the 
forces are calculated at the social weighing-in). The other is 
that there is a huge difference between the passive wisher-for-a- 
ohai%e who quietly adds up the factors and makes a decision as to 
lAich is the composition of all existing forces, and the active 
reformer who pushes so hard in the course of adding-up that the 
composite itself is changed.^
If the other side is motivated to the same kind of action, the end
result may be a type of escalation which may not end until the two
positions have became so distant and entrenched that peaceful conflict
resolution is no longer feasible nor desired.
Fourth, the moderates and conservatives may appear to support 
the extremist position when thqy identify with the supporters of that 
position on other issues. For example, the moderate, as he resents the 
brutal attacks on the entire wing of the continuum from the opposite 
extreme, may, in defending the right of the radicals on his wing to 
believe and communicate their ideology, ultimately identify himself 
with that position. The two vocal extreme positions, as thqy interact, 
produce exactly what is required to strengthen and accelerate the extwmity 
of the other.
Fgo-involvement, therefore, creates a dynamic situation within
ü^oward Zinn, "The Tactics of Agitation," in Antislavery Vanguard; 
wew Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin B. Dubsrman (Princetonj Prince-
ton university rress, lyo^ ;, p.
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a controversy that tends to produce a bimodal polarization closer to the 
extreme wings than occurs in less involved competitive confrontations, 
This qualitative and quantitative interaction process is accentuated 
by those factors which distort an objective analysis of the "real" 
issues involved in the controversy. Both ideational and interpersonal 
distortions create an atmosphere of confusion, hostility, misunderstand­
ing, and alienation.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to integrate the concepts discussed in 
Chapter H  into a broader context of rhetoric and compromise. The 
laçact of the social judgment approach on the interrelationship of 
rhetoric and conçromise was delineated on the ideational, inter­
personal, and structural levels. The forces which reject the rhetoric 
of change as an effective instrument of reconciliation also doom tto 
fruits of rhetoric, namely, compromise. These processes of perception 
and ego-involvement are also instrumental in the polarization of a 
conflict so that it no longer is amenable to some form of accommodation.
The theory of rhetoric and compromise which was developed 
in this oiiapter will be applied, in the next three chapters, in the 
ante-bellum controversy between the North and the South. Chapter 4v will 
seek to explain the historical, political, social and cultural, and 
rhetorical backgrounds to that controversy.
CHiPTER IV
BACKGROÜSD TO THE i860 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
During the iwfttad controversy over the Conçroœise of I65O,
John C. Calhoun, the leading spokesman of Southern nationalism, made 
the following prediction:
The Union is doomed to dissolution, there is no mistaking 
the signs, I am satisfied in ny judgment that even if the 
questions which now agitate Congress were settled to the 
satisfaction and the concurrence of the Southern States, it 
would not avert, or materially delay, the catastrophe. . . .
The mode by which it will be is not so clear; it may be brought 
about in the manner that none now forsee. But the probability is 
it will ejqjlode in a Presidential election.^
Ten years later, during the presidential election of i860, the forces
of extremism that yielded to conpromise in the previous decade had
reached their zenith. The caiq)algn and election in i860 served to
articulate and crystalize the divisive attitudes which intensified the
sectionalism between North and South.
In order to understand the role of the I860 election in the 
broader setting of the eve of conflict, it becomes necessary to describe 
the atmosphere in which the cançaign was enacted. This is inçortant for 
at least two reasons. First, an event or movement is the product of 
many forces, influences, or pressures. This is what Hoffer had in
Cited in Gerald M, Capers, John C. Crihoun; Opportunist 
(Gainsville; University of Florida Press, 19vO), p. 252.
97
98
mind \di®n he wrote:
No matter how vital we think the role of leadership in the rise 
of a mass movement, there is no doubt that the leader cannot create 
the conditions which make the rise of a movement possible. He 
cannot conjure a movement out of the void. There has to be an 
eagerness to follow and obey, and an intense dissatisfaction with 
things as they are, before movement and leader can make their 
appearance. When conditions are not ripe, the potential leader, 
no matter how gifted, and his holy causes, no matter how potent, 
remain without a following.^
Cantril has applied this concept in his study of such social movements
as lynchings. Father Divine's organization, the Oxford Group, the
p
Townsend Plan, and the Nazi Revolution. In each case Cantril examines 
the movement in light of the background factors which interacted to give 
it life. Since events or movements are influenced by and, in turn, 
influence their unique situations, the critic or observer should 
consider these factors in his analysis.
Second, the critic of events or movements should apply a 
standard of judgment consistent with the alternatives known and available 
to the people involved in a particular unit of study, Nevins discusses 
this notion in relation to historical research and criticism.
It remains to mention one special difficulty in using historical 
evidence in solving historical problems— the difficulty of eval­
uating events and figures of the far-distant past by the standards 
and atmosphere of their own time, not of ours. The essence of truth 
often depends upon giving the correct setting, material and espec­
ially moral, to an occurrence. Yet the nunc pro tunc fallacy crops 
up repeatedly in even the best writers. Though it is probably 
Iflçossible ever to see events of a past age precisely as men living 
in that age regarded them, we can at least avoid the grosser errors 
of perspective.3
E^ric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper & Row, Pub­
lishers, Inc., 1951)* p. 103.
2
See Hadley Cantril, The PsvcholMcv of Social Movements (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 19^ 3)•
A^llan Nevins, The Gateway to History (New York: Anchor Books,
1962), p. 253.
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Griffin has cautioned that the same nunc pro tunc fallacy should be
avoided when a critic is interested in the "rhetoric of historical
movements." He suggests that the
critic must judge the discourse in terms of the theories of rhetoric 
and opinion indigenous to the times. This principle mewis that the 
critic will operate within the climate or theory of rhetoric and 
public opinion in which the speakers and writers he judges were 
reared, and in which they practiced; in other words, that he will 
measure practice in terms of the theories available, not to himself, 
but to the speakers and writers whom he judges,^
An analysis of the social milieu in which an event or movement 
was spawned is, consequently, necessary in order to understand the 
nature of the phenomena under investigation as well as to provide a 
rationale for criticism or assessment,
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the historical, pol­
itical, social and cultural, and rhetorical influences lAidh permeated 
the caBçaign of i860 and influenced its results. The next two chapters 
will isolate the slavery issue for a more thorough analysis. This 
diapter will focus, primarily, on other factors involved in the 
cançaign which, of course, were not untouched by the slavery controversy. 
The purpose of this section, then, will be to describe the four influences 
which were interwoven into the fabric of mid-19th Century America and 
consider their effect on the campaign, candidates, and voters in the 
summer and fall of I860.
Historical Influences in i860 
The cançaign of I860 was staged in the midst of increasing section­
alism that divided the nation in half and created a feeling of hostility
L^eland H, Griffin. "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech. XXXVIII (April, 1952), 186-8?.
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and alienation between the two sections. By the time the voters 
flocked to the polls on November ?, i860, the nation was well on the 
way to the formation of a separate North and South. This is not to 
say, however, that every citizen had already identified himself as 
either a "Rebel" or a "Yankee" by i860. Not until the first blood was 
spilled in mortal combat did many force themselves to declare for the 
Union or the Confederacy. Even during the war occasional voices of 
protest were heard as many people, in both sections, refused to "rally 
around the flag.
The tendencies toward sectionalism by the time of the November 
election, however, were pronounced enough to justify the observation by 
Charles Mackey, erstwhile editor of the Illustrated London News, that
between Massachusetts and South Carolina, between Vermont 
and Arkansas, between Connecticut and Alabama, there exists as 
great a difference in everything, except language and style of 
dress and architecture, as there does between Scotland and 
Portugal, England and Naples, Wales and the Ionian Islands,^
The Charleston Mercury, claiming to speak for the South, asserted that 
"the North and the South are two nations, made by their institutions, cus­
toms and habits of thought, as distinct as the English and F r e n c h . "3 
Rosehbooffi wrote, in his gtudy of presidential elections, that "sectionalism
D^wight Lowell Dumond, Antislavery Origins of the Civil Was in the 
United States (Ann Arbor; The University of Michigan Press, I96O), p. 2, 
points out that "resistance to centralization of power under President 
Lincoln by the followers of Clement L. Vallandigham was as bold and defiant 
as it was to the arbitraiy acts of President Davis by the followers of 
William L. Yancey and Alexander H. Stephens."
C^ited in Henry Savage, Jr., Seeds of Time; The Background of 
Southern Thinking (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), p.~^ 9.
C^ited in Avery 0. Craven, Civil War in the Making. 1815-1860 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959), p, 102.
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triumphed in both North and South in 1860."^ Catton and Catton were
probably correct when they observed that
the American experiment had apparently produced two distinct 
societies(, the one free and the other slave, each with its own 
set of values and goals, standing now face to face in open 
antagonism bred of fear and suspicion. North and South at 
daggers drawn, war drums throbbing offstage, a house dividing, 
a nation rent in half
Finally, the importance of sectionalism to the causes of the Civil War
was discussed in considerable detail by Owsley as he labels it the
"fundamental cause,"
The cause of that state of mind which we may call war psychosis 
lay in the sectional character of the United States. In other words, 
the Civil War had one basic cause: sectionalism. There are two
types of sectionalism: there is that egocentric, destructive
sectionalism where conflict is always irrepressible; and there is 
that constructive sectionalism where good will prevails.3
This discussion of "destructive sectionalism" which was rançant 
in I860 will consider (1) the characteristics of sectionalism and (2) 
the effect of sectionalism. The purpose, here, will be to discuss the 
divisive forces which had been building up over the years and to consider 
the extent to which they created, in the minds of Americans, a yawning 
chasm of separation between North and South.
Characteristics of Sectionalism
The structural and normative functions which regulate membership 
in a reference group have already been discussed in a theoretical context. 
These factors merge in the development of intragroup rigidity and
E^ugene H. Rosenboom, A History of Presidential Elections (Hew 
York: The Macmillan Co., 19597, p. iSv.
William Catton and Bruce Catton, Two Roads to Sumter (New York: 
HcGraw=Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 63.
3
Frank L. Owsley, "The Fundamental Cause of the Civil War: Ego­
centric Sectionalism," Journal of Southern History, VII (February, 
1941), 7o
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intergroup hostility. The cleavage between the North and South in the 
ante-bellum period represents a prize sxaiapls of the interaction of 
reference groups in conflict.
Intragroup Rigidity in I860
As both North and South became more entrenched in their section­
alism, the various degrees of heresy and rensgadism wars subject to 
more severe stricture. The pressures to conform to the group norm were 
much stronger in the South than the North* Calhoun made the observation, 
in the decade before the Civil War, that the Ncirth was an aggregate of 
individuals; the South was an aggregate of communities,^ Each of these 
communities was a microcosm of the "Southern" point of view and strove 
to protect the rights of the South in general enforcing the orthodoxy 
at home. Since the issues -vrtdch created and proliferated sectionalism 
were more "ego-involving" in the South, the rules, written or unwritten, 
against deviant thought or behavior were more rigid. Nye, in his dis­
cussion of civil liberties in the controversy over slavery, claimed that
there were in the South two threats to the security of slavery; the 
Southerner who entertained unsound opinions, and the Northerner 
(whether abolition agent or traveller) who was likely to spread 
antislavery doctrine. To silence the one and eject the other, if 
legal means were too slow or not justified by the case, the citizen- 
mob, backed by popular opinion, was the most effective instrument.2
Freedom of speech, thought, and action, particularly on the 
slavery question, rapidly disappeared in the South during the fifties. 
Criticism of the institution of slavery was prohibited. Any remark
S^ss Richard Hefstadter, The American Political Tradition (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1948), pp. 68-92.
9 .
"Russel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom; Civil Liberties and the Slavery 
Controversy. I8IÙ-1860 (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 
1949), p. 141.
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or action which was interpreted as inimical to the South was likewise
dangerous. The literature of that period; especially in the North, was
full of exanples of individuals who were expelled from various communities
in the South because of suspected subversion. Oliver Temple, in his
Notable Men of Tennessee, wrote:
No one dared any longer to suggest its ■slavery. removal or its 
amelioration. All. whether slaveholders or non-slaveholders, felt 
the crushing power and the omnipotence of this despotism of public 
opinion. The least suspicion of disloyalty to slavery, brought upon 
such person infamy and the curse of social outlawry.^
This persecution of deviants from the Southern norm was not only 
directed at traitors who, in many cases, were forced to move out of the 
South, but also at fellow Southerners who took a position only slightly 
removed from the orthodox view. Craven described these "heretics" in the 
following manner.
There is no sadder story in all American history than that of 
the Southern conservatives in the final crisis. Under the circum­
stances, the advantage was all with the smaller group of determined, 
exasperated radicals idio now talked loudly of Southern rights and 
Republican threats, and who were quietly, but not openly, planning 
secession. They hurled the charges of disloyalty, cowardice and 
weakness against all who would not join their ranks. They called 
them abolitionists and Northern syipathisers.^
Although such intragroup rigidity was more apparent below the
Mason-Dixon line, it also existed in the North. Nevins, in his study of
the pre-war controversy, supports this notion.
The fanatic never sees his own inconsistencies. Though antislavery 
journals continually arraigned Southerners for their intolerance, no 
more dishonorable exaaçle of political lynching could be found than 
the removal of Judge Edward G. Loring in Massachusetts in 1858,3
C^ited in Clement Eaton, The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the 
Old South (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 196^77 pp. 275-76i
C^raven, Civil War in the Making, p. 59.
■^ Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln. II (Now York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1950), 30.
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In this particular case, the comunity persecuted the judge for his actions 
in enforcing the fugitive slave law in spite of the pressure and agitation 
stirred up by the antislavery factions. The condemnation of any form of 
deviant behavior, consequently, was not the product of either the North 
or the South but, in both sections, resulted from radicalism, extremism, 
or high ego-involvement.
As the sections became more rigid and committed in their positions, 
deviant behavior of any form was censored. The South, because of its 
involvement with slavery as a necessary part of its social structure, was 
more susceptible to such intolerance. The North, on the other hand, was 
more pluralistic and allowed greater flexibility of thought and action 
until the war forced a conformity of patriotism on all citizens.^
Intergroup Hostility in I860
The effects of intergroup or intersectional hostility in the I860 
controversy were evident in the (1) breakdown in communication, (2) the 
discovery of conspiracies, and (3) the development of stereotypes.
Breakdown in Communication
"By the end of 1659,“ observed Catton and Catton, "the two 
sections had essentially lost the power to communicate. Isely adds
S^amuel Eliot Morison, The Oxfo^ History of the American People 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), P. 6oO, points out that
"throughout the Civil War active disloyalty was effectively dealt with 
wherever it raised its head; but there was no general censorship of the 
press, no 'relocation' of suspects; and discussion of leaders and war 
aims remained open, unrestrained and often ill-informed, libelous, and 
nasty. Sentences of courts-martial were comparatively mild, and 
offenders were pardoned with the coming peace."
C^atton and Catton, p. 18?.
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that "by the time of the crisis of 1860=l86l, the north and the south 
had passed the point of understanding. They spoke to one another in a 
foreign tongue.This disruption in communication between the sections 
was a product of both sectional isolation and communicative distortion.
Sectional Isolation.— Provincial isolation, fear of a minority 
status, and deep-rooted insecurities and tensions caused the South to 
disrupt channels of communication with the North, Mail was searched, 
freedom of thought and expression vanished, the Northern press was 
censored, and travelers from that section were viewed with increasing 
suspicion. The slightest provocation would place the Northerner in 
danger of tar and feathers or something worse. This led the Cincinnati 
Daily Commercial to eonplain that
the recent proscriptive and despotic treatment to which many 
Northern citizens have been subject in the South, is one of the most 
serious and deplorable effects of the present political excitement. 
If not speedily arrested, it threatens to lead to the most disas­
trous consequences. It is iiq>ossible to maintain harmony and 
good feeling between the different sections of the country, where 
any considerable number of the people of one section are liable to 
continual outrage and persecution whenever they set foot in the 
other.2
In withdrawing itself from the North on all levels of interaction, the 
South was attempting to protect its civilization from the "contamination" 
of Northern influence. In short, the South was striving to enact what 
Boulding has called "avoidance" by seeking to withdraw from the field.
The danger of any governmental organization controlling what people are 
allowed to think has been discussed in considerable detail by Dumond in
-Jeter Allen Isely, Horace Greeley and the Republican Party. 
1853-1861 (Pïdnceton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 311.
'^Cincinnati Daily Coaaerolal. December 1, i860.
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his study of the origins of the Civil War.
No democratic government can survive through a single generation 
unless there be free and unrestricted iîsjuiry and discussion in the 
schoolroom, the press, and the public forums. That process makes it 
possible for people to live happily and harmoniously together, and 
the more difficidt the problems of adjustment, the more essential 
it is. Paralyze it and passion, prejudice, and emotionalism prevail. 
Destroy the source of an elightened public opinion and religious 
fanaticism, class hatreds, or racial antipathies lead straight to 
inquisition or civil war. There cannot be said to have been an 
enlightened public opinion in either section on the questions at 
issue after Lincoln’s election.^
Communicative Distortion. — Communications which did manage to 
penetrate the self-inqjosed Southern isolation were subject to distor­
tion. There existed between the two sections a "gauze curtain,"
Nevins wrote, which was "more opaque on the Southern side than the
O
Northern, distorting the vision of all who tried to peer through."
Rhodes reports that
Dr. Lieber, who knew by long actual contact the people of both 
sections, wrote that "it sometimes has occurred to me that what 
Thuoydides said of the Greeks at the time of the Peloponnesian 
War applies to us at present. ’The Greeks,’ he said, ’did not 
understand each other any longer, though they spoke the same 
language; words received a different meaning in different parts,^
This coasunication failure between the two sections, fra: the
point of view of the border states, was analysed by the editor of the
Lousville (Kentucky) Journal.
We seriously believe that when the North and the South meet each 
other face to face and eye to eye; when they take their ideas 
of each other’s sentiments and opinions from unprejudiced sources, 
and not through the perverted mediums of stump speeches, partisan
D^umond, p. Il6.
A^llan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln. II, 17,
3j»— s Ford Rhodes, History of ths United States (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1914), H, 489.
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distribes, buncombe resolutions, they will be prepared to 
fraternize most cordially, and kick parties, politicians, plat­
forms and schemers into the pit of Tophst.^
By i860, consequently, the communicative channels between the 
two sections were undermined 1:^ both isolation and distortion. As a 
result, the ideas prevalent in the South regarding what ideas were pre­
valent in the North and conversely, were neither realistic nor accurate.
Discovery of a Conspiracy
Both of the sections exaggerated the "evil" in the other and
identified a "conspiracy" which proved the ruthlessness of the opponent,
Tyler asserts that "when one adversary was personified as the 'Slave
Power* and the other as 'Black Republicanism* the political machinery
of the country broke down and war instead of a peaceful solution of the
2
problem was the result," Craven adds that
the combined efforts of reformer and politician gradually 
created the notion of the "slave power" and of "Black Republican­
ism." Each of these creations was supposed to consist of a well- 
organized force and program. The one was determined to spread slavery 
throughout the land. The other was determined to wipe out the insti­
tution of slavery even at the cost of a race war. Both were ficti­
tious. Yet partisans were able to bring all the fears and appre­
hensions, all the noble purposes and sentiments aroused by the anti­
slavery and the proslavery crusades, to their side and to pour all 
ths bitter distortions of that conflict upon their opponents.3
Both sections, then, were able to locate arei aaçilify an evil "conspiracy"
within the power structure of the other in order to solidify its own
support.
C^ited in Mary Scrugham, The Peaceable Americans of I86O-I66I : A
Study in Public Opinion (New York: Columbia University, 1921),p. lé.
A^lic© Felt üyier, Freedom's Ferment (New York: Harper Torch­
books, 1962), p. 5^ 7.
'Avery C, Craven, ^  Histqrian and the Civil War (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. ^2?
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The Slave Power.— The North blamed the "slave power" for all of 
its ills. Putting togsthsr all the evidence, the abolitioniota came to 
the conclusion that there existed a secret agreement, a conspiracy among 
Southern slaveholders to foist slavery upon the nation, destroy civil 
liberty, extend slavery into the territories, reopen the slave trade, 
control the policies of the Federal government, and complete the forma­
tion of an aristocracy founded upon and fostered l?y a slave economy. 
"Slavery," declared Joshua Leavitt, the noted abolitionist, "has been 
the prime cause of all the financial tornadoes which have swept over our 
country. It is a bottomless gulf of extravagance and thriftlessness.
James Russell Lowell, in the Atlantic Monthly for October, I860, wrote:
The slave-holding interest has gone on step by step, forcing 
concessions after concessions, till it needs but little to secure 
it forever in the political supremacy of the country. Yield to 
its latest demand— let it mould the evil destiny of the territories—  
and the thing is done past recall. The next presidential election 
is to say yes or no. . . .We believe this election is a turning- 
point in our history, ... In point of fact, we have only two 
parties in the field: those who favor the extension of slavery, and 
those who oppose it.^
The "positive good" thesis developed in the South in defense of 
slavery was used by the abolitionists to convince their Northern neighbors 
that the "slave power" was a threat to all Northerners. If slavery were
a "positive good," in the South, a superior political, economic, and 
social system, it seemed to be reasonable to expect that the next step 
would be to attempt to impose it upon the nation at large for the nation's
own good. Nÿe wrote that
^Cited in Norman A. Graebner, "The Politicians and Slavery," in 
Politics and the Crisis of i860, ed. Norman A. Graebner (Drbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 10.
"Cited in Rhodes, p. 486.
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the abolitionist contention that there existed a Slave Power 
conspiracy which threatened the continuation of liberty, was an 
iBçortant factor in enlisting support aaong certain Northern 
elements for the anti-slavery movement. The Slave Power threat 
helped widen the rift between North and South by making it more 
difficult than ever to be neutral toward or tolerant of slavery 
or its extension.!
Black Republicanism.— The South, on the other hand, accused the 
North of engaging in a conspiracy to (1) deprive the Southern states of 
their constitutional rights and (2) foment servile insurrections in 
the South through inflammatory literature and militant action.
First, the Southerner feared that the North was intent on
destroying the political power of the South in order to undermine its
institutions and way of life. With the growth in Northern voting
power created by the addition of new free states, the South feared
that it would be reduced to a minority status and be made easy prey
of the militant abolitionists. Whitridge points out that
Southerners came to believe that Northern manufacturers and 
capitalists had joined with the abolitionists to overthrow the 
constitutional rights of the slave states, tax the South for
the benefit of the North, and reduce the white man to the level of
the Negro.2
Second, the South lived in constant fear of servile uprisings, 
particularly after the Nat Turner massacre of I83I and the John Brows 
raid in 1859.  ^ The Southern press kept the people in near fresay and
^Russel B. Nye, "The Slave Power Conspiracy; I83O-I86O," in 
Slavery as a Cause of the Civil War, ed. Edwip C. Rozwenc (Boston; D. C.
Heath and Conpany, 194-9), p. 35.
A^rnold Whitridge, No Compromise 1 (New York; Farrar, Straus and 
Cudahy, I960), p. 10.
•'in August of 1831 a religious fanatic slave named Nat Turner, 
long convinced that he was destined to free his fellow bondsmen, led a 
revolt in Southampton Cmmty in southeast Virginia. Fifty=seven men, 
women and children were slaughtered by the slaves. See Louis Filler, The 
Crusade Against Slavery (New York: Harper Torchbooks, I96O), p. 52.
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hysteria by warning them of the danger of a possible slave war, spawned
by the abolitionists. After the insnrreetlonary scare of 18<6, the editor
of the Jaekson Daily Misslssippian wrote:
The conspiracies detected among slaves in Tennessee, Kentucky, South 
Carolina, and Texas show that the vile emissaries of abolition, working 
like moles under the ground, have been secretly breathing the poison 
of insubordination into their minds.
During the I860 campaign irumors of slave insurrections in Texas were
spread throughout the South ty the press.^  The Southern mind, according
to Elkins, "could conceive the enemy in any size it chose; specters were
utterly free to range, thrive, and proliferate."3
By I860 both the North and the South had successfully located the 
cause of all their internal problems in the opposite section of the 
country.^ Both sections were able to close ranks as the common enemy was 
identified and made into a "Bogey Man." The North was obsessed with the 
"slave power" threat; the South accused the "Black Republicans" of conspir­
ing to destroy Southern institutions and to foment slave uprisings.
^Citsd in Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the 
Old South (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 196^77 p. 100.
2
For a thorough discussion of the insurrection rumors during the 
I860 sleetion see Chapter V: "The Uses of Ssctionalism" in Ollingsr
Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election of i860 (Balti­
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 19^ 5), PP. 89-111.
3
Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery; A Problem in American Institutional 
and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959)»
p. 217.
G^raebner, "The Politicians and Slavery," p. 9, points out that 
"for antislavery politicians, therefore, victory would come when they had 
transferred, either by intent or by accident, the concept of slavery's 
confining influence from ths Negress of ths South to the farmera, mer­
chants, and industrialists of the North. This required, above all, the 
effective identification of all dangers to the countiy's welfare with an 
immoral institutions and with immoral concepts of society that, ly the 
accident of geography, lay neatly segregated in one portion of the 
nation."
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Developaent of Stereotypes
As the eonflict between the two soctioiis deepened, individual
differences disappeared in the maze of blinding stereotypes, Owsley, for
example, in his study of sectionalism and the Civil War observed that
in time the average Northerner accepted in idiole or in part the 
abolitionist pictiure of southern people; they became monsters and 
their children were not children but young monsters. Such a state 
of mind is fertile soil for war. The effect upon the miaïs of the 
southern people was far more profound, since they were recipients 
of this niagara of insults and threats. To th«i the northern 
people were a condbination of mad fanatics and cold-blooded political 
adventurers,^
As sectional tensions increased there was a growii^  tendency amo% 
Northerners to transfer their hostility toward slavery to the South 
itself, thus merging two separate but related subjects. Garrison, in the 
Liberator, wrote of the Southerners in the following fashion.
Their career from the cradle to the grave is but one of unbridled 
lust, of filthy aaalgamation, of swaggering braggadocio, of haughty 
domination, of cowardly ruffianism, of matchless insolence, of 
infinite self-conceit ... of more than savage cruelty , , , monsters 
idiose arguments are . . . the bowie knife and revolver, tar and 
feathers, the lash, the bludgeon, the halter and the stake,^
During the actual campaign of i860 the Freeport Wide Awake, a pro-Lincoln
canpaign newspaper, suggested that
the political contest of to-day is being waged upon eternal principles. 
On the one had the venomous and slimy serpents of rum, riot, murder, 
lust, slavery, and all the political evils that usually follow in 
the train of depotism, are rampant, seeking to fasten their fangs 
into the quivering flesh of outraged humanity, justice and freedom, 
and demanding at the hands of the general government protection, or 
at least non-interference in the accomplishment of their hellish 
designs. On the other hand the Republican party stands upon the
k)wsley, p. 17. 
S^avage, p. 77.
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inœaitable foiindation of truth, insisting that the energies of the 
general government shall be exercised in behalf of humanity ani_ the 
extension of the moralities revealed by our Creator.^
The same reaction was prevalent in much of the South as Northerners 
were grouped into a single objectionable class. Dr. Thornwell, president 
of a Southern college and editor of the Southern Presbyterian Review, said:
The parties in this conflict are not merely abolitionists 6uil 
slaveholders=»they are atheists, socialists, communists, red 
Republicans, Jacobins on the one side, and the friends of order 
and regulated freedom on the other. In one word, the world is a 
battle-ground, Christianity and Atheism the combatants, and th 
progress of humanity the stake.2
In addition, as Nichols points out, "never having seen a Yankee, many
a southerner had no difficulty in picturing him as a nasal-toned, penny-
grabbing, pious hypocrite whom it was easy to despise."3
Reactions, then, in both North and South were stereotyped and 
rationalized toward "principles," Northerners were all John Browns to
h
the Southerners ; slaveholders were all Simon Degrees to the Northerners.
The factionalism between North and South is a graphic exan l^e of 
the kinds of intragroup rigidity and intergroup hostility which develop 
within and among groups in conflict. Each section placed requircasnts 
on the behavior of its members; both sections suffered from a lack of 
communication, the exaggeration of the "evil" in the opposing group, and 
the stereotyping of its members.
^Freeport Wide Awake. October 6, 1860.
C^ited in Tyler, p. 520.
3Roy Franklin Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New 
York: Collier Books, 1962), p.~4?.
^^ Simon Degree was the cruel slaveholder in Uncle Tom^ s Cabin,
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Effects of Sectionalism
The development of intense sectional strife during the ante-bellum
controversy had momentous effects on the nation as a whole as well as
the two sections. The growing cleavage between the North and South
manifested itself in the divergent perceptions of issues and events. These
events and issues* which were raised during the decade before the firing
on Sumter* reinforced the division and hostility between the_sections.
ftirray Eielman, in his study of polities and symbolism, wrote that
this analysis suggests the corollary that the particular incidents 
in the news do not really matter so far as the creation of threat 
perceptions is concerned. No matter what incidents occur and 
which of these are reported, they will fit nicely as evidence to 
support people's preconceived hopes and fears,^
In short, everything that activated the sectional conscience was
perceived through sectional eyes and, as a result, had different
meanings on both sides of the MasoncDixon line. This intact of sectional»
ism on perceptions was evident in the diverse interpretations of issues
and events.
Perceptions of Issues
Practically every political, economic, or religious issue that 
was raised during the fifties was subject to sectional interpretations 
and versions. The limited scope of this chapter will not allow a thorough 
discussion of all the issues that developed. There arose between the North 
and South questions of transportation, communication, trade, land, and 
foreign relations tliat drove the wedge deeper between the sections,
T w  1^4 a  g i iw a w a w r  4 C Œ iiaos T .n + T i4  n  • ïw r t 'f ja  o
Murray Edelman, The Symbolic uses ox Politics (urbanas uXiiversity 
of Hjinols Press, 196t-), p, 13,
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Had it not been for sectional contests over economic policies— Field's 
Atlantic cable, protective tariff, internal iuqsrovements. Pacific 
railroad, transcontinental telegraph, overland-aail routes, homestead, 
endowments for agricultural-mechanical colleges, and the proposed 
acquisition of Cuba and parts of Mexico— it may well be concluded that 
the sectionalism on which the Republican party rested would not have 
been so profound, and the emotional rantings of anti-slavery and 
pro-slavery extremists would not have been so intense,^
Because of this sectional inte^retation of issues, according to
Smith, "many measures supported by the North were defeated for sectional
reasons when they appeared in Congress. The Homestead Bill suffered defeat
because the South did not want to allow territory to be foraed into
free states."^ The Southern reaction to the Homestead Bill, as an example
of sectional bias, was described in an editorial appearing in the North
Carolina Standard. The editor declared that should the Homestead Bill
become law, the people of the free states
would pour their thousands into the territoires where the bitter 
hates made still more bitter, would rise State after State
of Yankee growth, to take their places in the Senate— to vote us 
down upon every question affecting our vital intewsts, and 
finally to control the government absolutely and reduce us either 
to subjection or force us into the horrors of general civil war.3
Sectionalism both encouraged and allowed the biased interpretations 
of issues as each section read different meanings into the issue 
eosfrOntailonB that plagued the 1850's.
Perceptions of Events
In addition to these divisive issues, a number of events, both
R^einhard H, Luthin, The First Lincoln Campaign (Caz^ ridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1944), pp. 5-19.
^William Ernest Smith, Ths Francis Preston Bla^ Family in 
Politics. I (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 1933)»
'Cited in Joseph Carlyle Sitterson, The Secession Movement in 
North Carolina (Chapel Hill; The University of North Carolina Press, 
1939), pp. 109-lU.
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dramatic incidents and inflammatory publications, electrified the
atmosphere between the sections. In describing ths role of dramatic
incidents in social influence, Nevins concluded that
words may excite mankind, but it is the violent act which raises 
emotions to fever heat. Newspaper polemics and party broadsides 
can never crystallize popular sentiment like a dramatic blow— the 
Boston massacre, the destruction of the Maine, and the sinking of 
the Lusitania.^
Five such events will be discussed briefly in this analysis: the publi­
cation of Uncle Tom's Cabin. "Bleeding Kansas,” the Brooks-Summer Affair, 
Helper’s The Impending Crisis, and John Brown’s raid.
Uncle Tom’s Cabin.— The publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin by 
Harriet Beecher Stowe in 1852 and the sequel in Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
in the following year, provided explosive material for the sectional
p
confrontation. Although many antislavery books and plays were produced 
during that decade. Uncle Tom’s Cabin became the symbol of the mistreat­
ment of slaves from the Northern point of view and abolitionists’ lies 
and distortions from the Southern point of view. Tyler, for exançle, 
claimed that "it is probable that Uncle Tom’s Cabin had more effect in 
shaping public opinion than had all the abolition tracts and societies 
together. In the South the book was anathema, and it was a penal offense 
to buy or sell it."^ Channing, in his historical analysis of that period, 
wrote that
Kevins, The Emei%enc@ of Lincoln. II. 70.
T^he Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin was written to verify that the 
original book was based on authentic situations in the South. For a 
discussion of both publications see Reginald Valentine Holland, "The 
American Theatre as a form of Public Address," (Unpublished Ph. D. disser­
tation, Department of Speech and Drama, Cornell University, 1951).
"'Tÿler, p. 513.
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Uncle Tom's Cabin did more than any other one thing to arouse the 
fears of Southerners and impel them to fight for independence. On 
ths other hand, the Northern boys who read it in the fifties were 
among those who voted for AbrahajB' Lincoln in i860 and followed the 
flag of the Union from Bull Run to i^ponattox.^
Bleeding Kansas.— The bitter struggle over the Lecompton Consti­
tution in "bleeding Kansas" was the result of the Douglas-inspired Kansas- 
Nebraska Act of 18^4 which abolished the Missouri Conpromise line in 
favor of the doctrine of popular soveriegnty. The South was willing to 
try popular sovereignty in Kansas but became enraged îdien the proslavery 
Lecompton Constitution was defeated in the Senate, primarily because of 
the efforts of the "turn-coat" Douglas.^ The North, on the other hand, 
viewed the removal of the Mason-Dixon line as the boundary of slavery as 
a sell-out to the "slave power." The confrontation over the proposed 
constitution, which became symbolic of the war in the territories, 
widened the gulf between the North and South. Until that time the only 
disunionists were Southern fire-eaters and abolitionists, who denied 
that Americans shared common values. But during the congressional 
debates over the Kansas debacle, even moderate Southerners and Northerners 
became involved.-'
C^ited in Lorenzo Dow Turner, "Anti-Slavery Sentiment in American
Literature," Journal of Negro History. ZIV (October, 1929)» 444.
2
For the Southern reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its 
consequences see Roy Frank Nichols, "The Kansas-Nebraska Act: A Century
of Historiography," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. XLII (Sep­
tember, 1956), 186-212, and George Fort Hilton, The Eve of Conflict: 
Stephen Douglas and the Needless War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1934), pp. 258-314.
%eoive H. Mayer, The Republican Party. 1854^1964 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 70.
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Brooks^ Stminey Affair.«-The debate over Lecompton was farther
dramatized by the bratal attack by Preston S. Brooks, Congressman from
South Carolina, on Charles Simmer, Massachusetts Senator, on the floor
of the Senate, May 22, 18^ 6. Two days before the attack Sumner had
delivered his infamous and inflammatory speech on "The Crime Against
Kansas" which Included a fierce attack on Senator Butler of South
Carolina, a relative of Brooks. In measuring public opinion in both
sections following the attack. Craven discovered that
a startling difference in approach to the assault by Southerners 
and Northerners was apparent at once. Most Southerners viewed it 
as a strictly person^ affair between one individual who used 
insulting language and another individual who rightly resented 
such flagrant irresponsibility. Northerners, on the other hand, 
ignored the personal angle. Sumner had spoken for freedom. He 
was not the mew representative of a State, or party, or section.
He labored for the elevation of our Government and of mankind . , . 
and the blow which struck him to the earth, throbbed in the teaÿles 
of twenty-five millions of people.^
To Northerners, then. Southern approval of Brooks' attack 
staged all Southerners as men of violence hardly different from the 
Missouri border ruffians whose sacking of Lawrence, Kansas, was revealed 
in the Eastern papers at almost the same time. His percha cane became 
the symbol of Southern intention to check free speech and to use force 
because it could not meet argument in order to "bully" the North into 
submission.
The Impending Crisis.— The general endorsement of Hinton Helper's 
The Impending Crisis by Northerners further intensified the crisis.^  
Although the book, written by a Southerner about the evils of slavery to
^Avery 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism. 1848-1861 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953)» P« 395.
9
“Helper, a "poor white" from North Carolina; oTmressed with oonvino= 
ing statistics the wrong done the South's non-slave-hoMing ■rfiites by slav­
ery. The book was largely ignored in the South until Horace Greeley, in
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the Southern econonjy and culture* was published in 1857» it did not have
its laaaAguis effect on sectionalism until ths North used its srdorssasnt
as a criterion for the election of Speaker of the House of Representatives
in the organization meeting in 1860,^ . Bailey contends that
The ÜBpending Crisis alone did not produce the dispute. Its 
endorsement came at a convenient time to serve as the most 
dramatic symbol for the contest of sections. Yet coming to 
light after the Brown raid, no better instrument could have 
been found to increase sectional tensions,^
John Brown’s Raid.««The greate^ boon to the Southern fire«
eaters, however, was not the economic argument of Helper, but the overt
act of John Brown's raid. Fite, in his study of the i860 campaign, wrotes
the creation of sudden and intense excitement, which rendered 
deliberation and moderation well«nigh impossible, he forced
the political parties of the country to assume extreme positions and 
declare .extreme principles before they were prepared to do so; and 
from these positions and principles, once assumed and declared, there 
could be no receding. The only change possible was progress into 
more advanced radicalism. John Brown must, therefore, bear the 
immediate responsibility for the extremes of Üie presidential eanpaign 
of 1860.3
The raid on Harper's Ferry, consequently, was effective in 
convincing the South that its varied economic groups had a common concern
1858, undertook to publish it as a campaign document for the Republican
party.
^In 1859» when the House of Representatives was engaged in choos« 
ing a Speaker, a Southern member introduced a resolution that no one who 
had endorsed Helper's book should be considered fit to be Speaker. This 
provoked a bitter debate since the leading Republican candidate for 
Speaker, John Shepnan, had endorsed the book. See Ollinger Crenshaw,
"The Speakership Contest of 1859-1860," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review. XXK (December, 1942), 323«38.
%ugh C. Bailey, "Hinton Rowan Helper and The Intending Crisis," 
The Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XL (April, 195?)t 145.
"^ Emerson David Fite. The Presidential Campaign of i860 (New Yorks 
Ths Macmillan Cosçany, 1911), p. 32.
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in the stability of the slavery system. Morison argued that Brown
played into ths hands of extremists on both sides. Southern Union­
ists were silenced by secessionists saying, "There— you see? That's 
what the North wants to do to us.'" Keenly the South watched for 
indications of Northern opinion. That almost every Northern news­
paper, as well as Lincoln, Douglas, and Seward, condemned Brown 
they did not heed, so much as the admiration for a brave man that 
Northern opinion could not conceal. And the babble of shocked 
repudiation by politicians and public men was dimmed ty one bell­
like note from Bnerson: "That new saint, than whom nothing purer
or more brave was ever led by love of men into conflict and death.
. . will make the gallows glorious like the cross,^
In the fifties, then, the two sections. North and South, moved 
steadily apart in synçathies and ideologies. One of the factors which 
farther alienated and distorted the relationship between the people in 
the sections was the divergent perceptions of issues and events. Sit- 
terson, in his analysis of secession in North Carolina, argued that "the 
enmity between the two sections was intensified by the course of 
events during the 1850's, and the people of the Southern states were 
coming to look with suspicion upon the North and everything that smacked 
of anti-slavery sentiment."^
The historical background to the i860 presidential can^aign and 
election can be represented in the single word— sectionalism. Sectionalism, 
Wulou was a product of isolation and communicative failure, thrived on 
imaginary conspiracies and blinding stereotypes. "The tremendous isçact 
of ten years of hammering and pounding upon one great social issue, that 
of slavery," Dunham concluded, "inevitably led to sectional misunderstand­
ing, misrepresentation, and misinterpretation."^
M^orioon, p .  602.
S^itterson, p. 119.
- Chester Forrester Dunham, The Attitude of the Northern uiergy 
TowaN the South, 1860-1865 (Toledo, Ohio: The Gray Company, Publishers,
P. 3^.
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Political Background in I860 
The influence of political theory and practice in the i860 csnç)aign 
and election was diverse and mary»sided. Mayer, in his study of the histpry 
of the Republican party, was probably correct when he called the nineteenth 
century the "golden age of politics. No other single election in that 
explosive century was more important and significant than the four-cornered 
contest between Lincoln, Douglas, John C. Bell, and John Breckinridge in 
I860. This discussion of the political background to the election will 
consider (1) the splintering of the political parties, (2) the rise of 
the "common man," and (3) the use of political techniques.
Splintering of the Political Parties 
Although political parties are not mentioned in the Constitution, 
they have become an integral part of American political life. Tradition­
ally, the American party system has been characterized by the presence of 
two major parties which have been able, through skillful leadership, to 
absorb both diversity and intensity into their membership. On several 
occasions one of the two parties has suffered a split resulting in the 
formation of a third party. In I860, however, four parties of relatively 
equal strength appeared on the political stage— all claiming to embody 
the true principles of Americanism. These four political parties were 
the Republicans, the Northern and Southern Democrats, and the Constitu­
tional Union party.
The Republican Party
The origin and development of the Republican party has been
%ayer, p. 3.
121
discussed in a number of books and scholarly articles. Several obser­
vations, however, should be made in this limited investigation of the party 
of Lincoln. First, the party was composed of a curious agglomeration of 
political malcontents, abolitionists. Free Soilers, disgruntled Democrats, 
Whigs, German-Americans, and Know-Nothings when it nominated its first 
presidential candidate, John C. Fremont, in February of 1856. The 
single issue that made "political bed-fellows" of maiy groups who joined 
under the Republican banner was the question of the future of slavery, 
particularly in the territories. Kirway points out, for exançle, that 
"many Republicans opposed the spread of slavery for humane reasons.
Others, equally opposed to the institution, were impelled by less worthy 
motives."^ In short, the uniting and activating force of the Republican 
party in i860 was its anti-slavery position.
Second, the Republican party was a sectional organization in
the sense that it drew its support almost exclusively from the Northern
2
states. Although there was some support for the party in the border states, 
the anti-slavery party was not even represented on the ballots of the 
Southern tier of states in the I860 election.^ This provided fuel for the
^Albert D. Kirway, John Crittendent The Struggle for the Union 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), p. 372.
2
Avery 0. Craven, Edmund Ruffin-Southerner: A Study in Secession 
(Now York: D. Appleton and Conçany, 1932), pp. 210-11, contends that "freed 
from the restraints that a Southern wing would have imposed, the Republicans
had unconsciously become more and more antagonistic to the South in their 
efforts to control the North, offerir^  an economic program which satisfied 
the more conservative and adopting an attitude on abstract questions which 
was satisfactory to the radical."
Lincoln received no votes in Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas.
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Southern "hotspurs” in the post-election crisis as they could claim, with 
considerable validity, that the national government, or at least the 
executive arm, was under the control of a sectional, anti-slavery,
Northern political party.
Finally, although the party’s main enphasis and reason for exist­
ence was its anti-slavery stance, its appeal to the voters, during the 
campaign, had a much broader base. First, the anti-slavery plank limited 
the party to opposing the futher spread of slavery in the territories; 
the platform did not call for the tanpering with slavery where it 
already existed.^  Second, using the Covode Report and other evidence, the 
Republican rhetoricians asserted that the Democratic party which had
been in power for eight years was a corrupt, bickering organization with
2
a record of quarrels, illegal bargains, and questionable “deals." Third, 
they laid their greatest stress, in various parts of the North, on their 
economic program and, varying their tune to suit local and regional
desires, they argued for a protective tariff, agricultural colleges, the
3
homestead law, internal improvements, and the Pacific railroad. Finally,
anti-slavery plank read: "That the normal condition of all 
the Territory of the United States is that of freedom: ... it becomes 
our duty, by legislation, whenever such l^islaiion is nscessaiy, to main­
tain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; 
and we deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, or 
of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory 
of the United States."
2
See Luthin, pp. 176-76.
3
Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election of i860, 
p. 17. has argued that "the platform retreated from the radicalism of 
1856, much to the chagrin of such an abolitionist-Republican as Joshua 
Giddings, but it was sufficiently inclusive to promise a protective 
tariff designed to satisfy Pennsylvania, Congressional restriction of 
flavery in the territories, a homestead law, and a Pacific railroad, with 
whidi to win various blocs of voters. One issue could be enphasiasd in 
one region, and another stressed elsewhere."
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they wooed the foreign^bom element which possessed considerable voting 
power in the election by gnarantseing the "hyphenated Americans" that 
they would permit no unfriendly legislation.'*'
With Abraham Lincoln of Illinois and Hannibal Hamlin of Maine 
on the ballot, the Republican party, characterized by its sectional, anti­
slavery platform, was able to win the election because of the superiority
2
of voting strength in the Northern states.
Northern and Southern Democrats
Until the Charleston convention of the summer of I860, the
Democratic party had been able to maintain, at least in theory, its
national character and support. The Northern and Southern wings of the
party reconciled their differences ly adopting, especially in I856, an
ambiguous or "rotten" platform which would enable the politicians in
3
both sections to maintain their local support. By i860, though, such 
a conpromise was no longer feasible and thé party split asunder over 
what Luthin called "personalities, policies, and patronage.
■^T!he role of the "foreign" vote in the election has been debated 
ever since i860. See, for ezasmle. Joseph Schafer, "Who Elected Lineoln?" 
American Historical Review. XLVÎI (1941), 51-63, and Robert P. Swierenga, 
"The Ethnic Voter ard the First Lincoln Election," Civil War History.
XI (March, 1965), 27-43.
2
Although Lincoln carried only 39.8^  of the popular vote, he won 
169 electoral votes to a total of 134 for all of his opponents combined.
In short, Lincoln won the election because of the strength of the 
Northern states in the electoral college system. See W, Dean Burnham, 
Presidential Ballots. I836-I892 (Baltimore; The John Hopkins Press, 1935)« 
PP. 84^5.
•%or an interesting discussion of a "rotten plank" see Scrugham, 
pp. 42-44.
4t TO
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Split 076P Personalities
Ths leading personality in the Démocratie party in early I860 
was Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois who was fresh from a triunç>h 
over Lincoln in I858. Douglas, a Northern Democrat, had been able, until 
the Leconpton controversy and the Freeport Doctrine speech, to cultivate 
friendship and support in the South.^ When the party convened in 
Charleston for the quadriennal nominating convention, the name of Douglas 
had become anathema in a large part of the South. So strong was the 
personal animus against Douglas that Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia 
placed the breakcç) of the party solely on the personality issue. The 
Southern bolters, he wrote in September, i860, "ran not from a platform 
but from a man. The whole rupture originated in personal ambition, spite 
and hate."^
The increasing sectionalism had turned life-long political friends, 
within the Democratic party, into deadly enemies. Interpersonal harmony, 
^ich had maintained the party's unity while the Whigs were splitting, was 
victimized by the polarization behind sectional lines.
\hc Douglas oosition on the Lsoojroton controversy identified him 
with the fMe-soil elements against the South. In the famous "Freeport 
Doctrine" Douglas atteaçtsd to harmonize popular sovereignty with the Bred 
Scott decision. Many historians feel that the "Freeport" question posed 
by Lincoln caused the South to turn on Douglas. A revisionist point of 
view, however, has argued that hy 1858 Douglas had already alienated 
the South and that the most significant effect of the debates with 
Lincoln was the loss, to Douglas, of any free-soil support. See, for 
example, Don E. Fehreribacher, Prelude to Greatnesss Lincoln in the 1850's 
(New ïoï4c! McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19^), pp. 122-42.
2
Cited in Robert W, Johannsen, "Comment on 'Why the Democratic 
Party Divided,'" in The Crisis.of the Unions I86O-I86I. ed. George Harmon 
Knoles (Baton Rouge; Louisana State University Press, I965), p. 56.
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Split over Policies
Ths destruction of the Demoeratie party was also the result of 
sectional interpretations of the meaning of popular sovereignty, a plank 
in the I856 platform. Douglas and his Northern followers, because of the 
pressure from their st^ porters, contended that the people withip the 
territories should decide the slave or free territory issue before the 
question of statehood was raised. On the other hand, the "Southerns" 
argued that the I856 platform meant that the people in the territories 
should decide the fate of slavery only at the point of statehood. This 
distinction, which may or may not have been a meaningful one, served to 
justify the rejection, by the South, of Douglas and his doctrine. They 
had a "reason" to bolt. By convention time, moreover, the notion of a 
Congresionally guaranteed slave-code for all the territories had gained 
popular support.^
The motive and wisdom of the Southern Democrats in taking a rigid 
position behind a territorial slave-code has been seriously questioned 
for over one hundred years. Rosenboom insists that
the blunders of Buchanan and the extremism of southern leaders had
broken the party, but the immediate issue was a legal abstraction. 
Slavery could not exist in the remaining territories, and no court 
decision or Congressional cods could give it life; but the South had 
evolved its formula, and compromise was impossible.^
Split over Patronage
Finally, the two wings of the party split over the issue of control
For a thorough delineation of the Southern insistsncs on a slavs- 
code for the territories so© Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential 
Election of I860, pp. 26-58.
2ia  ---  T.   m w.'
xi.o»e»iiuooin, p.
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of political patronage. In the time before the passage of the Civil 
Service Act; the president wielded a tremendous amount of political 
power, since all federal offices were subject to executive authority. Since 
the Kansas feud, Buchanan had used the patronage power against Douglas 
and his allies in an attempt to ride them out of the party.^ The Charles­
ton confrontation, consequently, became a struggle for control of the 
national party between the two sections. The section which was able to 
capture party control, nominate the candidates, and win the election, 
would have access to political patronage.
The Charleston convention, therefore, because of the differences 
over "personalities, policies, and patronage," was unable to agree upon a 
slate of candidates. The Southern fire-eaters used this as an opportunity 
to stage a dramatic walkout. The convention adjourned, after a week of 
nothing but deadlocks, because no candidate could obtain the necessary 
two-thirds vote, to be reconvened later that June in Baltimore. At the 
second convention the bolting state delegations were refused credentials; 
Douglas was nominated by the convention while the Southern state delegations 
nominated John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, the incumbent vice-president, 
on a slave-code platform.
In the campaign, the Northern Democrats, with Douglas as both 
leader and spokesman, appealed primarily to the voter in the North.
Douglas, however, did tour the border and Southern States with his doctrine
2
of popular sovereignty and appeal to unionism. In the North, Douglas
"^ See Philip G. Auchampaugh, *?The Buchanan-Douglas Feud," Journal 
of the Illinois State Historical Society. JH (April, 1932), 5-^.
Popular sovereignty and unionism were the two themes that Douglas 
developed in his canpaign speaking in both North and South. At Raleigh,
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attacked the radicalism of the abolitionists; in the South, he attacked 
the radicalism of the fire-eaters. The "Little Giant" sought to hang 
the extremist label on both the Republicans and the Southern Democrats.^  
Although the Southern Democratic party had token siqjport in the 
North, it appealed almost exclusi-vely to the Southern voter by creatii^  
the image that the real issue in the caagaaign was a sectional one. A 
vote for any candidate other than Breckinridge was considered a vote for 
the abolitionists,^
The Constit^ utiftiiAl Union Party
In May of I860 a conservative anti«Democratic aggregation of
Whigs and "Americans," mostly from the South, organized the Constitutional 
3
Union party. All of those in attendance at the convention were certain
North Carolina, for example, he defended popular sovereignty as an exten­
sion of the principle of local-self government which, he pointed out, was 
"an inherent right in North Carolina." In regard to the value of the 
Union, he asked: "Now when you tell me that you are going to divide the 
Union, I ask where you will run the line? Will you run it between the
graves of your ancestors?" For the text of the Raleigh speech see Fits,
pp. 289-90.
IWhereas Douglas admitted that neither Lincoln nor Breckinridge 
were radicals, he argued that the parties they represented were controlled 
by extremists. He rejected the extremists with a "plague on both your 
houses" attitude and remarked in speeches in both New York and North 
Carolina that "I wish to God we had Old Hickory now alive in order that
he might hang Northern and Southern traitors on the same gallows." Cited
in William E. Baringer, "The Republican Triunph," in Politics and the 
Crisis of I860, p, 109,
. M^any in the South were so ego«involyed in their position that they 
develops the "all-or«nothing" attitude, Henry T. Shanks, The Secession 
Movemnt in Virginia, I847«l86l (Richmond: Garrett and Massie, Publishers, 
193^ )» p. 113, observes that "radicals, including Edmund Ruffin and John 
Tyler, Jr., even suggested that the 'South ought to secede if any candi­
date except Breckinridge were elected.’"
^Shanks; p. 102, points out that W. G. Riyss of Virginia urged 
Crittenden to change the name of the party from "National Union Party," to 
the "Constitutional Union Party" because of Southern hostility to the word, 
"national."
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that a new party, with a new name, without fanaticism or prescription, 
could unit patriotic and conservative men of all parties to check sec­
tionalism and disloyalty to the Onion. In calling for the new party, the 
Daily Chronicle and Sentinel wrote s
But îAat shall be the basis of the new party? In the first place it 
must be truly a Union party, standing on middle ground between the 
extremists of each section, rebuking the fanaticism of the North 
and the ultra!sm of the South. Its great aim must be to preserve 
the Union of these states.
The party nominated John C. Bell of Tennessee as the standard 
bearer with the distinguished Edward Everett of Massachusetts as his 
running mate. The platform ignored all public issues, including slavery, 
and made general statements concerning the value of the Union. Parks 
points out that
the Constitutional Union appeal to reason and caution, although 
commendable, could not have been calculated to generate much 
enthusiasm. Paradoxically, its strong point was also its weak 
point. Its refusal to take a stand on the one exciting issue 
robbed its candidates of all chance of substantial st^ >port from 
the more aggressive politicians? few people become excited over 
a proposal to do nothing.^
Bell and Everett drew support mainly from the border states but 
were also able to challenge Breckinridge in the states of the Upper South. 
The party appeal, however, was primarily in these areas of the South 
where the slave system was not as firmly entrenched.  ^ In social judg‘d 
ment language, slavery was not so important an "anchorage" as unionism.
O^Qhlcle .and. Sentinel (Augusta, Georgia), cited in Dwight 
Lowell Duffiord (ed. ), Southern Editorials on Secession (New York: The 
Century Conpany, 1931)* p. 33.
2^
"Joseph Howard Parks, John Bell of Tennessee (Baton Rouges 
Louisiana State University Press, 1950J7~PP. 3^7^81
S^ee Seymoim Martin Lipset, Psliticsl Man; The Social Bases of 
Polities (Garden City, New Yorks Doubleday & Conçany, IncT. I960), pp. 346=
52.
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Two observations should be made concerning the unique four-party 
race for the presidency in i860. In the first place, two elections in­
stead of one were held. Douglas and Lincoln fought over the the North 
and Bell and Breckinridge competed in the South. Lipset observeds
Although there were four candidates in the race, the contest in 
each region of the country was largely a two-party affair. In the 
southern states it was a contest between the secessionist Democrats 
supporting Breckinridge and the Old whig Constitutional Unionists 
who advocated remaining in the Union, In the North it was the 
Democrat, Douglas, who,opposed slavery but favored saVing the Union 
by giving the southern states various guarantees for their "peculiar 
institution." The northern WhigJRepubllcans under Lincoln fiso 
hoped to save the Union but vigorously opposed the extension of slavery 
in the territories or new states fmd included a number of prominent 
abolitionists in their ranks. Thus the northern Whig-JRepublicans 
and southern Democrats represented the two extremes, while the 
northern Democrats and the southern Whig-Constitutional Unionists 
represented the groups in each section of the country who were 
seeking to compromise the cleavage.
Second, the reorganization of the political parties occurred at a 
dangerous point in American history. Nichols asserts, for example, that 
"the triple conjunction of tensions in politics, business, and religion 
was gathering in all its force, making perilous this period of political 
reshuffling."^
The splintering of the political parties, consequently, was both 
the cause and the symptom of the growing sectionalism and agitation over 
slavery. The extent of bitterness between the two sections was measured 
in the destruction of the one remaining national organization that could 
speak to both sections— the Democratic party. That four political parties 
of relatively equal strength should enter the "hustings" was evidence of 
the divided state of the Union.
I^bid,. p. 345.
%ichols. The Disruption of American Democracy, p. 24.
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Rise of the Common Han 
The Western famer. Eastern workingman» and middle class reformer 
had been able, by the time of the Linco^ election in i860, to broaden 
the base of participation in the American democracy. The rise of the 
"comon man" had witnessed such reforms as the direct election of presi­
dential electors, the abolition of property qualifications for voting 
and office holding, and the substitution of the national nominating 
convention for the congressional caucus. "Thus, by I860," as Staapp 
points out, "the ’common man* had gained increased opportunities to make 
his influence felt in government."^
All critics, however, have not viewed the emerging power of the 
common man as an advantage. Donald, for example, argued that "it can be
safely maintained that universal democracy made it difficult to deal with
2
issues squiring subtle understanding and delicate handling." In 
describing lAat he called the "excess of democracy," Donald contended 
that the broadening of the base of democratic influence occurred at an 
unfortunate time since it placed within the hands of incompetent and 
unlearned citizens the power to determine the destiny of the nation. Since 
the slave issue had so inflamed and distorted the differences among 
individuals and between sections, the average "common man" would be unable 
to react in a rational fashion to the converging emotional pressures.
Eaton reinforced this notion by writing that
Kenneth M. Stampp, "The Republican National Convention of I860," 
in Anti-Slaverv and Disunion. 1858-1861. ed. J. Jeffery Auer (New York; 
Harpers and Row, 1963), p. 194.
^avid Donald, "Excess of Dsaocracy; Ths Amsrlcairi Civil War and 
the Social Process," The Centennial Review. V (Winter, I961), 3^ .
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the rise of the common man as a political and social power inten­
sified the atmosphere of intolerance. Such concurrence of the 
illiterate and of the educated classes of the South a policy 
of repression indicates that factors other than illiteracy played 
a dominant role in closing the Southern mind on the slavery 
question.
The i860 cançaign, then, occurred during a significant political
and social period of transition in the American Democracy. More people
were actively participating in the campaign in one way or another, and,
in addition, the atmosphere was conducive to an outbreak of deflagoguery
and irrationality. In this regard, Cattbn and Catton point out that
at the same, manhood suffrage and party polities did away with a 
recognized, quasi-patrician class of leaders and substituted a 
species of professional politicians whose interest in living up an 
jâmediate majority tended to obscure a national viewpoint and put 
constructive statesmanship at a discount. At the lowest level this 
meant demagoguery and appeals to prejudice, and even at the highest 
it encouraged saying what one's audience wanted to hear or risking 
defeat at the hands of a rival who never said anything else.
Use of Political Techniques 
The political methods used during the canç>âign to win support for 
the various candidates were adapted to the specific political conditions 
and practices of that day. In the first place, the campaign was more than 
just an opportunity for political persuasion but was an important social 
event as well. Catton and Catton wrote:
A red-hot political campaign in this unjaded era was festival, 
circus, and bank holiday rolled into one. To a disordered society 
in the grip of change, the spread-eagle democracy of log-cabin 
campaigning and professional party organizations was vitally iaçjor- 
tant. Politics was church and country club, intellectual stimulant, 
mass entertainment, and prime emotional outlet for this generation, 
and every facet of the American ejqieriment— rough edges, partisan 
enthusiasm, ballyhoo, and all.3
iEaton, p. 29.
‘^Catton and Catton, p. 78. 
^Ibid.. p. 157-
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The air was literally filled with the oaapaign. Bands, toroh-light 
parades, political rallies, pele=raisings, fiery speeches and editorials 
and extensive pamphleteering olupged the campaign atmosphere. Mayer 
observed that
the parades, picinics, and contests accon a^nying the oasgiaign rally 
were America's equivalent of the religious celebrations and royal 
celebrations that existed in the European countries fr<m which its 
people had come. For a few fleeting hours life took on a magical, 
operative quality for the spectators and principals alike. Boastfhl 
oratory, flamboyant gestures, and emotional battle cries gave the 
crowd a sense of participation in the great enterprises of the 
party. 1
In the second place, since the political parties had not been
able to organize at the local level, each candidate had his own marching
clubs which would, in addition to making an appearance at local rallies,
perform the perfunctory duties necessary in a political campaign. In
describing the role of Lincoln's "Wide Awakes" in the i860 campaign,
Randall observed that
they functioned as party clubs, ready at all times with mottoes, 
torches, special uniforms, and exploding fireworks to demonstrate 
for the Union, for Lincoln, for free homesteads, free labor, the 
Constitution, Plymouth Rock, Liberty throughout the world, American 
industry, river and harbor improvements, and the Republican party. 
Their music, pageantry, and army-like drill, being designed for 
spectacular show and sensational appeal, were unanswerable: it
was tuôlrâ to shout, not argue, it was theirs also, at election 
time, to get out the vote.2
The other candidates also had their own versions of the "Wide 
Awakes." Douglas was represented at various political rallies ty the 
"Little Giants" and "Little Dougs." In Brooklyn a Douglas group started
M^ayer, p. 8.
G. Randal __
& Company, 19*^ 5), I, 179-80
l, Lincoln the President (New York: Dodd, Mead
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the "Chloroformers," their sworn object being to "put the Wide Awakes 
to sleep,"*' Bell; on the other hand, had his "Bell Ringers," "Miante 
Men," and "Union Sentinels," T^ ose fighting for Breckinridge and Lane 
worked under the banner of "National Democratic Volunteers."
The political techniques used in the i860 cançaign were adapted to 
the particular demands of political persuasion in that generation. The 
atmosphere was conducive for an unusual amount of "ballyhoo" since a 
political campaign occupied such an important place in mid-19th Century 
American culture. Furthermore, the marching clubs were organized in 
order to fill the vhcuum between the party organization and the average 
voter.
The election of i860 was conducted against a backdrop of intense 
emotionalism amidst a period of political transition and reorganization. 
Four political parties appealed with all their vigor and enthusiasm to 
the American voter who, because of the extension of democratic opportuni­
ties, was in a position to exert maximum influence on his own destiny.
This expansion of the franchise enlarged the opportunity for political 
bossism and demagoguery as each candidate sought to out-flank the other.
In describing the campaigns of that period, Nichols wrote:
The campaigns of that critical decade focused public attention 
too sharply upon conflicting attitudes, exiaggerated them to perilous 
proportions, and generated dangerous over-conflicts in the course 
of the political maneuvering. They aroused passion to such a pitch 
that only bloodletting, occasional or wholesale, could relieve the 
tension. Election cangiaigns thus became the catalytic agents 
which fatap.y hastened the processes that brought on secession and 
civil war.2
luthin, p. 174.
2
Nichols, The Dismption of American tiemocracy. p. 21.
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Social and Cultural Background in i860 
Sines a political or historic movement is part of its unique 
social situation or milieu, an analysis of the movement must include a 
discussion of the social and cultural influences which were dominant at 
that particular time. These factors, typically, are so interwoven into 
the movement that it is difficult to unravel and view them separately. 
This observation can certainly be made of the ante-bellum controversy 
over slavery. Nichols, in his study of the "pervasive attitudes" which 
permeated the pre-war culture, suggested that "Protestantism and romanti­
cism fundamentally influenced emotion and action within the Republic,
They stood in the way of realistic consideration of troublesome questions 
and issues.
The two social and cultural influences, romanticism and religion, 
made it difficult for the Americans of that generation to discuss or 
decide critical issues with a reasonable amount of rationality. This 
part of the chapter, then, will discuss the effect that romanticism and 
religion had on both sections of the country as the crises between them 
became more acute.
Effect of the Romantic Movement 
The first half of the 19th Century has been rightly called the 
"Romantic Age," for romanticism was an attitude common throughout western 
culture at that time. The American was like his counterpart in Europe 
in that he glorified in the melodramatic and utopian; advocated the 
glorious triunroh of virtue and defeat or punishment of vice. His
f  «
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^ucatlon was dominated by classic lore, rhetoric, logic, aid moral
philosophy. In his analysis of the Romantic movement within the American
democracy, Minar wrote that
the term romantic is, of course, a very loose one. In the present 
context, we mean it to refer to the reemphasis within the liberal 
tradition of the iaçjulse of religion, or optimism, and of reform.
It was a reassertion of faith in the individual, captured in the 
reinvigorated use of snch terms as spirit, nature, destiny, and 
faith.^
The romantic spirit permeated both the North and South, but in 
doing so, was manifested in different ways. In the North, on one hand, 
romanticism manifested itself in a passion for making over society 
according to the dreams of perfectionists, Fourierites, feminists, aboli­
tionists, and the transcendentalists. Romanticism "underlay transcen­
dentalism and the agitation for immediate abolition of slavery," observed
2
Eaton, "it was directed toward reform, toward establishing utopias."
In the South, on the other hand, the Romantic movement looked to 
the past for its inspiration, to the dream of a Greek democracy based on 
slavery, to the feudal charm of Sir Walter Scott's novels. As Osterweis 
observed, the South was based on a tripod of slavery, the plantation
3
systés, and Southern romanticism. In the language of Farrington, "the 
dream of a Greek civiligation based on black slavejy was discovered at 
the bottom of the cup of southern romanticism."^
David ¥. Minar, Ideas and Politics; The American Expsrienos 
(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1964), p. 237.
2
"Clement Eaton, The Mind of the Old South (Baton Rouges 
Louisiana Stats University Press, 1964), p. 184.
-Collin G. Osterweis, Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old 
South (New Haven: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927), P. 13^7
\emon Louis Farrington, The Romantic Revolution in ^ erica. 
1800-1860 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and CoBç>any7 1927), p. 13^T
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In addition to the backward=»looking characteristics of Southern 
rmantlcism, the romantic spirit also made ths average Southerner resentful 
of any outside criticism, especially from the abolitionists, Eaton suggests 
that
the sensitiveness of Southerners to criticism was exaggerated by the 
existence of a weli<=developed vein of romanticism in their society.
The vogue of romanticism was not peculiar to the Southern States 
of this period, but it attained a more luxuriant growth below the 
Potomac than elsewhere in America.
The Romantic movement, consequently, flourished in both the 
North and the South, Such romantic concepts, however, could not supply the 
kinds of rational correctives idiioh were necessary because of the 
emotional impulses of the time.
The American mind often viewed its problems unrealistically. The 
people easily espoused causes and went forth on crusades instead of 
giving constructive thought to grave social questions. They were 
willing to accept simple explanations for complex social problems, 
easy "cures" for pervasive ills. Political behavior was much 
affected ty this romanticism, for voters could be swept along by 
inpassioned oratory playing upon fears and hates and could rush 
heedlessly into the chaos of civil war,^
Effect of Religion
Romanticism was closely related to the i*eligious thought and 
practice of that day. Like romanticism, religion had a telling effect 
in the way in which the voters perceived political problems and contre - 
versies. Religion influenced the ante bellum conflict in at least two 
ways. First, the Protestantism of that day viewed the world as "black or 
white" in so far as moral judgments were concerned. The religionists had
■^ Eaton, The Fro edom  ^of-^Thought Struggle in the Old South, p. 4?. 
2
Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, p. 37,
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a keen sense of "sin" and "morality" and "were quick to see a moral issne
in practically every qnestion^ -social» political, and religions. Van
Densen verified that
moral judgments carried great weight one hundred years ago. Religious 
teachings made a deep intact during the 1850’ss Northern pastors of 
evangelical churches thought they knew a sin when they saw one. and 
both preachers and congregations knew that slavery was sinful.^
On the other hand, the Southern form of religion came to the
defense of slavery on moral grounds. Both sections, moreover, believed
the same Bible, prayed to the same God, but violently disagreed as to
the Christian view of slavery. This tendency toward moralizing every
issue further intensified the sectional split. "As long as religious
ties reinforce secular political alignments," Lipset noted, "the chances
for conçromise and democratic give-and<=take are weak," The reinforcement
of the "secular" issue of slavery by "religious ties" is a prime case in
point.
In the second place, religion influenced the culture of that
period by sustaining a form of revivalism. Donald has commented that
"religious rsvivalism reached a new peak Ixi the 1850’s. Hysterical fears
and paranoid suspicions marked this shift, of Americans to other-direct^ ed™
ness;* Never was there a field so fertile before the propagandist, the
3agitator, the extremist."
Because of this revivalism, the churches of the nation were unable 
to escape the political question of slavery. In the Nort.h, as Mayer has 
pointed out, local preachers took their cue from older evangelists like
^lyndon G, Van Deusen, "Why the Republican Party Came to Power,"
Ths Crisis of the Cnioxi « 1860=18ôl, p, y,
lipset,.p, 84, 
Donald, p. 35.
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Lyauui Beecher and Charles Grandis on in exhorting *’their flocks to fight
slavery, Intemperance, and other evils. In the best American traditions,
1
the cmsading chnrchmen represented their opinions as the will of God,"
In the South, a counter movement developed in the churches as the ministers,
stung to anger by attacks tpon their institutions and slurs upon their
2
moral integrity, made their pulpits into rostrums of defense.
Romantic and religious concepts combined to add to the already 
explosive atmosphere prevailing during the I860 election by infusing 
irrational and moralistic points of view into complex and difficult 
problems. Furthermore, those mho clearly "saw the light" felt obligated, 
in using emotionalized i*evivalistic methods, to "convert" the doubtful 
by condemning the "heathen." Romanticism and relgion were, indeed, 
"^rvasivB attitudes" which prevented a thoughtful, rationalistic, and 
realistic approach to the settlement of vital questions.
Rhetorical Background in i860 
The success of any movement or canpaign is- to a laz^ e degree, 
dependent- on the effectiveness of the rhetoricians in the "adjusting of 
ideas to people and people to ideas." This is evident fear at least two 
reasons. First, the rhetorician performs the role of a "gatekeeper" in 
that he is able to control what people know about the movement or candidate
3
by letting through "some kinds of information but not others." In short.
^ayer, pp. 6-7.
E^aton, The Hind of the Old South, pp. 177-78.
C^harles A. McClelland, "Systems Theory and Human Conflict," in 
The Nature of Human Conflict, ed. Elton B. McSeil (Englewood 
Jersev! Pfmnti m*—Ral 1 . Tr»,» . 10A< \ rs OAP.
Cliffs, Sow
f t  t r  •
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the picture the population has of an idea or person is influenced by the
*gstskssp3?s,
Second, the rhetoricians are instrumental in gaining popular 
support for an idea or individual. Ideas become powerful and individuals 
become influential when they have been popularized. The rhetoricians, 
consequently, who are associated with a movement have the responsibility 
for filtering and popularizing the kinds of information which serve to 
develop the "image" of a movement of personality.
The background analysis of the I860 cançaign would be incoi^ lete 
without a discussion of the rhetorical practice and methodology of that 
particular generation. This study will consider the rhetoridal function 
of (l) newspapers, (2) campaign documents, and (3) public speaking.
Role of the Newspapers in I860
The newspaper was a major source of communication and persuasion 
in i860. Since communication was limited, except for speeches, to written 
form, the newspaper was a chief vehicle for news dissemination and colora­
tion. By i860, 372 dailies and 2,971 weeklies were in circulation. As
public literacy was increased because of the development of state school 
systems, more of the voters were able to read newspapers than ever before 
in the history of the nation. The newspaper, as a result, occupied a 
strategic role in the I860 can^ aign.
The ingjortanee of the press to the political parties was evident. 
Mayer observes that
party leaders distrusted editors but regarded them as a necessary 
evil because the political machine subsisted on favorable publicity. 
Since association was inescapable, the risim politician preferred 
that the editor be his employee, and either bought a personal organ 
or induced his followers to do so if possible. Lesser politicians
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who could not afford to own p^ers were obliged to pay editors 
for support. Coi^ressium £Uhu tfashbume of Illinois regarded 
$50 per editor as the standard fee in the I850’s, although ha 
had to put tqp $200 to secure satisfactory treatment from the 
Chicago Tribune.^
The editors of I860, free from copyrighted influences and news­
paper chains, and representing every political party and every economic 
and religious group, were representative of the thoughts of the general 
population. In small population centers their offices were the favored 
exchanges of "local intelligence," and almost invariably the editors 
themselves paired off to cross quills In provincial politics. Perkins 
reported that the newspapers "were certainly far better spokesmen 
of their times than are the editors of modern newspapers; and the 
conclusion seems warranted that they were the best spokesmen of their 
day."^
It is, of course, difficult to assess the extent to which the
newspapers actually influenced the voter in I860. Caiq)bell suggested,
in her study of the I860 campaign and election in Tennessee, that
the nen h^is Appeal's campaign in behalf of Douglas, whom it had 
represented as being the only candidate who could unite all 
sections and so insure the preservation of the Union as it then 
existed, was responsible in a large measure for the stqsport which 
he rsssi^ in -sst Tennessee, particularly in the area around 
Mei^ >his.3
The newspapers, then, performed a significant rhetoric function 
in the I860 campaign by carrying the names of their favorite candidates
^^er, p, 20
Howard Cecil Perkins (ed.), Northern Editorials on Secession 
(New York: D, Appleton-Ccntury Conpany, 1942), I, 4-5 .
%ary Emily Robertson CaBçbell, The Attitude of Tennessee Toward 
the Union. 1847-1861 (Vantage Press, 1961), p. 134.
141
on their masthead and by "beating the drums" for their man in the 
editorials aixi news stories,
Role of Campaign Documents in i860
In order to supplement the newspapers, the political parties 
published a number of different types of cançaign documents. The most 
popular forms of doooments were the panphlets and campaign biographies.
Campaign pamphlets, published by the thousands by each party,
usually included the text of speeches favoring their candidate or a
series of quotations, usually taken out of context, of the opponent in
order to reveal his "true position" on various issues. Nichols described
the role of the campaign pamphlet.
What the party lacked in newspaper power it must compensate for by 
pamphlets. The resident committee worked particularly hard at 
preparing sudi material for people still set great store by this 
reading matter. Voters in the country and the small villages prized 
the pamphlets ^ ceived by mail as their special contact with the 
outside world.
In addition, campaign biographies were mass produced in order to 
introduce the voter to the background and career of the candidates. In 
I860, biogr^hies of Lincoln were written by Bartlett, Washbume, and 
Howells. Brown estimated, in regard to Lincoln, that between one hundred
and two himdred thousand copies of his biographies were distributed during 
2
the campaign. Biographies of Douglas, which were written specifically 
for the campaign, were authored by Sheehan and Flint.^
N^ichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, p. 55.
/William Burlie Brown, Die People Choice s The Presidential
Image in ^  Campaign Biography (Baton Rouge s Louisiana State University 
Press, 1960), p. 10
^or an analysis of the Douglas bi(graphies see Martha Kester,
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The newspîçjers and canpaign documents, consequently, were utilized 
ty the rhetoricians in appealing to the voters in behalf of their respec­
tive candidates. As the cançaign saturated othenr areas of social life, it 
^80 filled the available reading material. Although it is difficult to 
assess the overall effect of any written propaganda in eontemporaiy 
campaigns— much less can^ aigns that were staged over on# hundred years 
ago, the fact remains that the politicians relied on these written forms 
of persuasion.
Role of Public Speaking in i860 
Campaign or public speaking was perhaps the most significant 
rhetorical method employed by the candidates and their supporters in 
i860. The American form of government has always encouraged the develop­
ment of political speaking as an essential aspect of the democratic
system. This discussion will consider (l) the ia o^rtance of public
speaking in I860, (2) the style of public speaking in i860, and (3) the 
occasions for public speaking in I860.
Importance of Public Speaking in i860
On November 8, I96O, the day after the election, the New York 
Tribune observed that "while the circulation of speeches, campaign ami 
paaçâilet essays has not been remarkably large, the number of meetings 
and oral addresses in this canvass has been beyond precedent. Because 
of the nature and sotting of the cançaign, a high premium was placed on
"Stephen A. Douglas : A bibliogr^hieal Study," (unpublished master’s 
thesis. Department of Library Science, University of Illinois, 1953).
C^ited in Rhodes, p. 484.
1^3
public speaking as a means of voter influence. The New Orleans Bee, for
example, advised the party leaders to "speak to the sovereigns face to
face. Stnmp oratory is the mightiest political weapon that can be
wielded,"^ That same newspaper, in describing the obligation of one of
the political parties, suggested that
the plain duty of the Constitutional Union Party is to rely chiefly 
on public speaking as a means of spreading useful and isçortant 
information. Cançaign circulars «md documents are not without their 
usefulness, but a million of them will effect less than half a 
dozen able and well considered speeches . . . .  every member of the 
party conçetent to deliver a well-timed and forcible speech should 
be pressed into service.^
Although this interest in public speaking was nation-wide, the 
South was especially fascinated by speaking from "the stung)." W. G.
Brown points out, in The Lower South in American History, that "it was 
the spoken word, not the printed page, that guided thought, aroused 
enthusiasm, made history. It is doubtful if there ever has been a 
society in which the orator counted for more than he did in the Cotton 
Kingdom."^
One of the reasons for the general popularity of public speaking 
in the South was related to that section's isolation. Southern isolation 
placed a prsmiurn on any moans of breaking the boredom ana satisfying 
the common craving for human association. Three such opportunities were 
available in that section— political rallies, court days, and church
C^ited in Jerry L. Traver, "Political Oratory aisi the New Orleans 
Camoaign Clubs of i860," Southern Speech Journal. XXVII (Summer, 1962),
325.
Ibid.
C^ited in Robert T. Oliver, History of Public Speaking in America 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., I965), p. 181.
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services. In all three the great delight was listening to speeches.
For this reason, Nichols wrote that:
the South specialized In oratory— political, court *md pulpit. Its 
politicians, lawyers, and ministers became past masters in the art 
of pouring out «notional rhetoric. The average southerner would 
stand for hours in the heat to hear the impassioned flow of speech.
The result was sharp rivalry among candidates for command over 
crowd emotions.
Political oratory in i860, therefore, was an effective instrument 
in the hands of politicians who campaigned in the generation of an "excess 
of democracy," If a candidate was not adept from "the stump" himself, 
he would gather around himself a number of stgiporters who were able to 
take the message to the people.
Style of Public Speaking in i860
Public speaking in general in that century has been aptly
described by Weaver as "the spaciousness of the old rhetoric,"^ Weaver
argues that the rhetoricians of that day used general, vague, or "spread-
eagle" terms and phrases in order to remind people of what they already
thought instead of making them think, Nichols adds that this high-flown,
florid, and fancy form of oratory was influenced by the cultural factors,
"It was an age of romantic ençiricism," he claimed, "so beefed up by
hyperbolic Historic that it is difficult to discover exactly what some
3
cff these extrav%ant speakers were thinking,"
This notion of a "romantic rhetoric" was especially predominant
^Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, p. 46,
%iehard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Rsgnery 
Company, 1953)tPP. 164-85.
%ichols, "Why the Democratic Party Dividsd," p, 42.
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in the South, Lieutenant Francis Hall, an Englishman who travelled
throughout the South during the ante helium period, classified the various
brands of Southern orators as the "political spouters" descanting upon
liberty, the rights of man, and the freedom of the seas; the "Fourth of
July orators;" the "orators of the Human race ;" and the "tobacco-spitting
stump orators."^  In describing the effectiveness of Yancey, a Southern
fire-eater, Eaton suggested that
The passionate addiction of Southern people to florid and 
emotional oratory was one of the social conditions that gave 
Yancey the opportunity to become something more than an ordinary 
politician. An examination of Yancey's style of oratory and its 
effect upon Southern audiences, therefore, affords a clue to a 
significant facet of the Southern mind of the eve of the Civil War.
To a great extent Yancey eu^ loyed the technique of the cai^  meeting 
in moving the masses. A deeply religious man himself, he allied the 
cause of obtaining justice within the Union or the alternative of 
secession with great moral forces and with the ineluctable dictates 
of honor. Much of his success as an oratory also depended on the 
fact that both he and his audiences were strongly affected by the 
Romantic movement.
This is not to say, however, that all public speaking in i860 was
of the "spread-eagle" variety. In fact, a number of speakers of that
generation exhibited some of the basic characteristics of the Attic style 
of oratory. Perkins points out that "Southerners tended toward the grand
3
style, Westerners toward the plain style," Mayer observed that Lincoln’s
chief asset as a speaker was a simplicity and clarity that contrasted 
sharply with the turgid oratorical style esteemed at the time, a 
style ornamented by ponpous platitudes and quotations from the classics. 
There was an austere eloquence in his incisive sentences which enabled 
him to hold his. liateners' attention,^
E^aton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South, pp. 50-51. 
E^aton, The Mind of the Old South, pp. 209-10.
Lindsey S. Perkins, "The Democratic Conventions of i860," Antislav­
ery and Disunion, p. I87.
h
"Tkyer, p. 55
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In the same sense, Hofstadter contends that Wendell Phillips'
manner of speaking was "informal and direct in contrast to the pctoous
pedestal oratory that was so common."^  Finally, Braden took exception
with the stereotyped view of Southern oratory by insisting that the
Southern literary historians, in their attempt to "keep alive Southern
regionalism," tended to select certain kinds of speakers and speaking
styles from the ante bellum period and label them as representative of 
2the entire section.
In spite of these exceptions, it can be said that the speaking 
of the day was more "spacious," florid, and ornate than one would esqpeot 
to hear in the second century after the Civil War. In practically every 
case, however, the Romantic movement influenced, in one way or another, 
the kind of caiq)aign speaking that appealed to the voter.
Occasions for Public Speaking in i860
One of the most popular rhetorical occasions for the display of
oratorical ability was the campaign tour. The Daily Missouri Democratic
remarked in September of i860 that
among the most noticeable features of our quadrennial Presidential 
Canvass, both in a philosophical and a humorous light, arc the 
oratorical pilgrimages made throughout the length and breadth of 
our happy country by the most distinguished advocates of the 
respective candidates, and the consequent iiamense outdoor mass 
meetings of the people, who thus drunk \sic| in, as by inspiration, 
the most profound or most erraneous [gi^ political principles from 
the lips of the most illustrious statesmen, or the most nortorious 
Q i ^  demagogues, as the case may be.3
R^ichard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1948), p. 142.
W^aldo W. Braden, "The Ehnergence of the Concept of Southern 
Oratory," Southern Speech Journal. XXVI (Spring, 1961), I83.
^aily Missouri Democratic. September 19, I860.
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Speakers in the caiEpaign tonrs of I860 were both rauaerous and
distinguished, Lincoln, for eYaisple; was represented by such well-known
politicians as Samuel Chase, Carl Schurz, William Seward, Edward Bates,
and Charles Sumner. Lacking party organization and financial support,
Stephen A, Douglas took to the hustings himself and, in doing so, broke
the established tradition which restricted presidential nominees to
"front porch" canpaigning. This caused the St. Louis Democrat, a Lincoln
paper, to report that
Mr, Douglas, under one pretext or another, is vagabondizing all 
over New England and New York, and availing himself of every halt 
at a railraod depot to make a stump speech, in which he vilifies 
the Republican party almost as much as the party which is headed 
by Breckinridge. Since the day of his nomination, Ihr. Lincoln has 
never left Springfield, nor spoken, nor written a work for the 
public, with the exception of his brief note of acceptance.^
Douglas conducted four "oratorical pilgrimages;" two in the North
and two in the South.^  His decision to take to the hustings was prompted
by many factws. One of these factors has been described by Milton, one
of Douglas' most recent biographers.
For Douglas to be in town, even if for a few hours only, was a 
campaign tonic. His cheery smile, his rsminiscsncs, his liand-shake, 
his arm thrown about the shoulder, could in themselves upset the 
Opposition's best laid plans. Then too he always made a sturdy, 
convincing, sledge-hammer speech, concluding his remarks with 
deep and resonant words about the Constitution, the Union, the
1St. Louis Democrat. November 1, i860. On the other hand, 
Lincoln has been criticized for his refusal to speak during the campaign. 
Kirway, p. 385, writes that "in the ominous public silence that Lincoln 
maintained from his nomination until his inaugural, he revealed someidiat 
his failure to understand the temper of the southern people. He appar« 
ently thought that the average southerner could distinguish between 
Lincoln's own philosophy on the slavery question and that- of abolition­
ists like William Lloyd Garrison,"
% ’or a discussion of ths Douglas tours see Lionel Crocker, "The 
Campaign of Stephen A, Douglas in the South," Antislavsrv mid Disunion.
pp. 262-78.
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Democratic party as a national institution and the fondamental 
right of self-government.
The eaagjaign tour, as a series of rhetorical situations, forced 
a degree of flexibility on the rhetoricians since they had to adjust 
both their message and their method to different kinds of aodienees, Mayer 
wrote that
most caim>aigners took as moch care with their speeches, as their 
persongÇL contacts, especially if they reached higher political 
office. Seasoned orators were prepared to address groups of ten 
or ten thousand on a moment*s notice. Normally, they had only 
one speech but constructed it in such a way that sections could 
be added or deleted as circumstances required,^
The esÿhasis on cangiaign speaking in that generation led Whltridge 
to describe the mid-point in the Ipth Century as "the golden age of 
oratory, Public speaking was especially i#ortant in the i860 election 
because of the lack of other effective means of commonication and 
persuasion. This speaking, in reflecting the spirit of romanticism, 
tended to be both "spacious" and ornate. The voters flocked to hear 
the political orators as they would come through the town on one of
*urs or pilgrimages, "Stuaÿ speakiag,” then, was a signi^canttheir to
rhetorical device in the elections of that period In general and the 
firmt Lincoln presidential election in particular.
The cssçaign of i860 provides an interesting essKpl© of tbs 
role of riietoric in social influence. The newspapers, cai^aign publica­
tions, and public spsaksKf contributed to the dissemination of "Images"
■iHlton, p, 185.
r» TO^  y  #
Vnitridge, p, 4?,
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and infoHnation to the voters. In describing the effect of the cançaign 
on the voters. Fish and Smith concltded that "if ever the people «ere 
prepared to speak it was in November, 1860."^
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to delineate the inpact of 
tw historical, political, social and cultural, and rhetorical background 
factors on the campaign, candidates, and voters in i860. Two conclusions 
seem justified. First, these influences contributed to the intensifica­
tion of sectionalism. Sectional interpretations of issues and events, 
a breakdown in the political party structure, and a romantic-inspired 
culture and rhetoric, all contributed to the real or "perceived" differ­
ences between the sections. Randall and Donald, in this context, have 
suggested that
two factors In the fifties tended toward the placing of undue 
stress upon controversy and strife: (1) economic sectionalism,
and (2) the intensification of the slavery issue by the singling 
out of one narrow aspect— slavery e3q>ansion in the territories—  
till it became a process of exaggeration and over-si3«g>lifieation, 
the equivalent of "Southern rights" when viewed by one set of 
leaders, while by another group the checking of such espansion 
was represented as synonymous with democracy and freedom.%
Second, these same background factors influenced the state of 
mind of the Americans of that generation. Sectional friction, emotion­
alism, and irrationality were instrumental in making it difficult for 
the people involved in the ante bellum dispute to sit down and *!reason 
together." Randall, in his study of Lincoln, reached the conclusion that
1
Carl Russell Fish and William Ernest Smith, The American Civil 
War (New York; Longmans, Green and Coaçany, 193?)» p. 26,
2
J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstrustic 
(Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, I96I), p. 79.
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Ebceept for saner elements ^ leh seemed inadequately rooal, the 
oaaqjaign m e  waged in an emotional atmosph^ of abnormal Intensity. 
It % c  unreality ssds real— a conflict made insTitablo hy repeatedly 
and vociferously declaring it so. Social psyebolo^ of the time 
partook of the pathological.^
The excitement of the caBq>aign, energized by various romantic 
concepts and religious precepts, created such a super-charged atmosphere 
that it became much easier to take sides and condemn all enemies instead 
of negotiate.
R^andall, Lincoln the President. iyO.
CHAPTER V
ATTITUDES TOWARD SLAVERY IN I860 
The preceding chapter described the background of the i860 
election in terms of ths intensification of seetlonallsm and the 
presence of irrationality which was influenced by romanticism and 
religion. This chapter will focus on the various attitudes toward 
the question of slavery which were prevalent in i860. The slave 
issue was of critical inçortance in the cançalgn of i860, Catton 
and Catton wrote that "the record seems to indicate that the nation 
was all engrossed by the slavery question— that it talked slavery, 
thought slavery, lived slavery, and barely existed on any other 
pl$ne. Surely nothing else mattered,"^ "The campaign of i860," 
observed Craven, "would, regardless of what else might be involved, 
turn on the issue of the security of slavery in or out of the Union: 
its equal treatment with any other kind of property." During the cam­
paign the Honorable J. 0. Broadhead wrote a letter to the president of 
the Republican Club of Jefferson City, Missouri, in which he adjured:
"We cannot avoid the issue if we would; all parties discuss the question 
idiether they profess to ignore it or not, and they all test the soundness
^William Catton and Bruce Catton, Two Roads to Sumter (New York; 
McGraw-Hi].l Book Company, I963), pp. 61-2,
2
Avsïy C. Craven, The Growth or Southern Nationalism. 1848-1861 
(Baton Rouges L:Wiisiana State University Press, 1953)e p. 313.
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of their candidates by their soundness on this question."^
Because of the isçortancs of ths issus of huioan servitude in 
the cançaign» then, this chapter will (l) delineate the various shades 
of opinion that existed on the question of slavery and (2) discuss the 
effect of the assimilation and contrast processes on the perceptions of 
these opinions.
Positions on Slavery in i860 
The attitudes toward slavery in i860 can best be investigated by 
grouping them into three categories— anti-slavery, pro=slavery, and neutral. 
Two observations should be made in light of this grouping. First, al­
though certain attitudes were dominant in a particular section of the 
country they were not exclusive to that section. Second, the shades of 
attitude vAioh will be discussed were not discrete categories. Instead, 
they should be viewed as dimensional in that a given individual may have 
selected a position anywhere on the slavery continuum.
Anti-slavery Attitudes in I860 
The various shades of belief represented in an important issue 
within a historical movement tend to be obscured by time. One example 
of such distortion has occurred with regard to the anti-slavery move­
ment. Smiley observed;
In the years which followed the Civil War, men who contemplated 
its origins often considered the anti-slavery crusade and its effects 
upon the tragic event. But as the years passed, many forgot that 
there had been various shades of opinion among the opponents of
•4)his letter was cited in the Dailv Missouri Democratic» October 
6, 1860.   ------
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of slavery» and put all agitators into the same category.^
These "shades of opinion" among anti=slave?y segments may be viswsd 
in several ways. Aptheker divides the movement in terms relative to the 
action that each segment was willing to take in order to abolish slavery. 
Hart sees a geographical division including New England, the Middle 
states, and Western segments as the significant part s. ^ Dumond makes the 
division in the attitudes a product of chronological developments.^ This 
study, however, will accept the notion, as has Potter, that the most 
effective method of interpretation involves an analysis of the prior­
ities which were assigned to the issues.
But in the realities of the historical past principles frequently 
come into conflict with other principles, and those who make 
decisions have to choose which principle shall take precedence.
#en principles thus conflict, as they frequently do, it is mean­
ingless to show merely that a person or a grovp favors a given 
principle; the operative question is what priority they give to 
it.5
This analysis, consequently, will consider the salient anchorages 
or priorities which were used by the opponents of slavery. These anchor­
ages were moral, moral and political, and social and econmic.
D^avid L. Smiley, "Cassius M. Clay and John G, Fpae: A Study in 
Southern Anti Slavery Thought," Journal ^  Negro History. LVII (July,
1957), 201.
S^ee Herbert Aptheker, "Militant AboHtionism, " Journal of Negro 
History. XX7I (October, 1941), 4]8.
A^lbert Bushnell Hart, Slavery and Abolitionism; 1831-1841 (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1906), pp. 196-97.
^^ Bwight Lowell Dumond, Antislavery Origins of the Civil War in 
the United States (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 19397,
p. 5.
B^avlu ”. Potter, "Why the Republicans Rejected both Compromise 
and Secession," in Ths Crisis of the Union. 1S60-1861<, ed. George Harmon 
Knoles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), p. 90.
Those anti-slavery elements which were the most radical in their 
attacks on the South were characterized by a keen moral sensitivity to 
the inhumanity of slavery and a rejection of any form of political 
compromise.
The Inhumanity of Slavery
The most significant feature of what has been called the aboli­
tionist movement was its view of slavery as an immozal Institution both 
in theory and in practice.^ Abolitionism, which in this context refers 
primarily to the radical agitators of the Garrison stripe, was motivated 
by French humanitarianism, English abolitionism, and American romanti­
cism and religion. Hofstadter, in his study of the abolitionist move­
ment, claims that it was "based upon a moral frenzy, not an économie 
discontent."^ Elkins suggested that
for them, the question was all moral; it must be conteng>lated in 
terms untouched by expediency, untarnished by scciety's organic 
compromises, uncorrupted even by society itself. It was a 
problem of conscience which by mid-century would fasten itself 
in one form or another, and in varying degrees, upon men's 
feelings everywhere.3
^Betty Fladeland, "Who were the Abolitionists," Journal of Negro
History. XLIX (April, 196^ ), 115, describes the difficulty in categorising 
abolitionisms "The sheer number of Abolitionists, the thousands of unaek- 
knowledged and unsung, the myriad of personalities, and the vhst diversity 
of exigencies which mounded each individual's decision to join the movement 
makes it iiq>ossible to label or categorize them. In my composite I find 
room for fanatics, reckless incendiaries, lawbreakers, militant suffra­
gettes, exaggerators, philantropists, political and social eccentrics, 
political conservatives, visionaries, idealists ahead of their time, dedi­
cated humanitarians, psychopaths, religious bigots, sincere Christians,
«X t  ^A 1 A A BA J J A A BA A A M A 1a a M a a A A AaA a a Ba 1 A 1a ^ A M ü
y  V A .A .V .L V «W . O U i tX O U D  9 «U B J. U e jL O X IU O A ^ O  %JX u m e a v  A i a o i r x u c u i
2
Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York; 
Vintage Books, 1948), p. 145.
^Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery; A Problem in American Institutional 
and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), 
p. 28.
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The moral argument of abolitionists was based on the view
of the Negro which held that all the races were equal. Abolitionism
fostered the notion that a slave was a human who deseirved all the rights
of humanity. If, therefore, the slave were human in the fullest sense
of the term, then the Negro was an equal— politically, religiously, and
socially— to the Caucasian. Twersky suggested that
it is only among the Abolitionists of the Weld-Tappan and Garrison 
caliber that we find the formulation and practice of a doctrine 
of coi^ lete equality with the hopeful and confident assertion that 
Negro and white would in the near future live in close and complete 
harmony with each other.^
The attack on the concept of racial inequality by the abolitionists 
centered on two fronts. First, an attempt was made to demonstrate, from 
the Bible, from science, from history, and from observed facts, the 
essential equality of the races. Second, the abolitionists sought to 
prove that the unfavorable environmental conditions of slavery and 
agrégation, rather than natural inferiority, had caused the vices 
and disabilities of the American Negro.
Whenever a Negro, either slave or free, was perceived as "human" 
and slavery attacked as "immoral," abolitionist thought led toward the 
Insistence of immediate freedom for all slaves and the aeeeptance of 
Negroes into the mainstream of American society.
The Rejection of Conpromise
The abolitionists, who called for immediate abolition of 
slavery regardless of the social and economic consequences, rejected any 
form of political eompromiss. This rejection of political compromise
^Atarah S. Twersky, "The Attitude of the Ante-Bellum North Toward 
the Negro," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Department of History, 
Radeliffe College, 1958), p. 246.
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was reflected in three areas of abolitionist thought and practice. First, 
the abolitionists developed an "all-or-nothing" attitude toward the 
elimination of slavery. This point was made by Farrington when he sug­
gested, in describing Garrison, that "there were no shades in his think­
ing but only black and white, righteousness and sin. Expedience was not 
in his vocabulary. He was as narrow as he was intense."^ In short, the 
radical opponent of slavery viewed anyone who was not totally with him 
as, ipso facto, his deadly enemy.
Second, the radical abolitionists were agitators; they were not
politicians. In referring to Garrison, Williams asserted that "he
illustrated anew the fault of the radicals who will have a whole loaf
or no loaf at all; who are utterly io^raotical in that most practical
and compromising of all activities— political oaiq>aigns by political
parties."^ Elkins adds to this description of the abolitionists:
Almost without exception, they had no ties with the sources of 
wealth; there were no lawyers or jurists among them; none of them 
ever sat in a government post; none was a member of Congress; 
they took next to no part in politics at all; indeed, as Boerson 
remarked, "they do not even like to vote."3
Finally, when it became apparent that the nation would not 
heed their demand for ccsçlete and immediate abolition, the agitators 
adopted an anti-union stance. Komgold suggested that to the aboli= 
tionists
V^ernon Louis Farrington, The Romantic Revolution in America. 
1800-1860 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Comany, 1927), p. 357.
W^syne C. Williams, A Rail Splitter for President (Denver:
yitxvoA-oxojr vi i-^ iAvox* ircoo# y , x w ,
%Lkins, pp. 147-48.
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dissolution of the Union would accomplish two things; it would 
eliminate the danger of slavey expansion into Northern territory 
and its baneful influence on Northern institutions; it wouM end 
the complicity of the North in the maintenance of slavery.
The attitude of the radical abolitionists to the political process 
of con^ romise has been summarized by Gara.
To the Garrisonians, politick required the compromise of basic 
principles. Garrison was virtually a Christian anarchist who advocated 
seceding, if necessary, from a government which condoned slavery. 
Furthermore, the Garrisonians did not believe it possible to deal 
with a moral problem by using political me^s. Commenting on the 
very light Free Soil party vote in the 1852 national election, Samuel 
May, Jr. said that "the Anti-Slavery men of this country must cease 
to rely upon human devices and deep-laid schemes," and "trust solely 
to the moral power inherent in their causes. Party organization, 
drill and ma^inery are worthless, God's truth is to be their shield, 
their helmet, their whole armour."^
The abolitionist view of slavery, consequently, was overshadowed 
by an obsession with the moral inçlications of the slavery system to the 
point that any deviation from their rigid position could not be tolerated. 
In accepting the equality of the Negro slave, the abolitionists insisted 
on immediate freedom and rejected any form of political compromise.
Moral ard Political Opposition to Slavery
The second degree of anti=slavery thought agreed with the aboli­
tionists that slavery was a moral evil. The two points of view differed 
in that the moderates were willing to work within the limitations of polit­
ical reality in order to achieve the ultimate extinction of slavery.
First, the moderates accepted, in large part, the picture of
R^alph Kornbold, Two Friends _of Man (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1950), P, 211.
L^arry Gara, "Who/Was an Abolitionist?" in ths Antislaverv 
Vanguard; New Essaya on the Abolitionists. ed. Martin B. Dubersan 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 37.
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slavery that the abolitionists had skillfully portrayed, Catton and 
Catton, in describing the core of anti-slavery thought in the North, 
reported that
at the heart of the general attitude was a principle that Lincoln had 
been enunciating almost without let up since 18^ 4, one which summed 
up everything that millions in the North really felt about slavery, 
however vague, arKÎ one which, as far as it went, both abolitionists 
and Nortern conservatives could honestly endorse ; slavery was a 
moral wrong that should not be permitted to expand,
Three representative examples of moderate abolitionist persuasion
were Abraham Lincoln, William ELls^ Channing, and Charles Sumner. Though
certainly not a radical abolitionist, Lincoln found the institution of
slavery deeply repugnant and rejected it on moral and traditional grounds.
Fehrenbacher wrote that "there were also Republicans like Lincoln, a
humane man but not really a humanitarian, who viewed the subject on a
more theoretical level, opposing slavery as a moral wrong and as a viola-
tipn of the principles on which the nation had been founded." Lincoln,
however, was unwilling to go as far as the abolitionists in declaring that
the Negro was equal to the white in all respects. In a debate with
Douglas in I858, Lincoln argued against the notion that
because I do not want a black woman for a slave I must necessarily 
want her for a wife. I need not havs hsr for sithsr, I can just 
leave her alone. In some respects she certainly is not ny equal;
but in hsr natural right to eat the bread she earns with her own 
hands without asking leave of any one else, she is my equal, and 
the equal of all others.^
The second exançle of moderate abolitionist conviction was William
^Catton and Catton, p. 227.
D^cn E. Fchrsnbachsr, "Comment on -Why the Republican Party Came 
to Power,in The Crisis of the Union, p. 22.
C^ited in Paul M. Angle, Created Equal? The Complete Lineoln- 
Douglas Debates (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. xxi.
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Ellery Channing, a leading transcendentalist and Unitarian minister. In 
distingnishing between Garrison and Channing, Minar made the following 
cwnparison.
Channii^’s position, while it shared much with Garrison's, gave 
greater enpahsis to the religions aspects and abstract ideals of 
abolitionism and less to their historical and nationalistic roots.
His arguments were those of the enlightened humanitarian. Channing's 
basic olaiffl was tha\ a slave is a man and must be treated as man 
and not as property.1
The last example of moderate abolitionist persuasion was repre­
sented by such politicians as Charles Sumner who, unlike the radicals, 
were able to serve in Congress with some degree of flexibility. Hart 
suggested that as time went on
the anti-slavery and abolition movements in the north came closer 
together and sometimes joined forces, partly through the appearance 
of political abolitionists like Salmon P. Chase and Charles Sumner, 
who built up a little anti-slavery party and secured the support 
of thousands of men who were never conscious abolitionists.2
Lincoln, Channing, and Sumner, then, were typical of the 
moderates who accepted the immoral view of slavery but were not as 
intense and single-minded as the radical abolitionists who, because of 
their moral frenzy, wore unrealistic in their solutions to the problem 
of slavery.
The abolitionists, consequently, viewed slavery as primarily a 
moral problem and refused to compromise ; the moderates accepted the moral 
indictment of the abolitionists but tendered it somewhat by advocating the 
extinction of slavery through political means. The priority given by the 
moderates to these political means had three manifestations. First, the
^David W, Minar, Ideas and Politics: The American Experience 
(Homewood, Illinois; Tïw Dorsey Press, 1964), p. Z5k,
%art, p. 175.
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moderates reached the conclusion that the "slave-poHer” was a political
organisation that should be met with cosparabls political force, %ot
just moral suasion or condemnation. Graebner reported that
ultimately the successful exploitation of antislavery sentiment in 
American politics emanated from the conviction that slavery repre­
sented a political power that could be checked only through the 
creation of a countering political force. % e  movement, in short, 
took its strength from the notion that a slave power was reaching 
beyond the confines of the South through its influence ever ths 
Federal Government.^
As far as the Republics leaders were concerned, they could e:q>eot to
gain a political victory over the "slaye-power" and, as a result, set
slavery on the road to extinction. The Republican party, then, was the
institution that would rally both anti-slavery and anti-Southern
sentiment into a single political force.
Second, the moderates Insisted that the gradual abolition of
slavery should take place within the context of social harmony and
cohesion. Minar has discussed, in considerable detail, the effect of
this anchorage on moderate thought.
The differences between abolitionists like Garrison and abolitionists 
like Channing on these matters reflects an age-old problem in political 
thought. It is a problem of priorities among values. The question 
is whether one must sacrifice social stability, to most men a value 
of high priority, if the sacrifice is necessary to achieve or preserve 
freedom, also a value of high priority. This was, perhaps, the 
most important question of political philosophy raised by the entire 
Civil War controversy. It occurred for Lincoln; it occurred for the 
statesmen of the South.^
The moderates, therefore, balanced their anti-slavery attitude with a
concern for social stability. Williams, for exasple, quoted Lincoln as
^Norman A. Graebner, "The Politicians and Slavery," in Politics 
and the Crisis of i860, ed. Norman A. Graebner (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 19&5, p. 8
%inar, p. 256.
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r«a»king that "much as I hate slavery, I would consent to the extension 
of it rather than to see the Union dissolved, just as I would consent to 
any great evil, to avoid a greater one.
Finally, these two manifestât!one of the political anchorage were 
joined in the formation of a policy of nonextensionism as opposed to the 
radical appeal to immediate abolition of all slaves. The Republican 
leaders sought first to attack the slave system by opposing, by political 
force, its extension into the territories. There was no intent, in this 
proposal at least, to attack slavery where it already existed in the South. 
Doberman, in his study of the North in the ante bellum period, Observed:
The formula of nonextension did seem, for a time, the perfect 
device for balancing these multiple needs. Nonextension would put 
slavery in the course of ultimate extinction without producing 
excessive dislocation; since slavery would not be attacked directly, 
nor its existence immediately threatened, the South would not be 
unduly fearful for her property rights, the Union would not be 
needlessly jeopardised, and a mass of free Negroes would not be 
precipitously thrust upon an unprepared public. Nonoxtention, in 
short, seemed a panacea, a formula which premised in time to do 
everything while for the present risking nothing.
The moderates, then, agreed with the abolitionists in their moral 
Indictment; they rejected ths solution proposed by the radicals. The 
radicals were in favor of a moral attack: the aodarates favored a 
political attack. The radicals endorsed immediatism; the moderates 
supported gradualism through a policy of nonextensionism in the terri­
tories .
-Cited in T. Harry Williams, "Abraham Lincoln; Principle and 
Pragmatism in Politics," Mississiooi Valiev Historical Review, XL 
(June. 1953). 104. ------- — -----
^Martin Duberman, "The Northern Response to Slavery," in The 
Antislavsrv Vaaguard. p. 402.
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Social and Economic Opposition to Slavegy
The third anti-slavery segment included those in both sections of
the country who viewed slavery as amoral but opposed its spread on social
and economic grounds. "Conç)lementing the moral antislavery arguments of
those like Garrison and Channing," suggested Minar, "were near-utilitarian
arguments directed at the economic and sociological effects of the slavery
institution."^ This basis for anti-slavery thought was found primarily in
the West and in certain parts of the South.
Many in the West, who were also Negrophobes, feared the expansion
of slavery into the territories because of the threat it would represent
to the free labor system. They argued that if the "slave-power" were able
to foster slavery as a competitive economic system, their jobs would be
undermined. Hofstadter wrote:
Most of ths white people of the Northwest, moreover, were in fact not
only not abolitionists, but actually— and here is the core of the
matter— Negrophobes. They feared and detested the very thought of 
living side by side with large numbers of Negroes in their own states, 
to say nothing of competing with them in labor.^
Williams argued the same point when he wrote that
people in the West might have vaiying feelings about the morality of 
slavery, some being much agitated on the question and others very 
little, but they were united on one conviction: they did not want to
meet the conpetition of slave labor in the national domain. And so 
the South lost the West to the Northeast— by insisting on the ac­
ceptance of a system utterly unadapted to the needs of the West.3
Furthermore, there were a number of "hyphenated Americans," settled pri­
marily in the West, who feared that if the South truly felt that slavery was
M^inar, p. 256.
hofstadter, p. 112,
Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern Politics 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, I961), p. I3.
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a "positive good" certain tinderpriviledged groups might, sooner or later, 
find themselves in chains. Whenever the rhetoricians of political aboli­
tionism approached these segments, the moral issue was subordinated to 
economic and social factors. Lafton observed that
the abolitionists were well aware of the appeal which could be made 
to the artisans, mechanics, and laborers. Such an appeal would, in 
a measure, remove the anti-slavery movement from the realm of moral 
reform to ons of economic refonn by preferring help to enable the 
workers to better their own lot.^
This difficulty in appealing to both the radical abolitionist persuasion
as well as the "near-utilitarian" position was discussed by Hofstadter.
Merely to insist that slavery was an evil would sound like aboli­
tionism and offend the Negrophobes, Yet pitching their opposition 
to slavery extension on too low a moral level might lose the valued 
support of humanitarians. Both could understand that if freedom 
should be broken down they might themselves have to conçete with the 
labor of slaves in the then free states— or might even be reduced to 
bondage along with the blacks!^
In the South the only significant attack on slavery was on 
economic and social grounds. Stajçp, in a rather lengthy statement, 
summarized this opposition to slavery .
In contrast with the basically moral issue raised by Northern 
abolitionists, whether professional reformers or politicians, the 
Southern antislavery argument was primarily an appeal to economic 
expediency. Here there was no call for immediate abolition on moral 
grounds; indeed there was but slight interest in the future of the 
Negro. It was the effect of slavery upon the whites that most con­
cerned the Southern dissidents. They attributed the Southern small 
farmer’s conçarative lack of progress to the institution of slavery. 
Conspicuous in the indictment of slavery by the Southern dissenters 
was the charge that it was a wasteful labor system which ruined the 
land by encouraging careless and unscientific agricultural methods.^
^Williston H. Lafton, "Abolition and Labor," Journal of Negro 
History. XXXIII (July, 1948), 249.
%ofstadter, p, 112,
■^ Kenneth M. Stampp, "The Southern Refutation of the Proslavery 
ArguDwnt," North Carolina Historical Review. XXI (January, 1944), 36
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This kind of slavery attack, as one might expect, never did capture the 
imagination of the Southern population. Two of the dissenters, however, 
received a considerable hearing in the North. First, the role of Hinton 
R. Helper in the ante bellum struggle has already been mentioned in this 
study. His opposition to slavery, articulated in The Impending Crisis. 
was primarily an amoral approach based on the influence of slavery on the 
nonslaveholding South. Helper compared the social and economic conditions 
of the South with those of the North and concluded that the North, in these 
areas, was far superior to the South.^
Perhaps the leading proponent of this opposition to slavery in the 
South was Cassius H. Clay of Kentucky, Clay, who was an advocate of free 
white labor and of an industrial economy, admitted that slavery "is not 
a matter of conscience with me, I press it not upon the consciences of 
others."2 Nye, in addition, pointed out that Clay was by no means an 
abolitionist in the sense feared and hated in the South, and his attack on 
slavery was "not based upon these social, moral, and religious opinions to 
which Southern feelings wore most sensitive. He was no friend of the 
Negro, and by no stretch of the imagination could he be construed as 
favoring racial equality or amalgamation."^
The voices of Helper and Clay were raised in the South in opposition 
to slavery because they were concerned with the social and economic effects
S^ee Hugh C, Bailey, "Hinton Rowan Helper and The Impending 
Crisis." Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XL (April, 1957), 133-45.
C^ited in Smiley, 204.
%ussel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom; Civil Liberties and the Slavery 
Controversy. 1830=1860 (East Lansing: Michigan Stats Collage Press, 1949),
p. 11.
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of human servitude on Southern society. Along with conservative groups 
in the West; they viewed the extrLnction of slavery frcsa ths anchorage of 
"interest" instead of "principle." Their refusal to see a moral issue 
in slavery was due, in part, to their Negrophobe sentiment.
There were, in I860, various shades of anti-slavery opposition- 
moral, moral and political, and social and economic. These viewpoints 
differed primaidly in the kind of anchorage or value that was utlized 
in the assessment of the slave system. Furthermore, in line with the 
social judgment hypothesis discussed in Chapter II, th^ also differed 
in the degree of ego-involvement that each approach activated. If there 
is a relationship between intensity and extremity it would necessarily 
follow that the abolitionists, because of their moral rigidity, were more 
ego-involved in their position in the moderates; the moderates, because 
of their acceptance of the moral indictment of slavery, were more com­
mitted to their position than the conservatives who based their opposition 
to slavery on utilitarian arguments.
Pro-slavery Attitudes in i860
Two weeks after the i860 presidential election. The Review, pub-
lised in Charlottesville, Virginia, observed:
Now we have followed a breadth of country of two thousand miles, and 
the sentiment of the Slavery question shades off with the precision 
and regularity of the law of teBçerature. Give the latitude, and you 
can give the figure at which the negrometer stands. An opinion on 
Slayeiy is not an intelligent judgment; it is a prejudice. The bears 
in the North are Wiite; the men are anti-slavery.— The bears in the 
South are black; the men are for the Slave Trade, There are also 
brown bears in Russia, a M  intermediate opinions of the Slavery ques­
tion in Virginia and Kentucky.^
"The Review (Charlottesville, Virginia), November 23, I860, cited in 
Soutrisrn Editorials on Secession. Ed. Dwight Lowell Dumoral (New York: The 
Centuiy Cospary, 193Ï7, pp. 261-62.
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Just as the anti-i.ery positions represented different priorities, the 
pro-slavery positions were also represented by diversity instead of una­
nimity. The development of pro^slavery thought is difficult to discuss 
in detail within the limited scope of this dissertation. The purpose of 
this section, therefore, is to (l) discuss the development of the "positive 
good" theory, and (2) delineate the degrees of commitment which existed in 
the nation to that theory.
Development of the "Positive Good" Theory
By the outbreak of the Civil War, there had accumulated a substan­
tial body of pro-slavery thought in the United States which is both inter­
esting and significant to a contemporary student of conflict and compro­
mise. This discussion will consider the origin of the theory as well as 
its salient characteristics.
Origin of the "Positive Good" Theory
Pro-slavery thought did not develop in a significant way until the 
slavery controversy itself had nearly reached maturity. As Minar pointed 
out, "from the early 1800’s and to some extent before, there had been 
real doubt in the South as well as in the North about the economic and 
social viability of the slave institution."  ^ A number of factors caused 
a progression, as Jenkins observed, "from the apologist of the early 
period to the propagandist of slavery, from an attitude of passivity to
2
one of militancy, from toleration to glorification of the institution,"
%inar. p, 260,
William Sumner Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South 
(Chapel Kill: The University of worth Carolina Press, 1935;, p. 106.
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Scarborough, in her study of slavery opposition in Georgia 
before I860, listed five such factors which closed the mind of the South 
on the slavery question.^  First, the rapid growth of the cotton industry, 
precipitated by the invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney, resulted 
in a significant increase in the demand for slave labor to harvest the 
cotton crops. Second, the Nat Turner insurrection in 1831 forced the 
South to consider the potential harm of slavery agitation or abolition and 
moved to make slavery a permanent part of Southern society. Third, the 
debates in the Virginia legislature of 1831-32 and the subsequent vote 
crystalized and solidified support for slavery in Virginia which, in 
turn, set the stage for the rest of the South Fourth, the agitation 
of the new abolition movement in the North under the leadership of radi­
cals such as Garrison forced the South to close ranks behind the doctrine
2
of the superiority of the slave system. Finally, the growing opposition 
to the colonization plan, which many Southerners had been active in 
promoting, eliminated for all practical purposes an alternative to a 
strong pro-slavery position. These five factors, then, combined to 
provide the necessary iiiçulse for the formation of a rigorous defense 
of slavery.
^uth Scarborough, The Opposition to Slavery in Georgia Prior to 
I860 (Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers, 1933), p. 185-
R^udolph Von Abele, Alexander H. Stephens (New York: Alfred A,
Knopf, 1946), pp. 155-56, points out that "the entire fabric of Southern 
Social and economic life was threaded by the Negro, both as Negro and as 
slave; and it was inconceivable that those most nearly affected by his 
presence should, under such relentless and bitter onslaughts as were 
coming from freesoilers and abolitionists, do anything but what they were 
doing«-uniting in self-defense. A chain reaction had been set in motion 
whose end was an e^ wlosion,"
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Nature of the "Positive' Good" Theory
The Southern defense of slavery, which took shape largely in the 
1850's, was popularized by a number of Southern apologists,^  In the 
writings of these apologists the "positive good" thesis was developed 
around four themes. First, slave labor was essential to the development 
and continued prosperity of the Southern economy. The loss of slave 
labor would substantially undermine the financial structure of the South. 
Second, the Negro was by nature an inferior being and was destined to a 
subordinate position for his own good as well as for the good of society. 
Third, slavery had lifted a savage people from barbarism to Christian 
civilization. This claim justified the argument that slavery was both 
Biblical as well as civil. Finally, the white race had not degenerated 
as a consequence but, on the contrary, had developed a unique and high 
degree of culture, similar to that of Classical Athens,
In summary, the entire Southern way of life was searched for 
evidence of the superiority of the slavery system. Economists, reli­
gionists, political theorists, scientists, and sociologists all agreed 
that slavery was a "positive good" and a necessary part of Southern 
civilization.
Degrees of Commitment to Slavery
Three degrees of pro-slavery thought existed in the nation during 
the prelude to the war. These lines of argument— radical, moderate, and 
conservative— were sipilar in structure to anti-slavery persuasions on 
the other wing of the continuum.
■Perhaps the leading publicists of the pro-slavery cause was 
George Fit^ iugh, author of two leading and influential works. Sociology 
for the South (1854) and Cannibals All (I856). See Harvey Wish, George
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Radical Défense of Slavery
The Southern connterparts to the Northern abclitionists.Tîsre the 
"fire-eaters" or "hot spurs," Like the abolitionists, these radical 
agitators were effective in both melodrama and publicity but were inca­
pable, either because of their personalities or ideologies, of working 
for compromise or consensus. These Southern radicals, rach as Jamas H, 
Hammond, Robert Barnwell Rhett, and William L. Yancey, were characterized 
by their moral commitment to the "positive good" theory, their insistence 
on regionalism, and their refusal to compromise.
First, the Southern radical was a firm advocate of the superi­
ority of the slavery system over the free labor society of the North. The 
radicals differed from other pro-slavery elements in that they openly ad­
vocated the revival of the slave trade. Whitridge reported that
Rhett, Yancey and Ruffin were all at one movement in favor of 
reopening the trade on the grounds that the South could never be 
the homogeneous slave society it called itself until every white 
man in the South had a stake in the institution. Revival of the 
trade would increase the sipply of slaves, lower the p^rice, and 
thus put slave-owning within the reach of everybody.
In this regard the radicals wore at least consistent for if slavery were
a "positive good" for both the Negro and the owner, then the slave system
should logically be expanded. The radicals, then, supported in full the
statement by Albert Brown: "For myself, I regard slavery as a great moral,
social, political, and religious blessing— a blessing to the slave and
a blessing to the Master.
Fitzhugh; Propagandist of the Old South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State 
University Press, 1934).
^Arnold Whitridge, ^  Compromise! (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Cudahy, I960), p. 58.
2
Cited in. James Byrne Ranek, Albert Gallatin Browns Radic^ 
Southern Nationalist (New York; D. Appleton-Century Compaiy, 193?)* P« 65.
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Second, the fire-eaters were in the first ranks of those insisting 
that the South declare its rights by seceding from the Onion. These 
radicals had already reached the conclusion that the protection of the 
slave system would require a legal separation from the Northern states. 
They were disunionistsj then, in that they held that the Constitution was 
a "coitç>actd* thus entitling a state or a combination of states to withdraw 
from the Union. They differed from the more moderate voices in the South 
in that they were advocating immediate secession through whatever means 
they had at their disposal.
Third, like the abolitionist, the fire-eaters opposed all forms 
of eoiq^ roaise. In describing the role of Yancey in the controversy, 
Whitridge suggested that "he stood foursquare before the world as the 
enemy of all compromise. He too could have said that he would not equiv­
ocate, that he would not retreat a single inch, and that he would be 
heard.Schultz observed, in his study of South Carolina politics, that
the fire-eater envinced a few of the qualities commonly attributed to 
the office-seeker politician. Doctrinaire and uncoi^romising, he 
showed neither the desire nor the ability to dissimulate or to 
reconcile conflicting interests or points of view. Matters of 
constitutional principle or personal honor were not to be compro­
mised. and always sensitive to violationg of either, he found him^ 
self in frequent controversies. The fire-eater found Congress an 
uncomfortable place.
The Southern radicals, consequently, were characterized by (l) 
their acceptance of the superiority of slavery, (2) their insistence on 
immediate secession, and (3) their refusal to be party to ary form of 
compromise.
W^hitridge, pp. 45-6,
H^arold S. Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism South Carolina. 
1852-1860 (Durham, North Carolinas Duke University Press, 1950y7"p7 iK ~
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Moder&t® Defense of Slavery
The Southern moderates had been able, until the secession conven­
tions of I86l, to control the radicals by claiming that the extremists 
h«i not analyzed the sectional controversy properly. Such Southern leaders 
as Jefferson Davis, Alexander Stephens, and John C. Breckinridge likewise 
accepted the premise that slavery was a "positive^ood" and should bo 
continued in the South and allowed to expand into the territories. They 
did not, however, generally advocate the renewal of the foreign slave 
trade and may, in moments of secret reflection, have foreseen the day when 
slavery would no longer be a part of Southern society.
Their most striking disagreement with the radicals was on the 
question of the protection of the slavery system. The radioes argued 
that slavery could be protected only in a Southern Confederacy; the mod­
erates insisted that slavery could be protected in the Union. The radicals 
clamored for immediate secession; the moderates were willing to wait until 
there was overt hostility from the North. The radicals rejected all compro­
mise proposals; the moderates were willing, at least on some issues, to 
negotiate with the spokesmen of conservatism from the other wing. By the 
I860 election, however, even the moderates had taken a firm, uncompromising 
position behind the Congressional guarantee of a slave-code for the terri­
tories.
Conservative Defense of Slavery
Although there were numerous Americans who held the mild form of 
a pro=slavory attitude, they are difficult to identify in the confusion of 
the conflict. This segment, however, was characterized, regardless of 
d^iere it was found, ty a support of slavery on economic and social grounds
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and, in addition, a strong unionist feeling.
In the South the conservative attitude was represented by such 
unionists as John C. Bell and John Crittenden who, in this particular 
study, will be classified as "neutralists.” In the campaign they chose to 
ignore the slavery issue totally in their platform in favor of an abstract 
defense of the Union, This in itself may be significant. Perhaps they 
were aware of the potential effect of a limited, utilitarian defense of 
slavery when others in the South were viewing it as a "positive good."
They chose, in the canpaign, to rely entirely on the appeal to peace and 
unionism and neglected the slavery issue.
In the North this defense of slavery was expressed by many finan­
ciers who feared the effect of slavery abolition or Southern secession 
on the nation's economy. Among these were a number of New York City 
bankers who viewed with considerable alarm the growing hostility on the 
question of slavery.^  To them slavery was a necessity in order to main­
tain Southern society; it was not a "positive good" in the same sense that 
the South defined it. Furthermore, they were strong unionists and 
feared, with some validity, the effect of secession on the North in gen­
eral and on their own bank accounts in particular.
The editor of % e  Review, consequently, was probably accurate in 
his assessment of the "sentiment of the Slavery question" in light of the 
"shades of precision" idiich existed in i860. The defense of slavery was 
based on different anchorages which, in turn, determined the degree of 
ego-involvement that each position represented. Just as the anti-slavery
S^ss Philip S. Foner, Business Slavery (Chapel Hill; The 
UniversItv of North Carolina Press- 1941).
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attitudes were different in the amount of personal commitment they 
required* the pro=sl£very commitments wsrs likewise dimensional in that 
the radical position, based on both "principle” and "interest,” was 
highly rigid; the conservative position was based primarily on "interest”; 
the moderate position was somewhere in between. Concurrent with the 
slaveqr attitudes were different views of the Union. The radicals 
rejected the value of the Union and asked for secession; the moderates 
were syi a^thetic with the estimate of the radicals but were not willing 
to act; the conservatives were generally pro-Union in sympathy until the 
dual anchorages of slavery and unionism caught them in a "cross-pressure."
Intermediate Attitudes Toward Slavery 
In between the anti-slavery and pro-slavery points of view in 
i860 were the "neutralists" or intermediate groups which sought to 
appeal to the American voters who were repelled by the arguments on both 
aides of the Hason-Dixon line. Sectionalism was so intense by i860, how­
ever, that each section had its own Version of "neutrality.” Stephen A. 
Douglas and popular sovereignty wore supported primarily in the North;
John C. Bell and the Ccnstitutional Unionists represented the Southern 
brand of neutrality.
Stephen A. Douglas and Popular Sovereignty
To an audience in Raleigh, North Carolina, on August 30, i860,
Douglas explained popular sovereignty in the following terms.
It is the siEçle right of ©very people to make their own laws, and 
establish their own constitutions according to their own interests, 
without any interference of any person outside their own borders.
That is all it is. Is not that a sound principle?Ï
^Cited in Saerson David Fite, The Presidential Campaign of i860
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The "sound principle" of popular sovereignty wa.s based on the assumption 
that the people in each of the territories should exercise "popular sov­
ereignty" in deciding the question of slavery for themselves. In denying 
that Congress should have the authority either to prevent or allow slavery 
in the territories, Douglas claimed that conditions within the territories, 
such as soil and climate, should determine the future of slaveiy in that 
area.
This view of slavery, on the part of Douglas and his supporters, 
required a profession of an amoral attitude toward slavery itself. The 
vary logic of popular sovereignty demanded that its supporters be neutral. 
The Senator was heavily criticized for his often quoted statement: "I
don’t care whether slavery is voted or down," In this regard, Jaffa 
observed:
Douglas was not blind to the moral implications of the slavery 
question, If he was constrained to profess indifference as to 
whether it was voted or down, this was a logical implication 
of his conmitment to popular sovereignty, according to which 
slavery ought to be dealt with at the local level. What his 
policy of "don’t care" really meant was that he believed he ought 
not to express an official opinion on a subject which he did not 
believe.ought to come within the scope of his official respcnsi^ 
bllity.^
The "official" position of Douglas, therefore, was that slavery 
was an amoral question. His role as a politician seeking to head a 
national party alliance required such a stance. The "private" position 
of Douglas, however, was best represented by his statement that he per­
sonally regarded slavery as "a eurse beyond confutation to both white 
and black." In short, Douglas dealt with slavery as a political issue
(New York: The Macmillan Coapany, 1911), p. 284,
^Harry V, Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (New York: Doubleday 
and Co^any, Inc,, 1959), p. 44,
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which should be a question of political policgr. Although Douglas did not 
necessarily believe that slavery was moral, he thought tiiat its morality 
was politically irrelevant. In describing lAat appeared to be the differ­
ence between Lincoln and Douglas, Kirway wrote that "the one real differ­
ence between them on slavery was philosophical. Lincoln thought slavery 
was a moral evil, Douglas thought it amoral; to him it was only a 
political issue, to be decided by legislation and by judicial decision."^ 
Popular sovereignty represented an attempt on the part of Douglas 
to discover a workable, pragmatic "formula" that might bridge the gap 
between the sections by removing the slavery question from the national 
forum. In this regard, Catton and Catton have written:
In a sense, popular sovereignty occupied a precarious middle 
position in the shifting spectrum of national attitudes toward 
slavery. It represented the latest attempt, however misguided and 
poorly thought out, to find a workable compromise amid the clash 
of pro-and anti-slavery viewpoints. Its one drawback, given the 
hardening sectional attitudes of the eighteen-fifties, was that it 
could not possibly work. Popular sovereignty resembled a ten-foot 
plank laid across a chasm ten feet wide: it would just bridge the 
gap, but no one dared walk on it.
This discussion of the political position would not be conplete
without mentioning that the appeal to unionism was uppermost in its
philosophy. All during the campaign Douglas appealed to the voter in
behalf of the perpetuation of the Union. In this regard, he clothed
himself in the fabric of Henry Clay and, in the deepening crisis, was
the leading spokesman for the Union. This was especially true in his
ill-fated tour of the deep South after the results of the October state
■^ Albert D. Kirway, John J. Crittendens The Strueele for the 
Pttion (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), p. 337.
ariH Cat.+.nw. r> 19"^
176
elections verified his fear that Lincoln could not be defeated.^
John C. Bell and the Constitutional Unionists
The Southern version of "neutralism" was represented by the
platform and candidates of the Constitutional Union party which was
composed largely of Southern Whigs, Southern Know-Nothingp, and a
number of Southern conservatives who were not willing to support the
Yancey-backed Southern Democratic party. Rosenboom has reported that
the conservatives of the upper South then turned their attention 
to an independent Union-saving movement, and the result was the 
Baltimore Constitutional Union convention. This convention was a 
gathering of graybeards, men of the faith of Clay and Webster, 
assembled to attempt the inçossible task of pouring oil on the 
troubled waters.^
The party that was formed, according to John J. Crittenden, stood
in that middle-ground and temperate region, where all who are 
opposed to both Democrats and Republicans might freely and 
properly meet . . . .  From that position they might defend the 
country against the madness of those parties, their sectionalism, 
secession, and disunion tendencies.^
As the name implies, the Constitutional Unionists were interested
in providing a rallying point for all Americans who joined with them in
granting to the Union the highest priority. In short, these men possessed
In describing the final cairoaign tour of Douglas, Kevins wrote; 
"Douglas' greatest single service to his country was this gallant effort 
to recall the South, as Lincoln’s election became certain, to its duty in 
the Union; this bold attempt to warn Southerners that any secession would 
mean Northern cpercion and war. In that late summer of i860 he loomed up 
as incomparably the bravest, wisest, and most candid statesman in the laisi." 
See Allan Nevins, "Stephen A. Douglas: His Weaknesses and His Greatness,"
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society. XLIII (December, 1949),
W !
“^Eugene H. Rosenboom, A History of the Presidential Elections 
(New York: The Macmillan Conpany, 1959/. pi 176.
C^ited in Kirwav. t > .  349.
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an overriding love of the Union, a conscious and lasting sense of 
identity with the interests of the nation. As the sectional conflict 
intensified, their primary concern was always that the Union be per­
petuated. The solution to any problem, even that of slavery, must 
be found within the national framework, never outside it in secession. 
Because of this anchorage priority, Catton and Catton observed that to 
the Constitutional Unionists "the Union was more important than state 
rights, or slavery, or anything else."
Since the Constitutional Unionists viewed slavery from the 
unionist anchorage, they refused to take a firm position on the slavery 
question and wrote a platform that was ambiguous with regard to human 
servitude. This ambiguity made possible a wide latitude of interpre­
tations, This, according to Craven, gave them a distinct advantage over 
the Douglas form of neutrality.
The broad sweeping character of their platform made it possible 
for them to adjust their appeal to the peculiar and differing local 
interests and attitudes. Where the Democrats were forced to accept 
and defend the general unpopular squatter-sovereignty doctrine, 
some Whigs in Maryland could follow Henry Winter Davis in a near 
affiliation with the Republicans; azvi some in Kentucky could play 
with the idea of backing Edward Bates on a conservative national 
program, while their fellows in Mississippi and Alabama could agree 
with Breckinridge Democrats on almost everything but disunion.%
The ambiguous view of slavery, consequently, was the result of an intense
brand of unionism which sought to smother the sectional conflict by
refusing to become involved in the slavery agitation, on either side.
The Douglas and Bell types of neutrality were not only different 
in that they were based in opposite sections of ths country. They were
-Catton and Catton, p. 20.
C^raven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, p. 3^ 3,
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also different in the degree of commitment that they called forth.
Douglas Was a doctrinaire neutral in his reliance on popul^ sovereignty 
as the only hope of the Union. On the other hand, the nebulous and some­
what confusing position of the Constitutional Unionists was neither 
rigid nor restrictive for it rested on the premise of unionism that, 
theoretically, the advocate of any slavery attitude could accept.
The controversy over slavery in i860 was characterized by four 
kinds of approaches to the problem. The radicals, represented by the 
abolitionists and fire-eaters, stood firmly on moral principles and 
refused to contemplate any kind of conqpromise. The moderates in both 
sections, who rejected both extremism and rigidity, were able to popu­
larize their views of slavery in their respective sections. The con­
servatives, who based their perceptions of slavery on economic and 
social grounds, stood for an amoral view of slavery and insisted that 
the Union be preserved. The "neutralists," represented ly Douglas and 
Bell, also saw slavery as amoral and were more unionist in syn^ athy than 
even the conservatives. These differing points of view can best be 
understood in terms of the anchorage priorities that were utilized in 
their development and defense.
Afiaimllfttion and Contrast Effects in i860
The effect of a political cauçaign on the voters was summarized 
in Chapter II. The point was made in that theoretical context that 
campaigns tend to "increase the amount of political consensus within 
the parties— once again, homogeneity within and polarization between.""^
^088 Stagner, "The Psychology of Human Conflict;" in The Nature 
of Human Conflict, ed. Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentiee-Hall, Inc., 19o5), p. 48.
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This same phenomena was apparent in the i860 presidential election as 
the political interaction among parties and voters increased the degree 
of assimilation around political candidates and intensified the contrast 
between political positions.
The social judgment approach would predict that the voter in 
the campaign would not distinguish among the various shades of attitudes 
which existed but would, under the effects of ego-involvement, tend to 
misperceive the ideological and interpersonal differences. This part of 
the chapter, then, will consider (1) assimilation effects in I860, and 
(2) contrast effects in I860,
Assimilation Effects in i860 
The voters in i860 clustered around the four major candidates 
in the cang)aign— Lincoln, Douglas, Bell and Breckinridge. The assimi­
lation phenomenon in the canpaign, however, can best be understood by 
examining (1) anti-slavery assimilation, (2) pro-slavery assimilation, 
and (3) unionist assimilation.
Anti-slaverv Assimilation
With the exception of the radical abolitionists who refused to 
support the nominee of the Republican party, those voters who selected 
an anti-slavery stance as a major anchorage were able to rally around the 
candidacy of Abraham Lincoln. The nomination of Lincoln by the Republicans, 
instead of Seward, Bates or Chase, was because, according to Fehrenbacher, 
he was "neither on the left wing nor the right, but very close to dead 
center."^ As one Lincoln backer put it:
D^on E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness; Lincoln in the 1850*s 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19%-), p. 14?.
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The Republican paï'ty has a head and a tail to it and a middle. I 
name William Seward as the head and Bates as the tail= I^ say that 
if the contention -selects the head, the tail will drop off; and if 
the tail, the head will drop off.
The Republican party, at least in appearance, selected a,standard 
bearer who stood midway between the radical and conservative wings of the 
party. All sides in the party were able to rally to him in the çacçaign, 
each hoping eventually to control him. In short, each faction within the 
party regarded Lincoln as "their man" and identified with him and his 
platform. He was radical enough for most of the radicals; he was eon» 
servative enough for the conservatives. Furthermore, his moderation also- 
made it likely that he would obtain votes from outside the Republican 
ranks, a prime consideration in the North.
The Lincoln platform was limited to the prohibition of slavery 
in the territories. This satisfied most of the radicals who were persuaded 
that such a platform was the only feasible proposal since there was no 
basis for an attack on slavery in the slave states. In addition, this 
also satisfied the conservatives who disliked the Negro and did not want 
to coBçete with slave labor in the territories. Consequently, nonexten- 
sionism became "official" Republican doctrine in i860.
The results of the election indicate that although a few of the
extreme abolitionists supported Gerrit Smith, most of the ahtl-slavery
2voters lined up with Lincoln, thus insuring his election. The Republican
C^ited in George H„ Mayer, The Republican Party, 1894=1964 (New 
Yorks Oxford University Press, 1964), pp.
A^s ths vote tally indicates Lincoln won ths election baoause he 
carried ths Northern bloc of states which had a majority in the electroal 
college, His total electoral count of I69 cut of a possible 313 Would 
have guaranteed him victory even if the other three candidates had with­
drawn in favor of a single opponent. For a gocxi analysis of the vote see
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ticket polled all but 26,388 of their 1,865,5^ 3 votes in the free states. 
This vote reflected the profile of Lincoln’s support~=.anti»slavery and 
pro-Northern.
Pro-slaverv Assimilation
Those supporting the pro«»slavery anchorage, which was of higher 
priority than unionism, flocked to John C. Breckinridge and the Southern 
Democrats, Just as Lincoln was more moderate than the abolitionists, 
^eckinridge was more moderate than the fire .^ eaters. This is the point 
that Crenshaw made when he wrote that Breckinridge "was the candidate of 
the element in the Democratic party associated with secession, he person­
ally was a moderate, and vigorously defended himself against charges of 
inconsistency and disunion,"  ^ Breckinridge and Lincoln were similar in 
the respect, as Shaw suggested, that "all parties had sought candidates who 
would appear to be somewhat less sectional than their platforms, or their 
main voting strength,"^
Because of his moderation, Breckinridge was able to pull votes 
from those of kindred spirits who could not brï_ng themselves to support a 
fire-eater. On the other hand, the native of Kentucky was "safe" on the 
Negro question and was openly supported by the radicals. In fact, as
Gerald M. Capers, Stephen A. Douglas : Defender of the Hnion (Boston: Little,
Brown and Corap any ,~"l95?)T P. 208.
O^llinger Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election 
of i860 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 19437, pp. 24-»5.
^Albert Shaw, Abraham Lincoln; The Yeaa* of His Election (New York:
The Review of Reviews Corporation, 1930), p. 96.
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Crenshaw reveals, the Breckinridge press "bestirred itself to prove 
their candidate a slaveholder."^  Breckinridge, as a result, presented a 
broad enough image to gain the support of many elements in the South,
On the issue of slavery, the Southern Democratic position and 
platforo became firm in a demand for a slave-code for the territories.
This platform, which has been discussed earlier, became, in i860, the 
"first line of defense for Southern civilization itself."^
The voting in i860 revealed that the bulk of Breckinridge suf^ ert 
was in the lower South where slavery was more firmly entrenched in the 
minds of the people and in the structure of society.^
Unionist Assimilation
During the i860 caaçaign the Douglas and Bell parties, though 
maintaining their separate identities, were able to engineer a partial 
fusion on the common ground of a peacful preservation of the Union with 
the national government under national control. The Richmond Whig 
reported :
But between the Douglas and Bell parties there is no such insuperable 
barrier. True, they differ==diifer widely on many important questions 
but these are administrative questions, which are entirely subordinate
to the greater question of the premanenoy of the Union.^
Both parties were publicly amoral on the question of slavery.
C^renshaw, p. 26.
2
Robert W, Johannsen, "Why the Democratic Party Divided," in The 
Crisis of the Union, p. 55.
%or an analysis, state by state, of the vote in the South in 
i860 see Crenshaw, 298;
^^e Richmond Whig. July 24, i860.
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Douglas wanted to evade the question and keep it out of the halls of 
Congress by placing it within the jurisdiction of the individual terri­
tories. The Constitutional Unionists wished to evade the question and 
did so by refusing to discuss it. Both parties considered it madness to 
rave about imaginary territory when slavery could hardly occupy the 
territory it already had.^ Their joint acceptance of the priority of the 
unionism anchorage was reflected in the creation of fusion tickets in, 
several states as well as the implementation of dialogues during the 
caiig)aign.
The actual results of the popular vote in I860 indicate that a
plurality of the voters favored the Douglas and Bell approach. Over two-
fifths of the electorate selected one of the unionist positions; one-fifth
2
supported Breckinridge; less than two-fifths supported Lincoln.
Assimilation occurred in i860 as the anti-slavery elements sup­
ported Lincoln; the pro-slavery voters, primarily in the deep South, 
rallied behind Breckinridge; the voters from both sections and the border 
regions with stronger unionist feelings than slavery sentiments selected 
one of the two unionist candidates— Douglas or Bell. As a result, the 
voting in the campaign did not reflect the true nature of the attitude
W^hitridge, p. 60, reports that "on the eve of Lincoln’s inaugura­
tion there were only forty-six slaves in all the Territories of the 
United States— two in Kansas, fifteen in Nebraska, and twenty-nine in 
Utah, but for political purposes men talked about the extension of slavery 
into the Territories as if it were a real issue."
^Mary Scrugham, The Peaceable Americans of i860-1861: A Study in 
Public Opinion (New York: Columbia University, 1921), p. 23, pointed out 
that "it is very important to note that this plurality voted neither for 
the anti-slavery candidate nor for the pro-slavery candidate. It regis­
tered itself neutral between Lincoln on the northern side and Breckin­
ridge on the southern side.
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toward slavery in the sense that the supporters of Douglas and Bell were 
not expressing their slavery attitude in their vote but were indicating 
that unionism was, to them, of higher priority. When the unionism issue 
was stripped away in I86l, the slavery sentiment became dominant and 
influenced the move toward and reaction to secession.
Contrast Effects in I860 
Not only did the canpalgn serve to "break down the barriers 
protecting one type of sentiment on slavery from another," but it also 
exaggerated the differences among the candidates and their platforms. 
Homogeneity within the parties and heterogeneity between the parties were 
both intensified by the campaign. The contrast effects, idiich make the 
positions appear to be further apart than they actually are, were evident 
between the abolitionists and Republicans, the sectional parties, and 
the sectional and intermediate parties.
Contrast Between the Abolitionists and Republicans
Although a number of the abolitionists supported the candidacy 
of Lincoln, the most radical agitators accused the Republicans of selling, 
out to the "slave-power," The Radical Abolitionists convention in 
Syracuse, New York, on Wednesday, August 29, I860, issued the following 
proclamation:
Resolved, That for Abolitionists to vote for a candidate like Abraham 
Lincoln who stands ready to execute the accursed Fugitive Slave Law, 
to suppress insurrections among the slaves, to add new slave states, 
aîd to support the ostracism, socially and politically, of the black 
man of the North, is to give the lie to their professions, to expose 
their hypocrisy to the world, and to do what they can to put far off
"Elkins, p. 199.
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the day of the slave's deliverance.
Furthermore, during the campaign a document entitled "Address of the Free 
Constitutionalists to the People of the United States" was published.
In representing the view of the extreme abolitionists, the publication 
claicfâds
Of ail these factions, the Republican is the most thoroughly ssnss= 
less, baseless, aimless, inconsistent, and insincere. It has no 
constitutional principles to stand upon, and it lives up to no moral 
ones. It aims at nothing for freedom, and is sure to accomplish it.
The other factions have at least the merits of frankness and con» 
sistency. They are openly on the side of slavery, and make no 
hypocritical grimaces at supporting it. The Republicans, on the 
other hand, are double-faced, double-tongued» hypocritical, and 
inconsistent to the last degree.%
The intense radicals, therefore, developed an "all-or-nothing" 
point of view. Since Lincoln and the Republicans offered something short 
of a frontal attack on slavery in the South, they were displaced to 
practically a pro-slavery position. The radicals exaggerated the ideational 
distance between themselves and the anti-slavery moderates and conserva­
tives.
Contrast Between the Sectional Parties
Ths Republicans and Southern Democrats exaggerated the distance 
between themselves. Thus, it became easy to identify the opposite party 
as under the control of the most radical elements within the party.
First, the highly ego-involved Southerner was unable to distinguish
C^ited in Arthur C, Cole, "Lincoln's Election an immediate Menace 
to Slavery in the States?" American Historical Review. XXXVI (July,
1 OOl \ ne:h
^lis political tract appeared under the title "Address of the Free 
Constitutionalists to the People of the United States, I860" and was pub­
lished by Thayer and ELdrigs, of Boston, in September, 1860. It may be 
found in the New York State Historical Library in New York City.
186
Wïong the anti-slavery elements. As Tyler reported, "to the Southerner 
every antislavery man was a Garrison abolitionist. Oversittplification 
of the nature of the opposition led to a conçlete and categorical denial
f "1
of the right to question the Southern position." In describing the
North, the Daily Journal observed: "The mass of the population are
abolitionists— none of your half-way men calling themselves Republicans
or Free Soilers, but plain Garrisonian abolitionists."^  Scrugham noted,
in her study of public opinion in the 1860 election, that
a tendency existed in the South to make no discrimination between 
the anti-slavery policies advocated by Garrison, Brown, Seward and 
Lincoln, respectively. To many a southerner these northerners were 
all abolitionists of the same hue. Southern newspapers and politi­
cians used the words "abolitionist" and "Republican" as synonyms,3
Because of this contrast effect, the advocates of the pro-slavery 
position perceived Lincoln as an abolitionist of the same stripe as 
Garrison and Brown. "Lincoln is exactly of the same type as the traitor 
who was hung at Charleston," reported the New York Herald, "an abolition­
ist of the reddest dye, liable to be led to extreme lengths by other 
men."^ The New Orleans Crescent described Lincoln as "a thorough 
radical Abolitionist, without exception or qualification.Nevins wrote 
that "'Abolitionist,' 'Black Republican,' 'nigger-lover,' and 'slave-
A^lice Felt Tyler, Freedom's Ferment (New York: Harper Torchbooks,
1962), p. 486.
^aily Journal (Wilmington, North Carolina), August 23, I860,
S^crugham, p. 14.
I^sw York Herald, May 23, I860.
^Cited in David M, Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Seoession 
Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19^ 2), p. 42.
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stealer' were terms which, loaded with bitter feeling, were applied 
with little discrimination to all Northerners.”^  At the same time the 
radical abolitionists were accusing Lincoln of pro-Southern tendencies, 
the involved Southerners were accusing him of abolitionist sympathies.
Second, the involved proponent of slavery abolition had 
difficulty distinguishing among the various shades of pro-slavery 
thought. Just as the opponents of slavery were stereotyped by the 
Southerner, the anti-slavery defenders grouped all Southerners in the 
same fashion. The Dailv Missouri Democrat, for example, claimed that
"every vote for Breckinridge is an individual indorsement of
2
lanceyism." The Illinois and Michigan men, in addition, were "denouncing
3
Jeff Davis as a fire-eating fanatic." The Northern opponent of slavery 
found it convenient to view all slaveholders as men of evil and wicked 
passions who were also hot-headed defenders of slavery. In addition, 
practically all Southerners were perceived to be slaveholders.
Both sectional parties, the Republicans and Southern Democrats, 
exaggerated the extremity of the other and had difficulty discriminating 
among the shades of sentiment on the question of slavery ïAioh existed 
in the opposite section.
Contrast Between the Sectional and Intermediate Parties
The positions represented by the sectional and intermediate parties 
were also mispercQivsd by both groups. First, the intermediate parties
^Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1950)» 1%, 157.
^ailv Missouri Democrat. November 6, i860,
%evins, The Emergence of Lincoln. II, 205.
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exaggerated the radicalism of the sectional parties. Second, the 
ssetionsl parties displaced the true positions of the intermediate 
parties.
Intermediate Views of the Sectional Parties
Since the intermediate rhetoricians were in conçetition with 
the sectional parties for the vote of the conservatives in both sections, 
the Douglas and Bell supporters amplified the extremism of the Republicans 
and Southern Democrats. In the North Douglas said more about the Southern 
radicals; in the South Bell's spokesmen lashed out against the abolition» 
ists. Both parties, however, did not hesitate to attack the sectional 
parties by branding them both with the stigma of radicalism,^
Sectional Views of the Intermediate Pafties
The observation was made in Chapter H  that under conditions of 
high ego-involvement the parties engaged in a controversy tend to view 
neutrality as an alliance with the "enemy. " The disappearance, in the 
perceptions of the sectimal supporters, of the intermediate positions is 
an interesting event in the history of the ante bellum straggle. The two
 a — n _ A  # ^ 1 3J L i i L c r m o u V O  u e u i u j . u a w u o p u u i i  a ,  u u u g x a o  o u u  w u u ii wq muvax
victim to the cross-stereotyping effect which is typical of extremism 
and intensity.
Sectional View of Douglas.— Because Douglas advocated an amoral, 
middle-ground, unionist platform in the eanmaign, he was contrasted by
.Lt.t l  j  ^  _ Ai_ _ T\ "I _ _ . .. Ji r% "1 j -______ ... _  _ _  _ J   X  _
'  n i u x o  UUC9 u o u g z a a  a r i a  d ^ ± x  r i i u v u r j . U A a u i a  w o r e  r i o u  a s  r u a o ^  u u
label either Lincoln or Breckinridge as extremists they did atteint to 
fix on them the extremist brand by arguing that both candidates were 
mere puppets for the radical elements in both sectional parties. The 
election of either one would mean extremist control of the White House.
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both the Republicans and Southern Democrats. As Crenshaw concluded, 
the quest by Douglas "for the Presidency was closely related to the final 
sectional cleavage, and it was his fate, as a middle-of-the-road states­
man to fall between the fires of the extremists."^
The opponent of slavery perceived Douglas arri his brand of 
neutrality to be as bad as the fire-eaters. To the Illinois State 
Journal the contest in the North was primarily one between Lincoln and 
Douglas, between "conservative Republicanism . . . and fire-eating, 
slavery extending Democracy." Carl Schurz, radical spokesman for 
Lincoln, claimed that "the point that separates Mr. Douglas and Mr. 
Breckinridge is but a mere quibble, a mere matter of etiquette. In 
nearly all practical measures of policy Ar. Douglas is regularly to be 
found on the side of the extreme South.
On the other hand, the supporters of slavery saw in Douglas 
certain dangerous abolitionist designs. The Athens Southern Watchman 
objurgated that Senator Douglas was "ten thousand times more dangerous 
than John Brown.The Breckinridge organization in Williamsburg, Virginia, 
adopted the following resolution: "Resolved, that we know no difference
between Stephen A. Douglas and Lincoln, and can only see in either an 
eneay to our state and our liberty, and our firesides.After the campaign
C^renshaw, p. 23.
^Cited in William E. Baringer, "The Republican Triumph," in 
Politics and the Crisis of 1860, p. 102.
C^ited in Fite, p. 257.
^Cited in Horace Montgomery, Cracker Parties (Baton Rouge;
Louisiana State University Press, 1950), P. 237.
'Cited in the Richmoid Whig. August I860,
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was over, Herschel V. Johnson, a friend of Douglas, observed:
They ^he sxtrsndstsjin the South have suoeesdsd in making them 
[the Southern peop]^ believe that, what they call "squatter 
sovereignty," is as bad as abolitionism, and that your election 
will, therefore, be as fàtàl; as'that <jf Lincoln.
Douglas and popular sovereignty, consequently, were caught 
between the extremism of that period which denied the existence of a 
middle position. As Randall reported, the hope that Douglas had of 
bridging "the widening gap between North and South was crushed under 
the weight of sectional agitation. It was his unhappy destiny that 
in the South he was distrusted as pro-Northern, idiile in Northern 
Republican circles he was denounced as pro-Southem."^
Sectional View of Bell.--John C. Bell, who also attempted to 
occupy middle-ground between the sections by campaigning in behalf of 
peace and unionism, was subject to sectional displacement. First, the 
Dailv Missouri Democratic, a Lincoln newspaper, editorialised that "we 
think it will be found, on examination, that he [ie]^ is a decided 
pro-slavey man— that his opinions on the slavery question are identical 
with those professed by the Breckinridge Democracy.Second, the 
Charleston Hercurv claimed that "the union=savsrs in the South arc
• h
especially ths most efficient allies of ths Black Republican party,"
herschel V. Johnson, "From the Autobiography of Herschel V. 
Johnson," American Historical Review. XXX (January, 1925), 321.
2
J. G. Randall, Lincoln the President (New York: Dodd, Mead 
and Conpany, 19^ 5), I, 202.
%ailv Missouri Democratic. August 18, I860.
^Charleston Mercury. August 4, i860.
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The Maury Press, a Bell organ published in Columbia» Missouri» said that 
while the "rabid Democracy of the South are denouncing John Bell as an 
abolitionist, the Republicans at the North are denouncing him as a pro» 
slavery advocate."^
The middle positions perceived the radices within the sectional 
parties to be in control of those parties. Each section perceived the 
neutralists to be allied with the opposite party. The sectional parties 
were branded with an extremist image; the middle positions vanished in 
the view of the ego»involved sectionalists.
The cançaign served to intensify the contrasting effect as the 
newspapers, speeches, and campaign documents exaggerated the differences 
among positions. Instep of the rhetoric of the campaign providing a 
basis for a meaningful consensus among the parties, it produced the 
crystallisation of positions to a greater degree than existed before the 
campaign. The eanpaign of i860, consequently, played a significant role 
in promoting the assimilation and contrast effects.
This chapter has considered the question of slavery from two 
view points. First, it delineated the various shades of slavery sentiments 
that existed before the sectional confrontation through argument and ac­
tion, distorted these positions in the eyes of the Voters. The second 
part of this chapter suggested that the participant in the campaign, 
because of the assimilation and contrast effects, would misperceive the 
other positions in direct relation to the amount of ego-involvemsnt his
-^ited in Mary Emily Robsrtscn CsspboH, Ths ittit^s of Tennessee- 
ans Toward the Union. 1847-1861 (New York: Vantage Press, 1961)5 p. 128.
192
own position activated. The oaapaign» then, instead of promoting the 
settlement of the conflict, actually made it more intense and rigid.
Chapters IV and V have, discussed the background to the i860 
election in general and the slavery issue in particular. Chapter VI 
will seek to make a direct application of the theory of rhetoric and 
compromise advanced in Chapter H I  to the context of the ante bellum 
conflict as deswibed in the last two chapters.
CHJIPTER VI
BIPOLARIZATION IN I860 
In Chapter IH  of this study the point was made that high 
ego-involvement within the anatonçr of a conflict tends to characterize 
that conflict, in Dahl's language, "severe disagreement; symmetrical."
The conflict is "symmetrical" in that the power centers have developed 
near the end of the continuum with a relatively few number of people 
supporting the intermediate positions. Under such cmidltions, as was 
demonstrated in Chapter HI, the usefulness of a rhetoric of concilia­
tion and the possibility of a meaningful compromise are both seriously 
questioned.
The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that by I860 the 
controversy between the sections, especially over the issue of slavery, 
reached the state of "severe disagreement: symmetrical." The plan,
here, will be to (l) discuss the nature of bipolarization in I860, (2) 
describe the specific causes of the bipolarization, and (3) delineate 
the effect of bipolarization on rhetoric and compromise.
The Nature of Biuolarization in i860 
James MacGregor Burns, in his study of the history of political 
movements, argued that for the democratic process to work effectively the
^Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 198.
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national parties must locate ttieir "vital centers" somewhere between 
the "conservatives who grumble that it is going too fast, ^  activists 
^0 complain about its inertia,"  ^ In the prelude to the Civil War, Burns 
contended, the national parties were unable to center on moderate posi­
tions.
Parties failed in the l850’s because power drained into tha hands of 
immoderates. Presidents failed because they could not huild a 
vital center as the basis for their influence. The crucial step, 
politically, toward tiie Civil War was not siaçly the splitting of 
partiesj it was the centering of power in the wings of the parties 
that saw the crisis of the 1850's as pretexts for pore extremism 
rather than as warnings of the holocaust to cone,^
This confrontation between the Immoderate "vital centers" created
a qualitative and quantitative bipolarisation which left the nation ill-
equipped to deal with what Burns called "hot issues and deep cleavages."
First, the conflict resulted in a qualitative shift that in the two
wings of the sectional continuum moved apart, thus eliminating the
influence of intermediate groups. Catton and Catton observed that the
conflict "finally developed that even the Northern moderates and the
Southern moderates had drifted into positions too far apart to be bridged.""
Dumond, in discussing the effect of thirty years of intense intellectual
ferment over the questions of slavery and unionism, oenoLuded that
majority opinion in each of the two sections had tended to crystallize 
on opposite sides of these questions. Great principles of human 
rights and human relationships such as were involved in those questions
D^wight Lowell Dumond, Antislaverv Origins of the Civil War in the 
United States (Ann Arbor; The University of Michigan Press, 1939)s p. 3«
p
Stanley n, ZLklhS, Slâvôrÿ; A Froblêm lii America Institutional 
and Intellectual Life (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1959;, p. 
189.
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camot be ooapromised, thoiagh men may be prevailed upon to 
forego a test of a™sd strength for a time in ÿope that üiey 
will triumph in the ordinary course of events.*
The two wings of the continuum, consequently* drifted into positions too 
far apart to be bridged. As the radicals became more radical, the mod­
erates and conservatives, in both sections, became less moderate and
conservative.
Second, the conflict forced a quantitative shift in both sections 
of the country as moral fervor became, to a degree, politically e^ gwdient. 
In short, the moderate and conservative elements were able to assimilate 
more of the radical view of the conflict while certain segments within 
the radical classifications adopted the moderate uad conservative views
of political action. In the North, as Elkins observed, "the democrati-
2
zation of antislayery had become oong>lete." As the spirit of abolitionism 
took the form of a political movement, it gained enough numerical stqjport 
to make it politically effective. The center of popular support, conse­
quently, moved to a position between the radical and moderate sentiments.
Because in the South there was general agreement that slavery 
was a "positive good," the quantitative shift there occurred on the issue 
of idiat should be done to preserve it. For years the radicals had 
appealed to the Southern population with the claim that the only reliable 
method of slavery protection was that of secession. By the time the guns 
had tamed on Sumter, however, this radical view had becœas popularized
^IMght llowell DumoM, Antlslaverv Origins of the Civil War in the 
United States (Ann Arbor; The University of Michigan Press, 193977”?• 3.
^Stanley M, Elkins, Slavery; 4 Problem in American Institutional 
and Intelleettui Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), P. 
B9.
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to the point that the attitude of a majority of Southerners closely 
approximated the radical position on the continuum.
In both sections, then, the political partook of the moral in a 
qualitative intensifications; the moral partook of the political in a 
quantitative intensification. Although the issues were slightly differ­
ent. the effect was the same as the "vital centers" settled in the wings. 
In the North abolitionism had been democratized; in the South regionalism 
had been popularized. This bipolarization of the issues that aroused 
sectional conflict was manifested on three dimensions— ideational» 
interpersonal, and structural.
Bipolarization on the Ideational Dimension 
Three processes augmented the development of divergent ideologies 
by the majorities on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. First, both 
sections erected moral and abstract defenses of their doctrines.
Although the specific issue in the campaign was that of slavery expansion 
in the territories, it was a more symbol of the larger conflict over the 
future of slavery in the nation. In this sense the question of the intro­
duction of slavery into the West was, in itself, a meaningless abstrac­
tion. Potter, in describing the influence of slavery ansion into
the territories, wrote:
But thus reduced to an abstraction, devoid of tangible significance,
it retained such emotional potency as a symbol that it remained the 
point of focus of all the political, economic, and social antago­
nisms of the two sections. The history of the slavery contest was 
a record of paroxysms arising from ter^torial rivalry, and of lulls 
following upon territorial. coopromise.~
 ^ -^ David M, Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 19%), p. 65.
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SeooM, the ideological positions became firm because of the 
desire on the part of both sections to formulate positions as far removed 
from the opposing section as possible. This sectional disengagement 
was spearheaded tgr the rhetoricians who tended to line up on opposite 
sides of an issue without very much regard for the merits of their 
stand, "The sharpest spokesmen of North and South, more and more 
inclining to stand at polar opposites on all questions touching slavery 
in the thirty years before the Civil War," i&kins reported, "had at 
least a feature of style in conmon: each expressed himself with a
siaçle moral severity.Hence, the conflict in the ante bellum period 
is a graphic exauçle of "mutually divergent modification" since both 
sections strove to disassociate themselves from the other.
Third, those abstract and symbolic ideologies had, by I860,
permeated the total fabric of the economic, social, religious, and
political thought of the conflicting sections. Craven reported:
Neither the South nor the North could yield its position because 
slavery h^ come to symbolize values in each of their soeial- 
econoaie structures for which men fight and die but which they 
do not give up or conçromise. These values had been emphasized 
and reinforced by two decades of emotional strife, name-calling, 
and self-justification. Right and wrong, justice and injustice 
were in conflict.
Consequently, sectional viewppinta became more rigid when they were
identified with "core" values; the more the sectional attitudes were
identified with_"core" values, the more rigid they became.
These three processes contributed to the development, of
E^Lkins-, p. 3^ .
A^very 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848- 
1661 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953)* p. 397.
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ideational positions on the explosive issues of slavery and unionism.
The sectional interpretations of the nature of a slave and the meaning 
of the Union were "mutually divergent."
Divergent Definitions of Sl&verv
The North and South did not agree on the definition of a slave.
The Northern view, infused with notions of humanitarisnism and romanti­
cism, defined a slave as "human." The South, in striking contrast, 
defined a slave as "property" and claimed that slaves should be 
subject to the saae regulations governing all forms of private property.
As Hart observed, "the two sides were not dealing with the same thing.
The starting-point in the north was the individual, his inborn God-given 
right to make the best of himself, no matter what his race or color.
The Southern view, based on the concept of society, vested rights, and 
constitutional guarantees, saw slavery in a different light. Jefferson 
Davis, in a speech as early as 1848, displayed the hard core of Southern
opinion when he remarked that slavery "is a conmon law right to property
2
in the service of man."
These contradictory definitions of slavery led to a stalemate on
the question of slavery expansion into the territories. Jaffa and
Johannsen described this phenomenon in their study of the Lincoln and
Douglas speeches in the state elections of 1859.
If a Negro can be regarded as nothing more than chattel, then there 
can hardly be any justification for depriving an owner of this species
■^ Albert Bushnell Hart, Slavery and Abolition; 1831-1841 (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 19065, pp. 310=11.
“Cited in Catton and Catton. n. 6l.
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of property simply because he has migrated to a federal Territory, 
But if a Negro is a man, and hence susceptible of the human rights 
enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, then it must be at 
least as wrong to countenace his enslavement as to countenance 
another man’s expropriation. There really was no logical middle 
ground between the two positions. The vote of the people of a 
Territory could not decide it.l
Nevins reached the same conclusion idien he argued that
two rival assumptions had divided South and North-=»one, the assunç» 
tion that slavery was right and wholesome; the other that it was 
wrong and deleterious. Slavery might persist indefinitely within 
the fifteen slave States, but as to its restriction, and as to the 
faith that it was in the path of ultimate extinction, the.,nation 
had come at last to an unavoidable determination,^  ^.
The North and South, therefore, occupied contradictory positions
on slavery in that they could not agree on the fundamental and essential
question of the inherent nature of a slave. To the North a slave was a
"man"; to the South a slave was a "chattel,"
Divergent Definitions of Unionism
The attitude toward unionism was reflected, in both sections, in
the attitude toward the Constitution, The North, in holding that the
Constitution was a "contract" which could be violated by individual
states, found secession intolerable. Stampp wrote that
though many may have favored compromise and hoped to avoid war, the 
masses of Republicans and Democrats shared the belief that the Union 
was perpetual. That was the most profoundly important conviction 
of nearly every Northerner during the crisis,3
%enry V. Jaffa and Robert W. Johannsen, In the Name of the People
(Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 19597, p. 50.
Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1950), II, 317.
%enneth M. Stançp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession 
Crisis, 1860-61 (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 33. 
See also Joseph T. Durkin, "The Thought that Caused a War: The Compact 
Theory in the North," Maryland Historical Magazine, LVI (March, 1961),
1=14.
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The South, in viewing the Constitution as a "compact,” insisted
that any state or combination of states could, by indopsndont action,
withdraw from the Union. Stampp wrote that
by I860 southern dialecticians had perfected the compact theory 
which entitled each sovereign state to separate from the rest of the 
states at its own discretion. The states were older than the Union; 
in ratifying the Constitution none had surrendered its sovereignty; 
each retained the right to resume its o^ginal independent position. 
Secession was an orderly legal process.^
The Union was not the same thing to Northerners and Southerners. 
The South, under the influence of Calhoun's brand of state sovereignty 
metaphysics, viewed the Constitution as an optional confederation. To 
the North the Constitution was a "contract"; to the South the Constitu­
tion was a "compact." To the North the Union was pei^ etual; to the 
South the Union was temporary.
Not only did the sections bipolarize the definitions of slavery 
and unionism, but they also injected the moral eong>onent which made 
their divergent positions even more firm. The moral factor, according 
to Fillerj "had altered the shape of ordinary political arguments it 
had turned common differences into antagonism." Current explained the 
implications of the infusion of moral principles into the confrontation 
when he claimed that "between the North and the South there was a moral 
gulf, too broad to be bridged cy compromise."^
The interaction between the two sections, then, served to amplify
^Ibid.5 p. 32.
^Louis Filler, The Crusade Against Slavery. 1830“i860 (New York: 
harper Torchbooks, I963), p."2oô7"
R^ichard N. Current, The Lincoln Nobody Knows (New York: 
Mdlraw-Hlll Book Company, Inc., 195877”]^ 98.
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if not create two divergent ideational positions on the salient issues 
of slavery unionism. The moral factors, introduced by the 
apolc i^sts in both sections, further calcified the ideological posi­
tions. Bancroft, in his study of conç)romise in 1860-61, wrote:
It was therefore not so much profound as logical thinking that 
"brought Lincoln to the conclusion, in I858, that the country must 
become all slave or all free. This the great majority of each 
sections hsd come to see: but only the ortrsmists upon each 
side, who in their reasoning ran ahead like scouts before an army, saw 
the meaning of the coming conflict; namely, that the two ideas 
were diametrically opposed; that the moral conviction and personal 
interest of each side were greater than their existing love for the 
letter or the spirit of the Constitution,
Bipolar!zatien on the Interpersonal Dimension 
As the conflict between the sections intensified, interpersonal 
hatred and hostility became conmonplace. In Januai^ of i860 The Liberator, 
a publication of one of the most rabid abolitionist factions, printed the 
following article from the Demopolis (Alabama) Gazette: "The North hates
the South. The Soutti hates the North. Th^ are at this time bitter
2
enemies. Can they continue as members of the same Confederacy?" "We 
are enemies as much as if we were hostile States," declared Alfred Iverson 
of Georgia, "I believe ^ hat the northern people hate the South worse than 
even the English people hated France; and I can tell my brethren over 
there that there is no love lost upon the part of the South.
^Frederic Bancroft, "Efforts at Conpromise, I86O-61," Political 
Science Quarterly. VI (Ssptsmbsr, I89I), 422.
C^ited in The Liberator. January 6, I860,
3 _ _
- Cited in Avery 0. Craven, xne ürowth of Southern Nationalism. 
1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953)# P, 395»
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This intersectional hostility, moreover, was not just between 
the Nc t^herners arri Southsmsrs. Even those within the border states 
who sought to find some conanon ground between the sections were subject 
to the same kind of verbal abuse. Since "neutrality" within an intense 
conflict is rejected in the same category as the "enemy," the proponents 
of moderation are usually subject to the same recriminations as the 
supporters of the opposing extreme positions. Because of this, the 
representatives of the middle positions on both slavery and unionism, 
such as Douglas, Bell, Everett, and Crittenden, were viciously attacked 
in both sections.^
Bipolarization on the Structulral Dimension 
The two structural factors necessary for both rhetoric and 
compromise are institutions of negotiation and channels of communication. 
The role of these structural conçonents has been discussed in Chapter IH. 
The ideational and interpersonal cleavage between the sections was 
reflected in the destruction of both intersectional institutions and 
channels of communication.
Destruction of Intersectional Institutions
As the North and South pulled further apart, the institutions which 
had bridged the nation were rent asunder. In addition, the absence of 
other types of national organizations hastened the move toward "legal"
secession.
"This is the point that was made in Qiapter V. Under conditions 
of high ego-involvement the middle cr "neutral" positions are not perceived 
as such but are skewed by both wings to an identical grouping with the 
extremists in the opposite wing. Since an ego-involved partisan has a 
larger latitude of rejection, he tends to view all positions which are 
not exactly his own as the same as the position furthest removed from 
his own.
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First» existing organizations, snch as ehurehes and political 
parties, that formerly enjoyed cooperation from both sections, fell 
victim to intense sectionalism. The national churches, which had been 
able to influence their individual congregations in all states of the 
Union, split into Northern and Southern wings.^ As Shanks pointed out, 
though, the
divisions in the churches did not prove that the Northern and 
Southern people were separate nationalities in i860, but th^ 
did show the growing animosities of the two people. The intense 
feeling stirred between those churches, especially the branches 
of the Melodist church, was carried over into the political 
contests.^
In addition, sectional opinions and interests destroyed the 
national political party as an instrument of power and harmony. The 
Whigs were unable to survive their participation in the Compromise of 
1850.^  The split in the Democratic party was even more dramatic. As 
Mayer observed, "the Democratic party had survived the schism in the 
Prdtestant churches and the other nation-wide organisations in the 
1840*8. Its disruption, therefore, foreshadowed the collapse of 
effective communication between the North and South.
-ELklris, pp. 184-35» wrote: The Methodists split in 1844 and the 
Baptist in 1845. The Presbyterians did not divide along completely sec­
tional lines until I86I, but the schism of 1837 was due, at least in part, 
to growing tensions over the slavery issue. That is not to say# of course, 
that the Northern and Southern church organizations thereby became impo­
tent; it was rather that they no longer retained the kind of institutional 
oommitments that transcended sectional interests and that might mediate 
in any way between the rospsctive Northern and Southern moral positions 
on slavery."
%enry T, Shanks, The Secession Movement in Virginia. 1847-1861 
(Richmond: Garrett and Hassie, Publishers, 1934J, p. 82.
%or a discussion of the death of the Whigs see Burns, pp. 58-61,
ijeorge H. Mayer, The Republican Party. 1854-1964 (Hew York:
Oxford University Press, 19&4), p. 70.
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The division of the Democratic party in the summer of I860 into 
Northorn and Southern m.ngs deprived the nation of the one remaining tie 
which held men of different localities and differing interests together 
for largei' national purposes. For the sake of party and the rewards of 
party victory men were willing to yield even a part of their convictions. 
The Democrats in Charleston, however, found that the convention system, 
the institution invented to engineer compromises, could no longer function 
since neither faction involved would advance concessions on either 
principles or candidates. The result, in the language of Nichols, was 
that
the Democrats destroyed the instrument of accomodation that they had 
used effectively for thirty years rather than exhaust is possibili­
ties, and in so doing they precipitated the catastrophe which was to 
follow. Their invention was smashed because a large faction, mainly 
from the South, found it no longer useful. The party must try some­
thing else to serve their purposes.
As a result, the pre-war national organizations were sabotaged by 
sectional feuds and divisions. Neither religious nor political organi­
zations were able to operate simultaneously in both sections.
Second, the friction between ths sections became intensified
before the nation was able to develop or strengthen other types of national
institutions and organizations. This made it less difficult for the
South to secede in I86l since there were both fewer and weaker national
ties to break. Elkins, in his study of the institution of slavery, points
out the potential value of such institutions.
There were no national universities to focus intellectual activity, no 
intellectual matrix within which the most pressing problems of ths day 
would have to be debated on national grounds and on their merits.
Roy F. Nichols, the Democratic Tarty Divided," in Tm  Crisis 
of the Union. 1860-186l. ed. George Harmon Knoles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 19^ 5), p. 50.
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There was no national focus of social and financial powen (the only 
possible American equivalent to a ruling class): no national vested 
business interest such as a national bank (the nearest approach to 
such a thing had beep smashed during the Jackson administration): no 
established mercantile axis powerful enough to resist a sectional 
movement: no seaboard social axis reaching from Boston to Charleston, 
whose vested loyalities might have gone deeper than local ones. There 
was no national bar which would, with its vested interest in standards, 
be forced to meet the legal complications of slavery in a national 
way. Indeed, there were not even sectional (to say nothing of na­
tional) abolition societies— no organization which carried anything 
ï'osembling power, or which lasted long enough to accomplish anything 
against slavery, Those that existed were contemptible in their 
importance.1
The growing sectional crisis witnessed the destruction of meaning­
ful and effective national organizations which would have provided a method 
of communicating feelings and intents from one section to the other. 
Furthermore, the path to sucession was cleared somewhat by the weakness or 
absence of other types of national organizations which would bind the 
sections together.
Destruction of Intersectional Channels of Communication.
The breakdown in Intersectional communication has already been 
discussed in Chapter TV, Because of the ideational differences and inter­
personal hostilities, a spokesman in one section was not likely to receive 
a fair hearing in the other section. This is not to say that the North 
refused to allow a Soutbsmer to speak within its states. Even a radical 
such as Tancey was permitted to campaign for Breckinridge in the North,  ^
The thesis, here, is that the ego-involved partisan would find it difficult 
if not impossible to assess objectively the message of the "enemy.”
•^ •Elkins, pp. 201-02,
2c'See Morwyn A. Hayes, "William L, lancsy Presents ths Southern 
Case to the North: I860." Southern Sneeo'" Journal. XXÎX (Sprinst. 196h), 
194-208.
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Furthermore, the intermediate spokesmen were unable to "interpret" 
the "true" motives of one section for the benefit of the other. Even a 
"neutralist" could not convince the partisans that they had a distorted 
perception of the goals and intentions of the alien spokesmen. The 
middle-B^ en would be open to the same charge of bias, prejudice, and 
propaganda that was hurled against the opposing rhetoricians.
In I860, consequently, extreme sectionalism had all but eliminated 
the remaining institutions so that they could no longer speak to both 
sections. In addition, the channels of communication were virtually 
closed by the intensification of the conflict.
The bipolarization in "the wings of the parties," therefore, was 
reflected within the ideational, interpersonal, and structural dimensions. 
The conflict had matured to the point that the two sections were present­
ing exclusive definitions of slavery and unionism; interpersonal bellig- 
eMncy became the norm in both sections; the structures of communication, 
both institutions and channels, fell victim to the disruptive influences 
of the sectional confrontation.
The Causes of Bipolarization in I860 
The qualitative and quantitative intensification of the conflict 
was the product of many influences, This discussion will consider (1) the 
specific impact of the campaign and election of i860 on bipolarization, 
and (2) the general effect of the influences within the anatomy of a 
conflict that encourage bipolarization.
The Campaign and Election of i860
The es^aign and election of Abraham Lincoln in i860 were signifi­
cant factors in the polarization of Northern, pro-unionists, and anti-
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slavery sentiment on one hand and Southern, anti-unionist, and pro- 
slavery thought on ths othsr, Ths prssidsntial campaign and slsction 
influenced the bipolarization process in two ways. First, the campaign, 
with its characteristic charges and counter-charges, reinforced attitudes 
as it exaggerated differences among the factions and minimized differences 
within the factions. The cançaign was one of a long series of confron­
tations which, through action and argument, accelerated the sectional 
crisis.
Second, the victory of Lincoln at the polls further reinforced 
the bipolarization phenomenon. In the North Lincoln's victory was wel­
comed as irrefutable confirmation of the righteousness of the anti-slaveiy, 
anti-Southern Cause. The first national victory of the Republican party 
infused that organization with the intoxication of triumph. Some of 
this spirit, in spite of the fact that the party rode to victory with 
less than forty-percent of the popular vote, was reflected in Lincoln's 
rigidity during the Crittenden compromise vote.^
In the South, meanwhile, the ascendancy of the sectional Repub­
lican party to national power was met with suspicion and despair.^ The
Many histoid.ans argue that the basic cause of the failure of the 
Crittenden compromise was the firm position taken by Lincoln against the 
compromise proposals which would allow the extension of slavery south of 
latitude 36 30'. This point was made by Allan Nevins to this writer in 
March, I966, in a private conversation, in Dallas, Texas.
2
Avery 0. Craven, "Why the Southern States Seceded," in The Crisis 
^f Dnion, ^560—l86l, p. 63, quoted the Reverend Benjamin M. Palmer as 
telling his people that the "Black Republican victory of November was 
incontrovertible proof of a diseased and dangerous public opinion all 
over the North, and a certain forerunner of further and more atrocious 
aggression,"
208
radicals, who had been threatening secession since as early as 1852, 
were gaining influence. Although the South still had control of the 
Senate and the Supreme Court, the threat or perceived threat of the 
Republican-controlled executive branch provided the agitators with the 
necessary opportunity, in the language of Yancey, "to strike the Southern 
heart," Furthermore, the failure of Lincoln to reassure the South during 
the critical period between his election and inauguration made the 
Southern conservatives helpless in their struggle with the radicals.^
The caH5)aign and election of i860, consequently, were among 
those momentous events which paved the way to secession, Th  ^effects of 
the campaign arguments and the results of the election combined to 
assist the bipolarization of nation issues that, in turn, set the North 
and South on a collision course.
Factors Within the Anatomy of a Conflict
The approach to a theory of rhetoric and compromise, formulated 
in Chapter IH, suggested that four processes are instrumental in 
deepening competition into conflict. All four factors, which serve to 
bipolarize a conflict, were present in the ante bellum struggle,
To begin with, communication between the radical rhetoricians 
in the oontrovery had at least two effects. First, extremism in one 
section produced extremism in the other section, Jaffa noted that "the
The role of Lincoln during tho campaign has been questioned by 
several historians. Since he failed to reassure the conservatives in the 
South of the true nature of his attitude toward slavery, the radicals in 
ths South were successiul in persuading the conservatives that Lincoln 
was as much an abolitionist as Garrison. In short, the argument suggests 
that Lincoln should have employed the strategy of disengagement during the 
campaign and after.
S^ee Chapter HI, pp. 91^ 96, for a discussion of these processes.
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extremes have a common interest against the mean. Calhoun’s political 
goal in 1850, the consolidation of southern nationalism, depended upon 
the enemy In the North, abolitionism,”'^ Ths St. Paul Pioneer aM Democrat 
was probably correct when it predicted that "the natural impulses of the 
Southern mind will be to meet Northern radicalism with the radicalism of 
ij^is own section,The interaction between the extremes, therefore, forced 
them both to take even more advanced positions in the conflict.
The second effect of the highly vocal extremists was felt on the 
perceptions of the moderates and conservatives. In I860, the extremists 
were perceived as representative of each of the sections by the population 
of the opposite section. Both North and South judged the opposing section 
by the excesses of the extremists of that section, Crenshaw, in his study 
of the Southern states in the i860 election, made this observation;
The student who has examined the mass of partisan mis-represen- 
tation which emanated from the principal actors in the drama of i860, 
cannot but reflect upon its vicious effects upon the welfare of the 
nation. The more rabid in each section avidly sought out for quo­
tation extremists’ expressions from the other section, where |t 
would do-the mM|t damage=or partisan good, Southemera.quoted the 
Liberator, the New York Tribune, and the Chicago Democratic ar 
authentic spolesnan of the entiw North, while the ululations of the 
Charleston Mercury or the Heiçhls Avalyioe were reproduced to stresgth= 
on the stereo-type of Southern society which was being presented to 
the Northern public. Calm voices were heard during the contest, but 
too often they were drowned in the furor. The gross misrepresenta­
tion bewildered when it did not mislead the voter of 1860.^
Whenever the moderates and conservatives became convihoed that 
the radical statoments in the opposing section were representative of
V, Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (New York; Doubleday 
and Co%any, Inc., 1959;, p. 50.
C^ited in Daily Missouri Democrat. October 31» I86O,
%llinger Crenshaw, The Slave States the Presidential Election
of I860 (Baltimore8 The Johns Hopkins Press, 19^5^7 pT'3^7 '
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that section's attitudes, they were more ^sceptible to the arguments of 
their uWTi radicals * ThuS, xn I860, the average Southerner perceived the 
abolitionist to be the spokesmen for the entire North; the average North­
erner perceived the fire-eaters to be the spokesmen for the entire South.
Second, moderates in both sections used the languages of the 
extremists in appealing to the extreme vote. The effect of such an attençt 
at assimilation in one section by the opinion leaders was to further 
convince the proponents in the other section that moderation was a false 
front to disguise radical intent.
In the North the more moderate anti-slavery spokesmen used the
language of the radical abolitionists. Cavanagh reported, in her study
of anti-slavery motivation in the Northwest, that
it is not difficult to find that the phraseology of the fervent 
abolitionist was easily transferred to the vocabulary of the anti­
slavery extensionist. The abolitionists* picture of the institution 
of slavery, his ingressions of the South as a section and of the 
slaveholder as a person were the very pictures which the Westerner 
adopted in this struggle for political control of the territories.
The radical language of Lincoln, a Westerner, had a damaging effect on his
image in the South. It became easy for Dixie to attach the abolitionist
label to Lincoln in spite of the fact that Lincoln was a moderate on the
slavery question. Catton and Catton wrote that
Lincoln's talk of conspirators and a house divided against itself had 
been a response to one of the oldest dilemmas of politics— that of 
the leader who plans to use the moderate approach when in office but 
resorts to immoderate language during the cançaign in the interests 
of getting elected.2
Helen H. Cavanagh, "Antislavery Sentiment and Politics in the 
northwest, 1844-lo60," (unpublished Ph.D. disseration, Department of 
History, University of Chicago, 1938), p. 46.
^Catton and Catton. r»n. 143=44.
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The same stereotyping effect occurred in the South as the
politicians attsjaptsd to out-flank each other by using radical language
in order to demonstrate the superior conformity to Southern norms.
Nichols reported that
in the frequent elections xdiich agitated the South, faction 
capitalized southern fears. Each rival sought to shew that 
the danger was great, that his opponents were incompetent to 
meet it, and that he alone could preserve, protect, and defend 
the Southland.^
The kind of language used by an opinion leader, whether it 
represents his real position or not, is selected by his enemies as 
representative of his "true" stance on an issue. Although the opinion 
leader may also use the language of the conservatives, this language 
will be screened out and not perceived by the enemies who wish to brand 
him with a radical image. On the other hand, the radical enemies lAo 
wish to make the opinion leader appear to be reactionary, will be able 
to perceive only his conservative language as the authentic representa­
tion of his "true" position. The Northern moderates, in the perceptions 
of the South, were identified with the radicals. The Southern moderates, 
in the perceptions of the North, were as extreme as the Southern radicals. 
In addition, the radical abolitionists in the North perceived Lincoln, one 
of their own moderates, to be more of a reactionary than he actually was 
because of the language he used in appealing to the conservative vote. The 
Southern radicals perceived Bell and the other Constitutional Unionists 
as "allies of the Black Republicans" beeaqse of their attempt to ^peal 
to conservatives in both sections of the country.
Third, the parties in a controversy may feel the need to take a
%oy Franklin Nichols, The Disruption of American Deaocracv (New 
York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 45.
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more radical position in order to improve their coapetitive bargaining 
positions. This will havs ths effect of increasing the distance between 
the parties in a qualitative sense, Zinn argued that "the abolitionists 
took an advanced position so that even if pushed back by canpromise, sub­
stantial progress would result."^  Many viewed the Southern threats of 
secession in i860 as a form of political blackmail in order to exact 
concessions out of the North. As Potter remarked, "whether or not 
Southerners distinguished between the threat of secession as a eaaqpaign 
device and the actual use of secession as a minority safeguard, they 
invoked it again in i860, perhaps more freely than ever before. That 
the South was bluffing both in the threat of secession and secession 
itself has been argued by many critics, both then and now. Historians 
who defend this interpretation contend that most of the people in the 
South did not want war; they just wanted to improve their bargaining
3
position and felt that secession was the only way to achieve the goal.
Finally, the moderates and conservatives in both sections were 
perceived to have supported the radicals in their respective sections 
because they Identified with the extremists on non-sectional issues. 
Dillon, in his study of the legaqy of the American abolitionists in the 
pre-war period, wrote:
^Howard Zinn, "The Tactics of Agitation," in Antlslaverv Vanguard: 
New Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin B. Duberman (Princeton;
Princeton University Press, 1965), p.
hotter, p. 3.
•a
-for a discussion of the historiography of Southern secession see 
Ralph A. Wooster, "The Secession of the Lower South: An Examination of
Changing Interpretations," Civil War History. V U  (June. I96I), 11?-2?.
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The large accession to antislavery society membership after 1835 
did not, in fact, result solely from a disposition to aid and elevate 
ths Negro. As Catherine Beecher observed at the time, a great many 
men either declared or implied that in joining the abolitionists 
"they were influenced, not ly their arguments, but because the 
violence of opposers had identified that cause with the question of 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and civil liberty.
The same defense of non-sectionsl issues was apparent in the . 
South since, as Nye mentioned, "the moderate Southerners might dislike 
the absurdities emanating from the 'positive good' school, and at the 
same time concede the slaveholders's right to protect and retain his 
property, his economic system, and his distinctive civilization, for it 
was his civilization, too."^
Although the non-radicals disagreed with the radicals on the 
questions of slavery and unionism, they were perceived by the opposing 
section to have agreed with the radicals on these issues because of their 
agreement with the radicals on other issues. In i860, consequently, many 
of the moderates and conservatives either identified with or were perceived 
to have identified with the extremists on crucial sectional issues because 
of their alliance on other issues.
Bipolarization in i860, therefore, was increased by the interact 
tion of such processes as sectional stereotyping, immoderate language, 
iEçrovement of bargaining positions, and identification with non-sectional 
issues. These factors, in combination with the ideological positions in 
the conflict, served to push the "vital centers" of the section into more 
radical positions.
“Merton L, Dillon, "The Failure of the American Abolitionists,"
The Joumal of Southern History. XXV (Hay, 1959), 173.
^Russel B. î^ e, Fettered Freedom? Cjyjl Liberties and the l^ayez? 
Controversy. 1830-1860 (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press,
1949), p. 251,
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The Effects of Bipolariâation ,i,n i860 
Since the fortunes of rhetoric and coniprcmise are linked together, 
the breakdown in one would be a sign of the disruption of the other. The 
failure of conçromise in the crisis of I860*»6l suggests that rhetoric, 
the necessary servant of compromise, was also underminded. This is not to 
say, however, that all rhetoric was ineffective. Two types of rhetoric 
were in deadly conflict. The rhetoric of reinforcement, represented by 
the abolitionists and political abolitionists in the North and the fire- 
eaters and nationalists in the South, was most successful in bipolarizing 
the conflict. The rhetoric of conciliation that sought to maintain the 
Union by pleading for sectional peace was, indeed, sabotaged. Both 
rhetoric and ultimately compromise, then, fell victim to the sectional 
confrontation. This discussion of the disruption of rhetoric and conçro- 
mise in I860 will consider the effect of bipolarization on the ideational 
and interpersonal dimensions as well as on the structures of negotiation 
and agreement.
Effect on the Ideational Dimension 
The political leaders and positions involved in ths pre-war 
controversy did not share the premises necessary for both conciliatory 
rhetoric and conpromise to function. Neither the sectional nor the neutral 
positions could sacrifice enough ground to provide the basis for a com­
promise on the issues of slavery ani unionism. Furthermore, no other 
superordinate goals existed which could bind the sections together.
Absence of Acceptable Values
Rhetoric of conciliation and cozpromiss, which thrive on over­
lapping values or premises, were ineffective in i860 because the sections
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did not share the same values on the two inçiortant issues of slavery and 
unionism. In additions the neutrals .mid not provide the necessary 
premises when approaching either one of the sections.
First, the Northern view lAlch held that a slave was "human" was 
countered by the Southern defense of slavery on the grounds that a slave 
was "chattel property," The two sections were not able to engage 
rhetorically in negotiation over the question of slavery the terri« 
tories because thuy failed to settle the dialectical question of the 
nature of a slave. The North argued that since a slave was huBum, 
slavery should be prohibited in the territories. The South contended 
that since a slave was property, a slave, as was true with any personal 
property, should be allowed in the territories, Douglas and Boll, who 
did not declare on the question of the nature of a slave, were unable, 
in either section, to supply the necessary promises. The Leavenworth 
Daily Times nut it this way. "Lincoln’s position advances Liberty ^  
cheeks Slavery, Breckinridge’s position advances Slavery and checks 
Liberty. There is no intermediate principle, no intervening power can 
harmonize the two."" The Daily Journal (Wilmii^ tona North Carolina.) 
printed the Southern version of the dichotony. "There is no half-way 
house between this principle and the reverse. He who is not in favor of 
the right must belong properly to the wrong. There are no half-breeds 
between truth and es^ or."^  Since the sectional values of "Liberty" and 
"Slaved’ were contradictoiy, and since there could be no "half-breeds" in 
the dispute, it would necessarily follow that no two opposing groups could
■^ The Leavenworth Daily Times. August 7. 1860, 
2.
"The Daily Journal (Wilmington, North Carolina), August 11, i860.
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share the same value or premise on slavaiy, The eonfrontation was dialec­
tical; it was not rhetorical.
The other ideational confrontation dealt with ths meaning of 
unionism. The immediate question of nullification or secession could not 
be settled until the nature of the Constitution could be agreed upon in 
both sections. The contractual view of the North conflicted directly 
i^th the conçactual view of the South, If the Northern argument were put 
into syllogistic form, it would include the following premises,
A contract is a permanent, binding agreement among parties.
The United States Constitution is a contract.
Therefore, the United States Constitution is a permanent, binding 
agreement.
If these premises were accepted then it would necessarily follow that 
nullification or secession were both ill%al and could not be tolerated 
by the other parties who signed the contract. The Southern form of the 
syllogism would read:
A conpact is a tei^ orary, non-binding agreement among parties.
The United States Constitution is a oospaot.
Therefore, the United States Constitution is a tenporary, non­
binding agreement.
If these premises were accepted, then it would follow that nullification 
or secession were legal since the nature of the agreement would allow a 
withdrawal from the compact at any time. The specific issues of nullifi­
cation, Southern rights, Southern nationalism, and secession turned on 
the nature of the Constitutional agreement, whether "contract" or "conpact," 
Because of this, ths Northern rhetoricians could not provide the necessary 
premises to the Southern audience; the Southey rhetoricians could not 
provide the essential premises to the Northern audience.
The confrontations between the sections over the values placed on 
slavery and unionism, consequently, became dialectical activities which
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were employed in search of philosophical or moral truths; they were 
not rhetorical activities which thrive on sTnedienriy in search of 
practical proposals.
These competitive values were made even more rigid as both 
sections sanctified and deified their positions. The injection of the 
moral issue Into the dispute, characteristic of the romanticism and 
evangelical religion of that day, further removed the conflict from the 
possibility of peaceful settlement. Thomas makes this point in his 
study of Theodore Weld, one of the abolitionists.
As long as slavery could be dealt with as a constitutional, an 
economic, or a political issue, there was always room for give and 
take. But as the North was won to the abolition view of slaveiy 
as a sin^  its resolve became more stubborn and more grim; for with 
sin one must not compromise. On the other hand, as more and more 
persons in the South were willing to believe that slavery and the 
Southern way of life were a positive good for all concerned, and that 
those who would disturb these things were evil bigots, then the 
South likewise became inflexible. With no further possibility of 
eoaproid.ae, war eame.^
The ideational conflict became more intense, then, as it was shot full of
moral coagjonents. As Craven argued, the sectional leaders had "lifted the
issues to the abstract level of right versus wrong and had thereby created
a situation with which the democratic process of toleration and compromise
could not deal. Only force would answer."^
The development of divergent values related to slavery and unionism
and the moralizing of the defense of those values by both sections led to
a situation in which conciliatory rhetoric was inoperative. Since a
rhetoric of conciliation failed because of a lack of mutually acceptable
■*3enjamin P= Thomas, Theodore Weld: Crusader for Freedom (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1950), p. 238.
^Avsry 0, Craven, An Historian and the Civil War (Chicago: Tlie 
University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 204.
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premises on slavery and unionism^  cdtpromis©, which also must share 
premises or values, likewise fell victim to the conflict.
Absence of Acceptable Goals
The relationship among rhetoric, compromise, and superordinate 
goals has been summarized in Chapter H  and IH. Even though parties in 
a dispute may possess different values or doctrines which are significant 
to a particular controversy, other premises, such as superordinate goals, 
may be relied upon by the rhetoricians seeking an accommodation. Two suck 
superordinate goals were present in I860 but, because of the intense and 
bitter sectionalism, were not powerful enough to be used as the basis of 
negotiation. These two premises were expansionism and a common enemy.
Expansionism
Stephen A, Douglas of Illinois sought to discover a working formula 
for the reconciliation of the alienated sections through the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty. This doctrine, which would provide a method of 
deciding the status of future territories and states, would encourage, 
Douglas hoped, the development of the territories. In short, Douglas 
wished, through expansion, to submerge factionalism in the melting pot 
of the Union. The revisionist interpretation of the role of Douglas in 
the ante bellum struggle emphasizes this concept in supplying Douglas' 
motivation in passing the controversial Kansas-Nébraska Aet.^ Jaffa
Thomas J. Pressly, Americans Interpret Their Civil War (Hew 
York: The Free Press, I965), pp. 298-99, reported that "while Hodder.
Hay and Beveridge were not in conplete agreement in their interpre­
tations of Douglas and his actions, they were all agreed that the 
evidence did not support Rhodes' severe criticism of Douglas's 
motives in sponsoring the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 18^ 4; the origins
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argued that
Douglas bslievsd that the organization of a new territory would 
rapidly result in new free states, would lead to an overwhelming 
preponderance of freedom over slavery in the Union a M  an absorp­
tion in the constructive task of filling aai building up the vast 
continental domain, a task which would so engage the energies of 
the nation as to leave the subject of slavery neglected and 
largely forgotten.
If this were the intent of Douglas, then his actions with 
regard to the Kansas-Nebraska issue and popular sovereignty represented 
an imaginative program for the reduction of intersectional strife.
Common Enemy
A. E. Cançbell, in his study of the effect of isolation on 
Civil War Causation, argued that the North and South were able to concen­
trate on their differences because neither were endangered by a foreign 
enemy.
The faot of American isolation is as indisputable as that of 
American democracy. Since the War of 1812, two political gener­
ations before the Civil War, thère had been no threat to the 
security of the United States. Even the War of 1812, though 
fought against a major European power and in the context of a 
great European struggle, was undertaken by Americans with curiously 
little calculation of what the international consequences of 
victory or defeat might be. That suggests ^ hat isolation had 
alraady sade its mark on American thinking.~
Since the nation was not threatened directly by any foreign power, little
if any reason existed to fear international hostilities. With the
absence of a common enemy, the sections were free to debate and fight
of this act they found not in the presidential ambitions of Douglas but in 
conditions prevailing in the Western states and territories in the I8$0's."
J^affa, p. 48.
2
A. E, Campbell, "An Excess of Isolation: Isolation and the
American Civil War " Journal of Southern History, XXIX (May, 1963),
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over their differences.
In 1861 William H. Seward, Lincoln’s Secretary of State and 
probably the leading Republican in the nation until the nomination of 
Lincoln at Chicago, attempted to exploit the "common enemy" method of 
conflict resolution, Seward proposed measures aimed at provoking war with 
several European powers. These measures, which were directed primarily 
against Great Britain, were designed, according to Jaffa, as a method of 
arousing "national feelings as a means to ending the secession crisis.
One can on3y speculate what the results might have been if a foreign 
country had inaugurated some kind of overt hostility against the United 
States during this period.
The gap between the North and South, consequently, had become so 
broad that the two sections did not share either values or goals. The 
sections had become hopelessly divided in their perceptions of the nature 
of slavery and unionism. Expansionism or a common enemy were incapable of 
providing a major point of agreement to be used by middle-sen in the en­
gineering of a ccsçromise. The ideational atmosphere was ripe for conflict; 
it was not conducive to oomromlse. Since both conciliatory rhetoric and 
cospromise operate from agreed upon premises, and since the mutual values 
or goals did not exist in the prelude to the war, that conflict was not 
amenable to a peaceful settlement.
Effect on the Interpersonal Dimension 
The notion that rhetoric and compromise also interact on the 
interpersonal level is defended in Chapter IH, Mutual trust and confi­
dence between the parties to a dispute or between those same parties and
J^affa, p. 82.
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a third party which has been brought in for mediation purposes, are
necessary ingredients for successful negotiation.
In the ante-bellum conflict, however, the ideational disputes were
so intense that personal hostility and bitterness were spawned by" the
confrontation. For exanyle, Hostettler, in his study of the Brcwnlow-
Pryne debate, held in Philadelphia in September of 1858, concluded that
the extremism of their expression could serve only to inflame 
sectional feeling further. Theirs was not the language of 
persuasion; it was the language of belligerenqy, designed to 
iBg)ress the faithful and to antagonize the eneny. It reflected 
the intensity of feeling, both South and North,^
The same feeling of hostility that characterized the two debaters in I858 
also existed among the national leaders as they faced each other in 
Congress during the months between Lincoln's election and the firing 
on Sumter. Host of the time was spent in bitter and personal attacks and 
diatribes against sectional enemies. One could hardly e3q>eet that 
effective bargaining could take place in an atmosphere such as that 
which prevailed during the secession crisis. While attacking person­
alities, the rhetoricians could not discuss issues.
Effect on the Structural Dimension 
Not only did bipolarisation effect the ideas and personal 
relations within the controversy, but it also destroyed the apparatus 
and channels of communication and negotiation. First, as has already 
been suggested in this chapter, the organizations and institutions 
which had served to provide the necessary machinery for negotiation
-Gordon F. Hostettler, "The Brownlow-Pryne Debate, September, 
I858," in Antislavery and Disunion. I858°l86l. ed. J. Jeffery Auer 
(Nsw York: Harper and Row, 19o3;, p. 2o.
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and sectional accommodation had been neutralized. Neither religious 
nor political organizations could claim national status and represen­
tation with any degree of validity. Even the United States Senate, 
which had long been the organization for the arbitration of sectional 
differences, was virtually helpless in the conflict.
Second, the channels of communication and mediation were elim­
inated in the perceptions of the highly ego-involved partisans. As one 
might expect, the spokesmen from one section were not capable of persua= 
ding the other section to conpromise. Even the most brilliant writer or 
speaker in the North could not persuade the Southern slaveholder to 
release his slaves or the Southern fire-eater to remain in the Union. 
Conversely, the most adept rhetorician in the South would have had 
considerable difficulty convincing the abolitionists of the merits of 
slavery or the Northern unionist of the advantages of secession.^
Furthermore, the spokesmen of the middle positions were unable 
to approach both of the sections with the same conpromise proposal.
Henry Clay and the other moderate leaders had been able, in I85O, to 
overcome extremism in both sections by marshalling enough support to 
pass the compromise measures. By I860, however, Clay was dead and the 
other moderate voices were not able to prevent the polarization that was
H^aynes, p. 208, pointed out that "Yancey's speaking in the North 
in the fall of i860 undoubtedly altered very few votes in November," Carl 
Schurz, radical spokesman for Lincoln, admitted that "ny speech at St, 
Louis, while gaining some votes for Lincoln, did not produce any visible 
effect upon the 'slave-holders of America.'" See Carl Schurz, The Remi­
niscences of Carl Schurz (New York: The McClure Co^any, 191?), H, 204.
In reaction to the Brownlow-Pryns debate, the Hew York Times. September 13, 
1838, wrote that it was of the opinion that "the discussion ... is not 
likely to influence public opinion . . . the question of the right and 
wrong of slavery Is already settled." See Hostettler, pp. 27-8.
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encouraged by radical elements in both North and South. "The North 
and South had now passed the point at which moderate utterances could 
have an emollient influence," reported Nevins, "if they pleased one side 
they seemed provocative to the other.Burns, in describing the i860 
election, suggested that "the moderate candidates had been ground to 
death between the two sectional ones; the compromisers had given way to
p
extremists. The center had been devitalized." Gerald M. Capers, a
recent biographer of Stephen A. Douglas, concluded that the
crisis of i860, in contrast to that of a decade earlier, ended in 
failure not because of the lack of a moderate leader with a plan, 
but because the majority in both sections which previously had 
supported compromise now rejected it. What made Douglas fail was 
what brought on the war. No one man, however great a leader, could 
have prevailed against the passions of 1861.3
The moderates, then, lacked the ability to mediate the dispute. The
sections could not communicate directly with each other; the sections
could not communicate through a third party; the third party could not
communicate with both sections at the same time. Mediation failed in
the crisis of I86O-I86I.
The fierce struggle between the sections, reflected on both the
ideational and Interpersonal levels, was also manifested in the undermining
of the structures of communication and negotiation. The spokesmen of both
sectionalism and moderation lacked the ideas, spirit, and machinery
necessary for a meaningful settlement.
Kevins, The Emergence of Lincoln. 107.
?Burns, p. 65.
3
Gerald M. Capers, Stephen A. Douglas : Defender of the Onion 
(Boston; Little Brown and Com)any, 1939T,lp7 225-
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Conclusion
The failure of the rhetoricians to mediate the sectional 
dispute marked the breakdown in the factors necessary for compromise. 
The ideational gap between the sections could not be bridged; the 
Interpersonal bitterness stood in the way of any significant negotia­
tion; the lack of effective structures of communication and mediation 
transferred the settlement to the battlefield.
CHiPTBR VII 
CONCLUSION
Over one hundred years ^ter the firing on Sumter plunged 
this nation into the most costly war in its history, critics are still 
attesting to unravel the causes of the sectional war. _ The basic 
questions raised by the Civil War, however, are not peculiar to that 
particular controversy in that particular century. Any time a con­
troversy becomes intensified certain factors and influences develop 
which are common, in varying degrees, to all types of conflict 
situations.
This study has sought to isolate some the variables within 
the anatomy of a conflict as they are represented in a contemporary 
theoretical construct and the ante helium historical context, The 
purpose of this concluding chapter is (l) to briefly summarize this 
study of conflict, rhetoric, and compromise and (2) to suggest areas 
futurs rsss&Pch.
Summary of this Dissertation
This study has been divided into two parts. The first part, 
represented by Chapters II and III, endeavored to  devise an interdisci­
plinary approach to a theory of the rhetoric of conflict and cospromise. 
In integrating the fields of h istory , political science, rhetoric, and
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the behavioral sciences, this disseration has attempted to provide an 
eclectic basis for an examination of haman behavior tmder confliot 
conditions.
This approach to a study of human interaction has been influenced 
significantly by the social judgment-involvement approach to attitude and 
attitude change, a scientifically-derived construct from the behavioral 
sciences. This paradigm, based on the concepts of perception-judgment 
and ego-involvement, has been applied in the oontext of intra- and inter­
group relations and In the development of a conteaporary theory of 
riietoric. Social judgment affects the study of group relations by 
considering the impact of ego-involvement on intragroup rigidity and 
intergroip hostility. Social judgment influences a oontegporary 
theory of rhetoric by defining the kinds of reactions audiences will 
make to cosmsunioations under the conditions of high ego-involvement.
The investigation into the nature of social conflict that is 
found in this disseration has centered on three basic relationships.
First, the relationship between conflict and eonpromise, based 
in part on the writings of Kenneth Boulding, has been delineated. 
Conflict, defined as a situation in tdiich the parties involved compete 
for the same behavioral space and, in doing so, attack the competitor, 
is amenable to eonpromise only if the parties possess or perceive that 
they possess shared values or goals. Furthermore, the mere existence 
of jointly-held promises does not guarantee that coj^ romise will result. 
The parties engaged in the conflict must utilize the means of discovering 
areas of agreement before an accomodation may be reached.
Second, Chapters II and HI diseuss the relationship between 
high ego-involvement and human conflict. Whenever the participants in
a conflict become extremely ego-involved in their positions, they tend to 
adopt an "all-or-nothing” syndremie and. as a result, are ineulstsd 
against eosproaise proposals. This process becomes even more intensi­
fied if the protagonists sanctify and deify their positions on moral 
grounds. As the parties pull further and farther apart, the conflict 
becomes bipolarized as the power centers occupy the wings and deny the 
existence of middle-ground or the influence of middlemen. The opposii^  
points of view disengage theselves as far from their “eneaçr” as 
possible. This disengagement will be reflected in the develt^ment of 
diehotomous Ideational positions, the intensification of interpersonal 
hostilities, and the disruption of the structures and channels of negotia­
tion and communication.
Third, the rhetoric of conciliation and co#romise are interrelated 
in that they both operate from shared premises; interact on an interpersonal 
as well as ideational dimension; and function through both structures of 
me<^ation and avenues of communication. The success or failure of eonpro­
mise will be reflected, consequently, in the success or failure of 
rhetoric as a process in the.lattlament of disputes. Under high ego- 
involvement, however, a rhetoric of attitude reinforcement may be 
quite successful in either intensifying or prolonging the dispute.
The purpose of this analytical model, based on these three 
relationships, is to locate the point at which a confrontation becomes 
an "irrepressible conflict" and is no longer amenable to a peaceful 
settlement. Whenever the parties in a controversy no longer share salient 
values or goals; view each other through an atmosphere of hatred and
and lack the necessary apparatus or mediation, that conflict
cannot be served effectively by the rhetoiric of conciliation nor can it
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ba resplv^ through eonpromise. This seems to show, as Carl Becker has 
said, that
go-emmsnt by discussion works best when there is nothing of profound 
inportance to disouss, and when there is plenty of time to discuss 
it. The party system works best when the rival programs involve the 
superficial aspects rather than the fundamental structure of the 
social system, and majority rule works best #ien the minority can 
meet defeat at the polls in good tenper because they need not 
regard the decision as either a permanent or a fatal surrender of 
their vital interests.^
The second part oi this study, found in Chapters 17, V, and 71, 
«perijq>oses this theoretical construct on the I860 ante bellum contro­
versy as the Inerieans of that generation did, indeed, "fail to talk 
out their differences." Chapter 17 concentrated on the unique back­
ground of the I960 presidential election by considering the hlstorioal, 
political, social and cultural, and rhetorical factors which permeated 
that atmosphere. These bacl^ round factors influenced the development of 
a spirit of sectionalism in viewing problems and a spirit of irrationality 
in attempting to solve these problems.
By i860 the two sections. North and South, had fomulated and 
popularised divergent ideational positions on the questions of slavery 
and. unionism. To the North a slave was "human"; the Union was a 
"contract." To the South a slave was "property the Union was a 
"coBpact." Since these ideologies were mutually sxclusiv®, a middle- 
ground did not exist in their perceptions. Furthermore, the conflict 
was characterized by intense sectional animosity which turned fors^ r 
friems into deadly enemies. Not only were they unable to communicate 
directly with one another, but they also were unable to 002“"’“’ ^
—  in Ssnneth M. Stamp (ed, ), Causes of the Civil War
(Englewood Cliffs, Nsw Jersey: Prsntiae-Sall, Inc., I965), p. 150.
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each other through a third party. Finally, the existing organist ions 
of mediation and channels of communication were sabotaged by the idea­
tion^ and interpersonal sectionalism. short, the conflict had been 
captivated by extremist elements who lacked not only the means and method 
of a peaefhl settlement but also lacked a desire to compromise.
areas for Future Research
The dualistio nature of this disseratation is also reflected in
the recommendations for future research. First, more research needs
to be done in the foiaatlon of a contemporary theory of conflict and
eonfliot resolution. In order to aceonplish this objective the
theorist must be able to draw upon the cogent material from many
disciplines. This point has been made by McNeil when he wrote:
That social science cannot "pull itself together" to meet the 
challenge of the nuclear age is distressing, but disciplinary 
narrowness has had an even more important facet. Teaching, 
training, and orientation to the close quarters of a single 
discipline has acted to prevent the appearance of new approaches 
to global problems, since one must break the bonds of past 
experience even to think in other than familiar patterns,^
The ability to "think in other patterns," eonsaqnantly; i? necessary
if a theory of human behavior in confliot situations is ever to be
developed. New insights from the integrated disciplines need to be
considered and, if possible, tested within authentic situations. As
the repercussions from human conflicts become more and more severe, the
fate of the world may very well hand on the ability of responsible parties
to understand the nature of conflict and its resolution.
Second, the approach to conflict and compromise, found in this
study, may be applicable to other kinds of historical contexts. For
^ELton B. M#eil, The Nature of Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentiee-Hall, Inc., 1^577 p. 19%.
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exaiçlep one might profit from some of these insights in the exploration 
of sneh eontroversies as the role of British propaganda in the prelude 
to World War I, the conflict over the League of Nations, or, in more 
modem times, the confrontations over race, religion, economics, and 
politics. In short, this analytical model in whole or in part may 
provide the critic with at least one way of viewing any dispute, con= 
temporary or hlstorioal.
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